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DYNAMICS OF INTERACTION
BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

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The PhD program Political Studies (POLS) (30th cohort) stems from the collaboration of four Universities, namely Università degli Studi di Pavia, Università degli Studi di Milano, Università degli Studi di Genova and Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. The University of Milan serves as the administrative headquarters and provides the facilities for most teaching activities.

Abstract.

Political parties and social movements are two of the most relevant actors in politics, despite this, their relations have attracted a moderate interest among the scholars. Thus, in a time when political parties look for new ways to connect with the citizens that do not trust them anymore, while social movements are approaching to institutional politics, their relationship is even more relevant than ever to understand upcoming political and social events. Therefore, this thesis explores the relationship between political parties and social movements. In particular, it focuses in the dynamics of the elements capable of altering the type of relationship existing between them. Using the method known as “analytic narratives” it investigates the story of the interactions between political parties and social movements in the cities of Milan and Barcelona. First it gives a coherent form to the events occurred around the local elections of both cities, and highlights the key actors and some crucial elements for those interactions. Secondly, through game theory tools it analyses these elements to observe their role in shaping the type of relationship that is establish between political parties and social movements.

I partiti politici e i movimenti sociali sono due degli attori più rilevanti della politica, nonostante ciò, le loro relazioni hanno attratto un moderato interesse tra gli studiosi. Così, in un momento in cui i partiti politici cercano nuovi modi di connettersi con i cittadini che non li affidano più, mentre i movimenti sociali stanno avvicinando alla politica istituzionale, il loro rapporto è ancora più importante che mai per comprendere i prossimi eventi politici e sociali. Pertanto, questa tesi esplora la relazione tra partiti politici e movimenti sociali. In particolare, si concentra sulle dinamiche degli elementi in grado di alterare il tipo di relazione esistente tra di loro. Usando il metodo conosciuto come “analytic narratives”, esamina la storia delle interazioni tra partiti politici e movimenti sociali nelle città di Milano e Barcellona. In primo luogo dà una forma coerente agli eventi accaduti nelle elezioni locali di entrambe città ed evidenzia gli attori chiavi e gli elementi cruciali per queste interazioni. In secondo luogo, attraverso gli strumenti di teoria dei giochi, analizza questi elementi per osservare il loro ruolo nella definizione del tipo di relazione che si stabilisce tra partiti politici e movimenti sociali.

Declaration.

I hereby certify that this Ph.D. dissertation, presented for examination at the University of Milan/ NASP, is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.

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Simplicity is a great virtue but it requires hard work to achieve it and education to appreciate it. And to make matters worse: complexity sells better.

Edsger W. Dijkstra

Social movements are at once the symptoms and the instruments of progress.
Ignore them and statesmanship is irrelevant; fail to use them and it is weak.

Walter Lippmann

A social movement that only moves people is merely a revolt. A movement that
changes both people and institutions is a revolution.

Martin Luther King Jr.

Acknowledgments

Writing a dissertation is always a complex process for any Ph.D. candidate, since it changes your mind, your beliefs and the own conception of what can be known and the ways we can know it. My case is not different. When I look back I see another person who started this dissertation. I see an endeavour that has transformed me. However, this evolution has not been done alone, as a lot of people accompanied me in this journey and made it possible. It is impossible to thank to all of them and their contributions here, nevertheless I would not be fair to myself if I no would mention some persons in particular.

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List of acronyms.

BeC	Barcelona en Comú
CiU	Convergència i Unió
Cs	Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía
CUP	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular
DS	Democratici di Sinistra
ENE	Entesa dels Nacionalistes d'Esquerra
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
EUiA	Esquerra Unida i Alternativa
ICV	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds
ICV-EUiA	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa
IU	Izquierda Unida
MA	Movimento Arancione
PAH	Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca
PCC	Partit dels i les Comunistes de Catalunya
PD	Partito Democratico
PP	Partido Popular
PSC	Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña
PSUC	Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña
SXM	Sinistra per Milano

Chapter One.

Introduction.

Presenting reality in a simple way making things more comprehensible and clear should be the goal of any academic work. Therefore, at a time when political parties have lost their connection with citizens and social movements increase their relevance in institutional politics, this dissertation aims to present the relationship between these actors in a simple and compressible way. Due to its relevance, this is an interaction that deserves to be studied from several points of views. Hence, this dissertation tries to advance in the understanding of its aspects, focusing specifically on the discovery of the diverse elements that affect the relationship modifying it from one type to another. To pursue the study of this matter, an unusual methodological approach is used, which enable us to answer questions that are still unknown. The use of “analytic narratives” provides a framework to explore the consequences of some elements over the various types of relationships between political parties and social movements theorized by Michael Hanagan (1998). Thanks to this method it is possible to bring elements to light that were not seen as relevant previously, and examine their role for this relationship. To obtain the required data for the analysis, this approach will be used to study the events of interaction between political parties and social movements in the cities of Milan and Barcelona around the local elections of 2010 and 2015-16. The ultimate expectation of this work is to contribute to the gap in the knowledge about two of the most fundamental actors in politics. This chapter will outline the content of this dissertation, as well as the academic process that guided this study.

1.1 Background of the study.

Political parties and social movements have been thoroughly studied by scholars -for instance, (Kriesi, 2015)(Kitschelt, 1993)(Rohrschneider, 1993). Their functions, their activities and their internal organization are all examples of matters that have been studied deeply, showing that both are crucial actors in

political science and political sociology. Their relationship is presented, thus, as an essential component to understand nowadays politics. However, little has been written about the interaction between these actors despite them being essential to understand politics. How is this relationship, what are the meanings for politics, which are the elements that affect it, and which are the various types of that interaction, all these, are questions that have not been fully answered yet.

Political parties have dominated institutional politics since their beginnings (Ware, 1996). They essentially started by people with similar ideas sitting together, becoming groups which compete for getting citizens' support, and finally being established as the actors around which the whole political system revolves (Scarrow, 2006). However, even though parties are still the central actors of the political arena, their position is less preeminent than before and nowadays they have to share their role with other actors, specifically social movements (Della Porta, 2015). Authors such as Robert Michels (1999), Duverger (1963), Sartori (2005), Panebianco (1988), Kirchheimer (1966), or Katz and Mair (1995), have studied the structure of political parties and shown how these structures affect the parties' behaviour in great detail. These authors have focused on how political parties have adapted internally to social changes, e.g. through the introduction of universal enfranchisement, the development of the mass media, or the expansion of the middle class. Their studies have shown how during the 20th century, political parties have changed from cadre parties, to mass parties and then to catch-all parties. Finally, so-called cartel parties developed in an attempt to operate in the new environment in the most efficient way. However, nowadays, political parties have a different relationship with citizens and consequently do not have the same structures than before. In a different social context where politicians are negatively perceived by big parts of the citizens¹, parties need other actors to keep mediating between institutions and civil society (Donatella Della Porta & Chironi, 2015). Hence, albeit we live in a time in which several kinds of parties exist at the same time, the today's most-common type of political party's structure includes new elements from outside

¹ Surveys such the Eurobarometer or the European Social Survey show that is not a phenomenon restricted to a single country or linked to particular events.

the party. Nowadays, political parties are lead by a reduced number of members (Farrell & Webb, 2000), but at the same time undergo a process hybridization (Lobera, 2015) (Schoonmaker, 1988). This means that in certain tasks traditionally performed by political parties, such as the mobilization of voters, external actors like social movements have now a more relevant role (Gomez Ribas, 2010).

Social movements are networks of mobilized actors to influence political decision-making through various forms (Pfister, 2016). The ways of influencing have changed during history, based on the context and the necessity to optimize their capacity of influence. And although social movements do not have the control over public institutions, their influence on the long-term power balance, - exemplified by movements such as feminism or the environmentalism- is undeniable (Pfister, 2016). As such, social movements are not just secondary actors but a different way for citizens to participate and influence politics by using other channels than political parties. Thus, as citizens feel further distant from political parties -as the surveys confirm-, they look for other ways to participate in politics, and social movements are one way to do so. Traditionally focused on producing changes on a particular issue, some social movements now also jump to institutional politics making this explanation more fuzzy (Iglesias Turrión & Monedero, 2011). Social movements use citizens' trust in them, which is higher than that in political parties², to arise as crucial actors for understating Western politics.

The story behind the relationship between both actors goes back to the very first moment of the appearance of social movements (Tilly, 2004). Traditionally political parties have been the targets of social movements demands, trying to influence parties' behaviour. This influence is so relevant that entire families of European parties owe their existence to the previous decisions of some movements (Piccio, 2016). Of course, this influence is not unidirectional, as political parties have also used social movements to forward their interest, either to win elections or using movements' capacity to introduce issues to the

² According to the numbers of the previous surveys. For more information see Chapter Two.

public agenda, which could be useful for the parties. This interaction created a relationship with enormous influence on every-day politics. Despite its crucial role for understanding politics, the attention dedicated to studying this interaction it is still low. Notable exceptions are the works of Daniela Piccio (2016) and Andrew Appleton (1994) which determine moments in which the interaction is especially likely to happen; the ways the interaction between parties and movements takes place (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015); and the topical areas in which social movements mostly interact with parties (Rohrschneider, 1993).

1.2 Statement of the purpose.

The purpose of this work is not to study political parties or social movements as independent actors, but to study their interaction. More specifically, the objective is to investigate the elements that affect their type of interaction. To do so, the dissertation will follow the various types of interaction between political parties and social movements created by Michael Hanagan (1998). Hanagan created a classification of various types of relationships between political parties and social movements based on the intensity of collaboration between them. However, up to now the elements that are able to affect these relationships with enough strength to alter their type are still unknown. Moreover, we neither know how these elements need to look like to affect the types of relationship. This creates a gap in the knowledge about the interaction between two of the key political actors that this dissertation tries to address.

To discover more about these elements, a thorough knowledge about the events connected to the interaction between parties and movements is essential. Thus, along with the revision of various kinds of documents, in-depth interviews will be conducted with the actors involved in these kinds of interactions. These interviews are crucial, as these actors, due to their particular position in the events, have unique knowledge of what really happens in an environment traditionally restricted for external observers. The events between left parties and social movements in the cities of Milan and Barcelona will provide the data, which will be analysed with the tools of game theory to test their relevance and impact for the type of relationship.

1.3 Research question.

As an academic work, the purpose of this dissertation is to discover more about the relationship between political parties and social movements, and follows the aim of answering a question that is still without response. In particular, the question guiding this research is:

How do certain elements affect the type of relationship between political parties and social movements?

This research question can be fragmented into the following sub-research questions:

- *Which elements affect the type of relationship between political parties and social movements?*
- *How can these elements influence the strategic choices of the political parties and social movements in their interaction?*
- *How do the dynamics of interaction between political parties and social movements change when the elements assume different configurations?*

In addressing these questions this work will firstly try to identify the key elements that influence the relationship between political parties and social movements in the study of the events of Milan and Barcelona. Secondly, this research will analyse the way in which these elements influence the relationship. And finally, to comprehend which consequences the various configurations of these elements have for the type of relationship between political parties and social movements.

This dissertation has certain expectations. The first expected finding is the existence of a coherent story in all studied events, allowing us to understand what happened and under which circumstances. The second expected finding is the demarcation of the key actors able to produce variations in the outcomes. The third finding is the definition of the crucial relations between the actors. Once all of the above is revealed, it is expected to identify certain elements,

which due to their configuration are able to produce alterations in the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. Likewise, it is also expected that these elements will have an influence on the actors creating incentives to be more or less collaborative. Finally, it is expected that the alterations in these elements alter also the incentives and the behaviour of the actors.

1.4 Overview of methodology.

Choosing the right methodology is capital for any academic work, as each methodology provides specific tools capable of answering certain types of questions. Thus, being the goal of this research to analyse the existence and influence of key elements on the relationship between political parties and social movements, and considering that this interaction is partially an unknown territory, it is advisable to face the first contact with this lack of knowledge with qualitative tools. Since we combine exploratory qualitative gathering with a straightforward analysis of actors and their relationship, analytic narratives appears as the optimal choice of method. Analytic narratives is an approach that combines two parts: the systematically presentation of a series of events on the one hand, with the analysis using game theory tools on the other hand. In the words of one of the founders of this approach, Margaret Levi, this combination of tools is based on the fact that “in order to understand instances of institutional origin and change, analytic narrativists insist on the combination of deep knowledge of the case and an explicit theoretical model” (2002, p108). Thus, the main goal of every work that uses analytic narratives is to highlight the key elements that have a relevant role for the outcomes of the studied phenomena. To do so, it is crucial to recognize the key actors, their choices in the crucial moments, the interactions between them and the consequences of every choice they make. Assuming actors display rational behaviour, it is possible to understand their choices based on their preferences and to make predictions about what happens in case of the alteration of the actors’ preferences. The purpose of the first part of the research, the narrative, is to extract the “key players, their goals, and the features of the environment that influence actors’ behavior (especially the rules of interaction, the constraints, and the incentives)

from narratives of social episodes” (Asquer, 2014, p80). Hence, the narrative part is crucial for “sorting out what matters for what” (Levi, 2002 p111), because only once the elements are specified, they can be analysed in the second part. Therefore, it is thanks to the first part and its tools (interviews, documents, journals...) that it is possible to propose a series of elements whose relevance will be observed. In the present work, we are specifically looking for the elements that are capable of altering the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. In the second part –the analytical one-, the analysis of these elements will be conducted using the tools provided by game theory, in particular the extensive-form games. With the help of these games it is possible to show the strategic interactions of the actors involved, the sequence of actions ordered after key moments in which actors face a critical choice. Game theory allows the analysis of actors’ choices and the consequences of these choices for the type of relationship that exists between the actors. That is, we can study the influence of every key element on the decisions of the actors and through it the alterations of their term of collaboration.

Since analytic narratives drinks from the observation of actual cases, the events that occurred in the cities of Milan and Barcelona around the local elections were chosen, as they offer very interesting insights for the studies of this dissertation. The choice was based on the existence of a notorious interaction between political parties and social movements in both cities. On the one hand, in Milan, the centre-left coalition formed mainly by the Partito Democratico and Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, sustained an important collaboration with a movement called Movimento Arancione. This movement born from another social movement dedicated to fight for a quality public education in Milan that wanted to have more influence in the city’s politics, and consequently organize them in the Movimento Arancione. The influence of the Movimento Arancione over the parties was so strong that the movement was able to assert their candidate of the coalition for the local elections -Giuliano Pisapia- over the rest of preferred candidates by the biggest party in the coalition, the Partito Democratico. On the other hand, in Barcelona, the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, a social movement dedicated to fight against the home evictions suffered by thousands of

citizens during the economic crisis, had a crucial role in the local elections of 2015. The members of this movement led a political project named Barcelona en Comú that was able to include several political parties and finally won the elections, leading to one of the movement's activists, Ada Colau, to become mayor of Barcelona.

1.5 Assumptions and definition of terms.

To conduct this study the following assumptions were made:

1. Regarding the nature of the actors, all actors involved in the study will be considered to behave as rational actors trying to maximize their benefit with each choice they have.
2. It is assumed that the interviewed will answer truthfully and accurately to the interview questions. Answers will be based on their personal experience, and their professional knowledge.
3. It is assumed that Barcelona en Comú acts as a coherent actor in the interactions with other actors, despite being formed by several actors with their own particular interests.
4. The term "social movement" will be understood in a broad sense. As such, it will include both, social movements with a permanent or sporadic organization, and those without an organizational structure. This implies that associations with political activity or civic movements with some social relevance in politics, e.g. by preparing an electoral list, will also be treated as social movements.
5. The terms "actors" and "players" are going to be understood interchangeably, specifically for the purpose of game theory.

Some additional assumptions will be made in the analytical chapter, specifically regarding the nature of the actors in the game theory models and regarding the specific treatment of certain actors in a defined particular context.

1.6 Organization of the dissertation.

The thesis consists of seven parts: 1. Introduction, 2. A view of the interaction between political parties and social movements, 3. Methodology, 4. The case of the city of Milan, 5. The case of the city of Barcelona, 6. The analysis of the elements highlighted in the previous cases, and 7. Conclusions.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to set the scene for the thesis by describing its overall context, including aims, objectives, and a brief presentation of the used methodological techniques. Chapter Two presents the two actors who are the object of study in this dissertation: political parties and social movements. It will review the role these actors have for the citizens, the existence of a relevant interaction between them for politics, and the scarce relevant literature about this interaction. As analytical narrative is not a frequent methodological paradigm, it is described in detail in Chapter Three, along with the explanation of the reasons for this choice. Furthermore, the techniques used to collect the data for the study and the way the data is posteriorly treated, are clarified there too. In Chapters Four and Five the two cases involving the events occurred in the cities of Milan and Barcelona are presented. Thus, Chapter Four displays the events happened between the Partito Democratico and the Movimento Arcione around the local elections in Milan. In this part of the dissertation it is possible to find a coherent explanation of the historical events that performed the current situation between both actors, along with the elements that affected their relationship. Chapter Five displays the events happened in the city of Barcelona leading up to the creation of Barcelona en Comú as well as its internal and external relations. By making use of the narrative, the actors and their choices are presented to make it easier to observe the crucial elements that have influence on the definition of the type of relationship between the various actors in the Barcelona case. Chapter Six presents the elements extracted from the two narratives, which can have a potential incidence on the type of relationship that political parties and social movements adopt. It analyses the role of these elements and the impact in the

relationships. Finally, the Conclusion offers a summary of the dissertation and highlights the potential of the analysed elements to explain several interactions between political parties and social movements. Moreover, it underlines the existence of opportunities of further research in the field of interaction between political parties and social movements.

Chapter Two.

The interaction between political parties and social movements.

This chapter is focused on the relationship between the two main elements of this dissertation: political parties and social movements. The aim is to go further in the knowledge about their place in the political arena, their relevance for the citizens and the interaction between them as well as the potentials of that interaction. Notwithstanding both are crucial elements in the study of politics and a lot has been written about political parties and about social movements, it is important to notice that their mutual relationship has not produced many pages in the academia even if those entities share part of their space. Researchers have traditionally allocated political parties and social movements into two different and independent fields, creating almost a barrier between them. The consequence of that division is that the majority of authors of each topic did not see the other element as a crucial part of their studies, and the result was that they ended overlooking that relationship in their works. A situation that happened both for political parties' scholars that have considered social movements as a second-level element in politics; as for "social movement scholars who tend to see movements everywhere, but do not connect them to political parties" (Kriesi, 2015, p.667).

Political parties and social movements share the same ambit of activities: the *res publica*; in particular, the public debate about common matters. Therefore, we cannot expect to understand how politics really works without taking in consideration both elements. Thus, meanwhile political parties have been traditionally considered as the way to transform societies from within institutions, social movements have been considered the way to transform societies from without. But this approach placed social movements almost outside the boundaries of politics, in the field of private demands. However, nowadays "social movements constitute an essential element of normal politics

in modern societies, and that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics” (Goldstone, 2003,p.2)

Currently, political parties are experiencing important credibility issues. Their way to act is not acceptable anymore by a part of the citizens, who reject their representation³ (Iglesias Turrión & Monedero, 2011). The numbers of several European surveys⁴ show that citizens do not longer trust political parties, confirming that the voters see them as a foreign element. Hence, even if political parties keep an important role on politics, its position is less central than in the past (Donatella Della Porta, 2015). Moreover, talking about people being involved in politics, now “there is a perception that parties are ‘damaged goods’ as participatory vehicles” (Jordan & Maloney, 2007, p.2). In fact, “fewer individuals now enact political roles as loyal party members, preferring instead to participate via non-partisan single-issue groups” (Farrell & Webb, 2000, p.123). Furthermore, social movements are more appreciated than political parties by the citizenry not just as an element to fight for a specific goal, but as a social resource itself. Thus, social “groups are seen as democratically valuable in offering more effective representation (than parties) and hence securing overall public policy that better ‘fits’ citizens’ preferences” (Jordan & Maloney, 2007, p.2).

Parties and movements interact because both are immersed in the same environment and they need each other to achieve their purposes. On the one hand, if social movements want to obtain institutional changes, they need political parties support them to get it. In fact, social movements are so linked to the other public actors that for authors like J. Goldstone (2003, p.2) “we cannot study movements independently of their political context”. On the other hand, political parties cannot ignore the relevance of social movements as mobilizer and agenda-setters, especially in those moments were citizens are turning their

³ The *15-M* movement in Spain is an example of that when they sing: ¡Que no! ¡Que no! ¡Que no nos representan! [No! No! They do not represent us!].

⁴ European Social Survey, Eurobarometer, British Social Attitudes, Barometro Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, General Social Survey (ALLBUS)...

back to parties. Here again Goldstone (2003, p.2) believes that is not possible to understand current political parties “without understanding their intimate and ongoing shaping by social movements”. This relationship between political parties and social movements is of such importance for politics that Hanspeter Kriesi believes that “some social movements have the capacity to fundamentally transform individual parties and entire party systems” (2015, p.668).

2.1 Public perceptions of political parties.

As said before, nowadays political parties have significant problems to connect with citizens and they are seen more as a problem than as a solution. They have been widely criticized for their oligarchic structure in the past by authors like Robert Michels (1999). But lately, it seems that there is a substantial lack of confidence from citizens towards them and their activities that are considered self-interested if not even corrupt⁵. Thus, for the prestigious and awarded author Hanna Pitkin,

Our governors have become a self-perpetuating elite that rules –or rather, administers– passive or privatized masses of people. The representatives act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them. We send them to take care of public affairs like hired experts, and they are professionals, entrenched in office and in party structures. Immersed in a distinct culture of their own, surrounded by other specialists and insulated from the ordinary realities of their constituents’ lives, they live not just physically but also mentally ‘inside the beltway’⁶. (Pitkin, 2004, p.339).



It is a widespread feeling between some authors that political parties have detached themselves from civil society in their gradual approach towards institutions (Donatella Della Porta, 2015), worrying more about how to reach

⁵ For instance, by groups like *Occupy* or the *Indignados* Movement.

⁶ "Inside the Beltway" is an American idiom used to characterize matters that are, or seem to be, important primarily to officials of the U.S. federal government, to its contractors and lobbyists, and to the corporate media who cover them—as opposed to the interests and priorities of the general U.S. population. Source: The Legal English Dictionary.

those institutions and how to keep it, than for the people they should represent. If so, political parties are not able to present themselves as trustful actors capable to act as linkage between citizens and institutions because those citizens do not feel connected to parties anymore. Donatella Della Porta and Daniela Chironi (2015) blame the behaviour of political parties for having “caused the interactions between political parties and civil society to short-circuit” (p.65). And this feeling of “decline in the capacity of parties to act as mediators between public institutions and civil society” (Della Porta & Chironi, 2015) is widely spread among different countries. As the numbers of the Eurobarometer⁷ [see table 1] show, 78% of European citizens tend to not trust political parties.

Table 1. Trust in political parties.

		Tend to trust		Tend not to trust		Don't know
		Aut. 2015	Diff. Aut. 2015 - Sp. 2015	Aut. 2015	Diff. Aut. 2015 - Sp. 2015	
EU28		15	-1	78	0	7
EURO AREA		14	-1	79	0	7
NON-EURO AREA		16	-1	76	-1	8





Source⁸: data taken from Standard Eurobarometer 84 2015 (p. 52).

The situation is even more severe in some big –in terms of population- European countries like the United Kingdom (81%), Italy (81%), Spain (86%) and France (88%) where numbers of lack of trust are higher than the average [see table 2]. But not just that, the numbers also show us that in all these big European countries -apart from United Kingdom- less than one person in ten tends to trust political parties. Showing clearly that in those countries political parties have lost the capacity to act in the name of citizens, who not believe them anymore.

⁷ Standard Eurobarometer 84 Autumn 2015.

⁸ Unless otherwise specified, the source of the figures and tables correspond to the author of the dissertation.

Table 2. Trust in political parties by countries.

		Tend to trust		Tend not to trust		Don't know
		Aut. 2015	Diff. Aut. 2015 - Sp. 2015	Aut. 2015	Diff. Aut. 2015 - Sp. 2015	
ES		7	0	86	-5	7
FR		8	3	88	-2	4
IT		9	0	81	-4	10
UK		15	-4	81	5	4

Source: data taken from Standard Eurobarometer 84 2015 (p. 52).

But this are not the only worrying numbers in the relationship people-representatives. In the European Social Survey (2014) we can find that citizens answer that their concerns are not relevant for politicians, that is, that they feel somehow ignored [see table 3]. Thus, in a scale from 0 (not trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) 76% of the interviewed answered with 5 or less to the question if “politicians care what people think” and just 5,5% answered with 8 or more. Showing clearly the feeling citizens have of being left apart in the decisions of public matters.

Table 3. Assessment of politicians' interest in regular people.

Politicians care what people think	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
Not at all	0	4,348	15.4	15.6
1	1	2,236	7.9	8.0
2	2	3,712	13.2	13.4
3	3	4,073	14.4	14.7
4	4	3,216	11.4	11.6
5	5	3,860	13.7	13.9
6	6	2,671	9.5	9.6
7	7	2,127	7.5	7.7
8	8	1,110	3.9	4.0
9	9	284	1.0	1.0
Completely	10	157	0.6	0.6
Refusal	77	11	0.0	-
Don't know	88	400	1.4	-
No answer	99	16	0.1	-
Total		28,221	100.0	100.0

Source: European Social Survey 2014.

The disaffection of the European citizens is not only towards political parties and politicians, but also about how difficult it is for regular citizens to be involved in the political system in case they want to change something. In table 4 we can observe that the big majority of respondents believe that the political system itself blocks any possible influence on politics by ordinary people. Based on those two tables [number 3, and 4], we can see that citizens have the feeling of being irrelevant for political elites and also they think that this cannot be changed using the traditional channels the political system provides.

Table 4. Assessment of capacity for political influence.

Political system allows people to have influence on politics	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
Not at all	0	4,217	14.9	15.2
1	1	2,109	7.5	7.6
2	2	3,471	12.3	12.5
3	3	4,068	14.4	14.7
4	4	3,175	11.3	11.5
5	5	3,564	12.6	12.9
6	6	2,540	9.0	9.2
7	7	2,257	8.0	8.2
8	8	1,451	5.1	5.2
9	9	435	1.5	1.6
Completely	10	399	1.4	1.4
Refusal	77	5	0.0	-
Don't know	88	521	1.8	-
No answer	99	9	0.0	-
Total		28,221	100.0	100.0

Source: European Social Survey 2014.

Thereby, it seems logical after observing these perceptions citizens have towards politicians and political parties that just 4.5% of European citizens [see table 5] participate actively in a political party.

Table 5. Involvement in political parties.

Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
Yes	1	1,279	4.5	4.5
No	2	26,885	95.3	95.5
Refusal	7	9	0.0	-
Don't know	8	40	0.1	-
No answer	9	8	0.0	-
Total		28,221	100.0	100.0

Source: European Social Survey 2014.

For Ingrid Van Biezen, Peter Mair and Thomas Poguntke (2012, p.38) “a party’s own membership organisation is but a special variant of the linkage between parties and the wider society”. For these authors “there is scarcely any other indicator relating to mass politics in Europe that reveals such a strong and consistent trend as that which we now see with respect to the decline of party membership” (2012, p.38). The decline of party membership has been a fact for a while, but it has now reached such a level that can redefine parties’ structure. But even if this is true and political parties are more interested in electoral effectiveness over any other feature, at the end, less affiliates means fewer direct connections with society and citizens. For that reason, it is not possible to deny that the numbers of membership loss are topic that parties have to reflect about as we can observe in table 6:

Table 6. Party membership change, 1980-2009.

Country	Period	Change in M/E ratio	Change in number of members	% change in number of members
Czech Republic	1993-2008	-5.05	-379,575	-69.65
United Kingdom	1980-2008	-2.91	-1,158,492	-68.42
Norway	1980-2008	-10.31	-288,554	-62.60
France	1978-2009	-3.20	-923,788	-53.17
Sweden	1980-2008	-4.54	-241,130	-47.46
Ireland	1980-2008	-2.97	-50,856	-44.67
Switzerland	1977-2007	-5.90	-178,000	-43.22
Finland	1980-2006	-7.66	-260,261	-42.86
Denmark	1980-2008	-3.17	-109,467	-39.70
Italy	1980-2007	-4.09	-1,450,623	-35.61
Slovakia	1994-2007	-1.27	-41,204	-32.32
Belgium	1980-2008	-3.45	-191,133	-30.97
Netherlands	1980-2009	-1.81	-126,459	-29.35
Austria	1980-2008	-11.21	-422,661	-28.61
Germany	1980-2007	-2.22	-531,856	-27.20
Hungary	1990-2008	-0.57	-41,368	-25.03
Portugal	1980-2008	-1.05	+4,306	+1.28
Greece	1980-2008	+3.40	+335,000	+148.89
Spain	1980-2008	+3.16	+1,208,258	+374.60

Source: Going, going,... gone? The decline of party membership (Van Biezen et al., 2012).

The crisis of the political parties as a trustful element of political participation around European countries is thus a fact, not just a feeling of a few citizens or the intuitions of some scholars. Moreover, all those numbers show that political parties are largely unconnected with the majority of persons they represent. Various authors like Claus Offe (1985) or Donatella Della Porta (2015) support the theory that nowadays political parties have lost their capacity to involve private individuals into public matters. The decrease of activity of political parties as social integrators (Della Porta, 2015) have limited their capacity to change societies through new policies. In part because there is within political parties a lack of the real internal programmatic debate that traditionally allowed parties to be the central element to propose new policies. This places other entities on the playing field, like think tanks or social movements, as the actual suppliers of new policy ideas for political parties and the media (Stone & Denham, 2004);(Rich, 2005). If political parties are no longer trusted by citizens,

they need to use other channels to perform their traditional functions: articulate and aggregate social interests; and create a link between citizens and the political system (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011).

2.2 Public perceptions of social movements.

But political parties do not monopolize public mobilization. People do not stay home ignoring what is happening in the square. The numbers of people involved in others associations show us that belonging to a political party is not the only way to participate in public matters. The data analysed by Della Porta (2015) point out that citizens look for political participation outside political parties as those are seen as too bureaucratic and with lack of internal participation even within those parties that activist feel ideologically close to. As opposed to the numbers of participation in political parties [see tables 5 and 6] the numbers of persons that worked in other organisations or associations reach more than 20% of the population [see table 7]. Through those entities citizens can canalize their interest regarding public matters and express their concerns about them. Thanks to associations, a window to participate in public matters, independently of political parties, is open to citizens, and it seems that they are using it.

Table 7. Involvement in civic associations.


Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
Yes	1	5,761	20.4	20.5
No	2	22,391	79.3	79.5
Refusal	7	5	0.0	-
Don't know	8	58	0.2	-
No answer	9	6	0.0	-
Total		28,221	100.0	100.0

Source: European Social Survey 2014.

It is important to analyse how citizens see these movements and organizations before concluding that such entities can serve as a way to express the concerns citizens have about politics. Going deeper examining that phenomenon, that is,

looking at the Eurobarometer figures, it is clear that citizens give an important role to social movements in politics. The survey of the Flash Eurobarometer named “Europeans’ Engagement in Participatory Democracy” conducted with more than 25.000 people, shows that three out of four Europeans believe that movements influence local decision-making process with their activities, and 70% of the respondents believe that they do it at a national level [see table 8] (Flash Eurobarometer 373, 2013). Those beliefs place social movements as relevant actors to achieve specific public policies.


Table 8. Social movements’ influence on politics.



Source: Flash Eurobarometer 373 2013 (p.6)

In general citizens do not just believe that social movements influence politics, but also that they are necessary to influence politics. In that way, only 41% of people [see table 9] agree that European citizens do not need these types of organisations to influence political decision-making, meanwhile more than half of the interviewed people consider that social movements are an essential tool to have an impact on policies (Flash Eurobarometer 373, 2013).

Table 9. Importance of social movements.




Source: Flash Eurobarometer 373 2013 (p.6)

Another relevant element to highlight is the proximity of social movements to citizens in confront to the distance with which political parties are perceived, as we have seen before [see table 3]. Therefor, “a majority of respondents (59%)

[see table 10] agree that they share the values or interests of some of these organisations, and that they trust them to act in the right way to influence political decision-making” (TNS Political & Social, 2013, p.6) showing us a connection between social movements and citizens.


Table 10. Proximity towards social movements.



Source: Flash Eurobarometer 373 2013 (p.6)

Additionally, it is important to highlight the relevance social movements have for the population as a way to become relevant in the political arena. In that way, “a majority of European respondents (54%) [see table 11] think that being a member of a non-governmental organisation or association is an effective means of influencing political decisions” (TNS Political & Social, 2013, p.25).

Table 11. Effectiveness in terms of political influence.



Source: Flash Eurobarometer 373 2013 (p.17)

With all these numbers regarding what citizens think about social movements, we can conclude that people that are involved in social movements believe that these organizations are able to change some political situation. And it seems that they are involved in those movements precisely for that reason, otherwise, believing in social movement’s political capacity, they would not be involved with them. Moreover, given the connection between social movements and citizens and the rejection that political parties produce to citizens, we can conclude that social movements play a crucial role for political participation and

they can potentially serve as a bridge between citizens and political parties, as well as public institutions.

Meanwhile political parties lose affiliates, social movements increase their legitimacy among citizens (Norris, 2002). Old forms of political participation embodied through political parties are losing ground in front of new forms of political participation: the social activism. After the 2000's, being involved in a social movement that defends an issue and has no institutional power –and consequently no political wear as political parties have–, seems to be more appealing for citizens than being part of a party and enjoy potential individual benefits⁹. Della Porta says that in her last research it became more than clear that there is “fiducia nei movimenti sociali e nelle associazioni volontarie come attori di una politica *altra*, si conferma invece la sfiducia degli attivisti nelle istituzioni della democrazia rappresentativa” (2015, p.219). Confirming what Norris and herself (2013)said in previous works.

2.3 Interaction.

The fact that two elements share the same field in which they perform their activities –like political parties and social movements do– suggests some kind of interaction between them. Different authors point towards that direction. Della Porta and Chironi hold that “although studies on social movements and political parties have usually treated the two separately, some empirical analyses have shown that they are deeply intertwined” (2015, p.61). Actually, looking again at the data of the European Social Survey 7 (2014) this theory seems to be confirmed. Taking the variable “worked in another organization within last 12 months”¹⁰ named *people involved* and running a simple univariate logit regression¹¹ using political interest¹² named *interested in politics* as independent variable, we can observe –with high significance– that when the interest in politics is lower, also the probability to not work in another

⁹ The widely studied Mancur Olson’s individual incentives (Olson, 2002).

¹⁰ Transforming it to a binary variable with values 1 being involved and 0 not being involved.

¹¹ I used STATA 13.1 for this analysis and the following ones.

¹² The ESS 2014 asks how interested would you say you are in politics by giving a scale of 1 (very interested) to 4 (not at all interested).

organization decreases. Or in other words: the higher the interest in politics, the higher the probability of also being involved in associations [see table 12].

Table 12. Regression A.

VARIABLES	(1) People involved
Interested in politics	-0.687*** (0.0159)
Constant	0.0527 (0.0378)
Observations	39,981
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

From this data we can deduce that those persons that are involved in associations or public organizations have a big interest in politics. They do not join associations because they ignore politics; they do it because they are more interested in producing changes in the society than other citizens and use other channels apart from political parties to achieve those changes. However, people more socially active do not reject the traditional channels of political participation as we might think. Meyer and Tarrow already said that “participation in protest activity has not come at the expense of other forms of participation... People who protest are more, not less, likely to vote and engage in the whole range of conventional citizen politics” (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998, p.7). People who are socially active also keep participating in electoral events, in fact, the numbers tell us that they do it more than the rest of the citizens. Using again the data of the European Social Survey 7 (2014) and running a logit regression with the variable *vote* as dependent variable and *people involved*¹³ as independent variable, we find with a high significance, that when people are involved in an association the probability of voting increases [see table 13].

¹³ Both, *vote* and *people involved* are dummy variables with values 0 and 1.

Table 13. Regression B.

VARIABLES	(1) Vote
People involved	1.168*** (0.0442)
Constant	1.037*** (0.0131)
Observations	36,276
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Political parties and social movements are linked and this relationship affects the entire public environment. Without citizens able to participate in public matters it is not possible to consider being involved in a real democracy. “There is widespread agreement among varied democratic theorists, ranging from Jean Jacques Rousseau to James Madison, John Stuart Mill, Robert Dahl, Benjamin Barber, David Held, and John Dryzak, that mass participation is the lifeblood of representative democracy” (Norris, 2002, p.5) but this public participation can only be held in a safe environment. Democracy needs public engagement in public affairs (Norris, 2002). A healthy environment means more trust between the actors and more probabilities of participation of anyone. Statistics confirm that idea¹⁴ when we run a logit regression using *people involved*¹⁵ as dependent variable and *trust in political parties*¹⁶ as independent variable. With a high significance we observe that the more the trust increases in political parties of the respondents, also the probability increases to belong to an association [see table 14].

¹⁴ Database of the European Social Survey 7 (2014).

¹⁵ Dummy variable with values 0 and 1.

¹⁶ A numerical variable with values that go from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).

Table 14. Regression C.

VARIABLES	(1) People involved
Trust in political parties	0.169*** (0.00572)
Constant	-2.234*** (0.0275)
Observations	39,374
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Trust in political parties increases the participation in public affairs and increases the quality of democracy in a society. Linking the two elements of study of that dissertation

All of these three regressions show us that exists a clear connection between political parties and social movements. People involved in movements are more interested in politics, vote more and trust more in political parties than the average. They share the political space. Political parties and social movements are not islands in the political arena.

2.4 The beginnings and the actors involved in the interactions between political parties and social movements.

The existence of a relationship between political parties and social movements is not new. It is an old story that has had a major impact on their elements, transforming political parties' structure and how social movements face their goals. Moreover, this interplay is not an exception of few cases during history of politics; it is the general rule of behaviour of those elements. In fact, Daniela Piccio believes that the relationship between political parties and movements is so crucial that,

The very origin of those that would become the most important party families of the twentieth century in Western Europe (i.e.: the Socialists, the Liberals and the Confessional parties) could not be understood without reference to the diverse movements, pressure groups, and associations, which became involved in institutionalized campaigns shaping the configuration of party organizations (2016, p265).

However, despite the importance and the constant presence of these connections between political parties and social movements during time, it is not easy to define exactly when those started. The different names and configurations of both elements do not make easier that task. For that reason is important to identify first when both elements appeared and then pay attention to their interaction. Thus, on the one hand, political parties are the oldest factor in our equation as the first of them appeared around the late 1600s (Scarrow, 2006); and if we follow Charles Tilly propositions (2004, p.3) social movement “existed nowhere in the world three centuries ago”, placing their origins about late 18th-century. Political parties are also the most easy to recognize as they already identify themselves as “political parties” in its early times, and they act with a clear goal: the institutional power (Ware, 1996). In an environment where coordinated action was revealed as the winning choice, they became quickly the central actor of politics, especially after the 19th-century when their preeminence was undisputed (Scarrow, 2006).

On the other hand, talking about our other factor, that is, social movements, Charles Tilly maintains that “by the turn of the twenty-first century, people all over the world recognized the term “social movement” as a trumpet call, as a counterweight to oppressive power, as a summons to popular action against a wide range of scourges” (Tilly, 2004, p.3). But as the movements do not identify themselves with the term at its origins, it is important to go further to know when those actors were born. So, focusing on their roots, Tilly (2004) holds social movements made its first appearances after 1750 in the United States and Britain and later in Western Europe. He proposes two cases as the first social movements in history that could be defined as such. The first one is the

mobilization of the population of the American British colonies against the British Empire for a fair relationship with the metropolis. This movement appeared because ordinary people -that is, not politicians- started to feel the necessity to express themselves about a reality that was not anymore sustainable for them. Thus, the movement “enlisted ordinary citizens such as artisans and sailors in campaigns of sustained opposition to royal policies” (Tilly, 2004, p.25), with techniques like “special-purpose associations, public meetings, marches, petitions, pamphleteering, and statements widely reported in the public media” (Tilly, 2004, p.25), that have not been used before. The second one is the movement that ended up originating the seed that subsequently led to the French Revolution. In a situation where a few advantaged held important privileges meanwhile the majority was exploited under the rules of the *Ancien Régime*, some voices started to claim for changes. The social claims and public activities -like riots- against the unequal situation of the population are already considered by Tilly (2004) as social movements, however not the French Revolution itself.

Furthermore, Tilly (2004) proposes two cases that could be considered an incipient interaction between political parties and movements. The first case would be the contacts between the antislavery movement in Britain with politicians and parties -mainly the Whigs. The battle of this movement for the abolition of slavery was long and the abolitionists were obliged to find support of their positions in Parliament to achieve their goal. This forced them to combine public activities addressed to convince the general population of the atrocity of that practice, with a direct pressure over the members of the parliament that had the possibility to legislate in that matter. Meanwhile, the other case of interaction would be all the relationships created in the revolutionary France of 1848 where the different political positions were looking for socially organized support. For Tilly (2004, p.39) March 1848 was a relevant moment in that field as “Lyon and France installed the social movement as a regular vehicle of popular politics”.

However, we can only start talking properly about relationships between social movements and political parties when labour movements initiated their

mobilizations and saw in political parties –mainly those from the left- possible allies. In fact, the relationship between left parties and social movements either at the beginnings or later in time, have been the object of the majority of studies in the field (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995) (Donatella Della Porta, 2013). The reason for Piccio, (2016, p.279) is because “the left wing parties have been more inclined to take on board social movements’ demands and provide their support to the movements’ mobilizations.” But the connections between social movements and current political parties are not exclusive of the left as exists examples also for the conservative and other political options. Thereby, social movements have shaped political parties as well as changed party systems by introducing new actors. And for some of those parties the degree of interdependence with social movements is so high that they could not survive in the way we know them without social movements backup.

A very good example of the interaction between political parties and social movements in the past is the one that had as result the creation of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. The movements for workers rights found in the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century good allies for their claims in the leftist parties all around Europe. But particularly relevant was the relationship that involved the British trade union movement and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. Not just because both had the improvement of workers’ rights as a main goals, but also because the Labour was precisely founded after the trade union movement saw that more institutional representation to advance workers’ conditions was necessary (Stewart Reid, 1955). Subsequently, “Labour was sustained by trade union funds and often by trade union activists” (Worley, 2015, p.4), showing in that way how social movements can effect and shape political parties and political systems as Kriesi held (Kriesi, 2015).

However, the relationship between parties and trade unions in the UK did not start creating the Labour but challenging an already existing political party. Once conquered male suffrage, some workers leaders decided to run as candidates endorsed by the Liberal Party (Pugh, 2011). The Liberal Party tried with this

movement to make sure that all new proletarian voters would support them instead of the Conservative Party, the other big party at that time. After seeing that workers' demands were not taken into consideration the way union leaders expected, "alliances with the Liberals began to strain and break" (Worley, 2005, p.5). At some point, the "leaders of organized labour in Britain had completely lost their faith in the Liberal party" (Stewart Reid, 1955, p.60) and ended up challenging the party that gave them the opportunity to be candidates: if the Liberals would not attend their demands they would create a new party with the support of the workers. Founding thus a new actor in British politics, the Labour Party, which after few years would replace the Liberals as government alternative to the Conservative Party. The interaction of the trade union movement and the Labour was so strong that "trades councils became electoral agencies for the party" (Worley, 2005, p.5) with the evident strength that this meant for electoral campaigns. This deep relationship between both elements, the party and trade unions, made the Labour become a crucial actor in the political party system of the UK, making it essential to understand British politics as it almost monopolized for long time the representatives of some areas like Scotland, Wales and North of England (Pugh, 2011).

Another relevant case of the interaction between political parties and social movements -and closer in time- is the case of the appearance of the Green Parties around the world. It is not possible to understand the formation of the first Green Parties without taking into consideration the crucial role the students' and environmental movements played in it (Schoonmaker, 1988). With a lot of similarities in the process of the creation of the Labour Party, "when it became evident that none of the established parties would respond adequate to their demands, activists from the [environmental] movements undertook to set up their own political party" (Poguntke, 1994, p.14), that is: the Greens. Again, we face a case where political parties risk having new opponents if they do not attend the demands of the social movements.

But even more relevant than its creation, the interaction between the party and social movements is interesting for the way social movements condition party's

structure. After the creation of the party the Greens “externalized” part of what were traditionally exclusive party elements (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). Thus, “the Greens have relied heavily upon new social movements for communication and mobilization” (Poguntke, 1994, p.14). Moreover, the Greens do not just use peace and ecology movements as an electoral resource, but also as a structural part of the party as those movements have been the equivalent of the membership for the traditional mass parties (Poguntke, 1994). Thereby, “new social movements and the Greens are related through a multitude of overlapping memberships and joint extra-parliamentary activities” (Poguntke, 1994, p.15). Creating a shared cultural space between the members of the party and the members of the movements, with similar values, lifestyle, ideals, literature, authors, newspapers... So deep is the connection between the party and the movements which support it that the Greens have been defined as “a hybrid movement/party” (Schoonmaker, 1988, p.64). This party model would provide the Greens with a direct connection with the demands of their potential voters, meanwhile “existing movements would give such demands legitimacy” through the parliamentary activity of the party (Poguntke, 1994). But, is important to notice that the relationship between environmental movements and the Greens was not exclusive. New social movements also had contacts with other political parties besides the interest of the Greens to canalize through the party all the demands of the postmodern voters (Schoonmaker, 1988). Therefore, even if, “the Greens played a prominent role in these movements, they were far from dominating them organizationally or politically” (Poguntke, 1994, p.14).

While “studies focusing on the relationships between social movements and political parties have traditionally looked at political parties of the left” (Piccio, 2016, p.279), but the interaction between political parties and social movements is not limited only to leftist parties. Connections, and even collaborations exist also with right and conservative parties, and a good example of that are the links of the Christian Right with the Republican Party in the USA. That movement in its different configurations has been able to exercise enough weight to condition Republican Party’s political decisions, whether on policies or selection of candidates. Christian Right followers have achieved such an important role for

the Republican party that already in the 80's and 90's "evangelicals had become an **establish**¹⁷ component of the Republican electoral coalition" (Oldfield, 1996, p.87).

The way the Republican Party chooses its candidates, that is, by primary elections allowing people and not the party leaders to select the candidates (Smith & Greenblatt, 2013), makes the party vulnerable to outside forces to influence the results. Consequently, even if associations with elements that are able to mobilize the voter could be potentially very useful in electoral contests, conservative "movements are seen as a disruptive force because of their contentiousness; they undermine elites and produce" (Green, Rozell, & Wilcox, 2001, p.414) unwanted candidates that put electoral victories at risk. Hence, Republicans leaders do not see those movements with a lot of enthusiasm as "partisan mobilization by social movements provide an antidote to party oligarchy by generating new party elites and producing popular candidates" (Green et al., 2001, p.414) that can threaten their privileged position within the party. A situation that is particularly visible in the case of the Tea Party, as it is "not operating under the guidance of official GOP institutions. The Republican National Committee is not in charge, and neither are state party organs"(Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p.28), creating some division inside the party that had had electoral consequences. So, either positive or negative, we cannot deny that the Tea Party had a big impact in the Republican party and its way to confront elections. Thus,

The Tea Party's impact was clearer within the Republican Party. Tea Party mobilizations enabled insurgent primary candidates to overtake and defeat a number of officially endorsed GOP candidates, including incumbents. Many mainstream Republicans, including Bob Bennett in Utah, Charlie Crist in Florida, Lisa Murkowski in Alaska, Sue Lowdon in Nevada, and Mike Castle in Delaware, lost their primaries to Tea Party candidates. Some Tea Party insurgent candidates went on to prevail in the general 2010 election, but this holds true primarily in strongly

¹⁷ Emphasis added.

Republican states. In more competitive environments like Nevada, Colorado and Delaware, Democrats benefitted from the Tea Party candidates' extreme ideology or less experienced campaigns (Williamson et al., 2011, p.35).

From the numbers of participation (Green et al., 2001), it seems quite possible that the Tea Party has “contributed to the GOP gains in the House, above and beyond those that might have been expected based on economic conditions and normal cyclical trends” (Williamson et al., 2011, p.35). Besides the electoral results what is more relevant than the specific impacts is that “the Tea Party revitalize right-wing activism in the lead-up to the 2010 midterm elections” (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p.26). But the fact is that the Tea Party did much more as it was able to revitalize not just the activism, but also the Republican Party itself, activating its voters and having an important media presence in its battle against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)¹⁸ and other Democratic policies (Williamson et al., 2011). All the presence of Tea Party exponents creates a political impulse for the Republican Party that had its maximum exponent when it was able to take the majority of the seats of both chambers of the United States Congress¹⁹. In conclusion, “fashioned at a moment of challenge for conservatives in and around the GOP, when the “Republican” label was tarnished, the Tea Party has helped to sharpen and refocus conservative activism in our time” (Williamson et al., 2011, p.37).

Thus, to conclude, the impact of social movements on politics and particularly on political parties in history is crucial, and can be summarized in these words:

The greatest sort of impact is the one that provides a group with continuing leverage over political processes and increases the political returns to the collective action of a challenger. These gains are usually at a structural or systemic level of state processes and constitute a kind of meta-collective benefit. Gains in the democratization of state processes,

¹⁸ Commonly called Affordable Care Act (ACA) or Obamacare.

¹⁹ The 2014 elections gave the Republicans control of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

such as winning the right to vote by a nonfranchised group, increase the productivity of future state-directed collective action by such groups. Many of the most prominent social movements have sought this basic goal, including movements of workers, women, and, in the United States, the civil rights movement (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Banaszak 1996, McAdam 1999, McCammon et al. 2001). The formation by movements of established political parties is also a structural political change (Schwartz 2000 and more below), if one step removed from transformations in states (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010, p.14.4).

2.5 When is interaction most likely to happen?

Knowing more about the relationship between political parties and social movements goes through finding when interaction takes place or when its probability of occurring is higher. The problem is that the exact moment of the interaction between political parties and social movements varies in every specific case, as every situation has its particular features. Defining when an interaction exactly happens is not easy as different forms and intensities of interactions may make that task difficult. Especially because we are talking about an action that is not a single point in time, but about a process. Moreover, the story behind the interaction of political parties and social movements is also an element to consider. Thus, as seen before, the interaction between socialist parties and trade unions that started in the 19th century has different dynamics than the interaction between the Greens and the environmental movements born in the second half of the 20th century. Generally, actors that have just appeared in the political arena, like new parties or new movements, do not have any story or previous relationship with anyone else and have to start to find collaborations in a already establish political system. Meanwhile, the parties and movements with long life have already had previous contacts creating both an organization cultural and personal contacts with leaders of both sides, making the interaction easier.

For those reasons, it is not possible to specify exactly when these contacts will take place. However, it is possible to define the circumstances under which the

contacts have a higher probability to occur. Thus, Piccio (2016) defines three conditions when that interaction is more likely:

- **Electoral vulnerability.** The existence of electoral test increases the receptivity of political parties to find social movements support. At the end, it is the moment when parties look for citizens' approval. Consequently, parties try to be backed by as many elements they can to be seen as a trustful actor. For several authors (Goldstone, 2003) (Amenta et al., 2010), that interest would be higher when political parties are expecting bad results in the coming elections. That is, when parties would be more open to put aside some of its traditional policies and make bigger commitments with social movements. "The underlying logic is that parties will employ strategies that are beneficial for the maintenance of their organizational survival" (Piccio, 2016, p.268). Thus, Piccio (2016) and Kriesi (Kriesi et al., 1995) consider that the existence of electoral adversaries in a shared ideological space increases the probability of parties looking for social movements that can increment positively the way parties are seen by the voters of that space. A good example of that are the social democratic parties when they have had competitors on its left (Kriesi et al., 1995).
- **Members' cumulative involvement.** As we have seen before with the numbers of the European Social Survey, people involved in social movements are more interested in politics and also trust political parties more²⁰. Political parties and social movements are two different ways to participate in politics but they are not mutually exclusive, in fact for a group of people this is cumulative (Norris, 2002). At the end, if those two actors shared goals or values, it is logical that several of its members participate in both. Thus, when political parties and movements share more, they will also have a bigger number of shared members and thus the higher will be the

²⁰ Section 3 of that chapter.

possibility to interact. Thereby, social movements' members that join a party will be particularly interested in the movement's line when debating new policies inside the party's organs. Meanwhile party members that join a movement will see the party as a way to implement institutionally social movement's goals. So, higher levels of double membership increase parties-movements collaboration.

- **Identity coherence.** In order to have an established relationship between political parties and social movements it is necessary to have some degree of shared identities (Piccio, 2016). On the one hand, parties do not go to look for social movements' support if those movements are ideologically opposed to the party's. On the other hand, social movements can demand some particular behaviour of a party they are against to, but hardly will collaborate with that party. "Parties will be more likely to be open to those movements whose cultural and ideological understandings of politics more closely corresponds to their own, and whose themes do not contradict their own traditional discourses (Kriesi, 1993; Rucht, 2004)" (Piccio, 2016, p268). So, the higher shared values, the higher are levels of interaction between parties and movements.

But apart from those three conditions listed by Daniela Piccio, it is important to notice other elements that have an influence on the interaction between parties and movements. Thus, based on the rules of internal parties' dynamics and its external influence developed by Andrew Appleton (1994), we extrapolate the following dynamics of parties and movements:

- **Connection between elites**²¹. Political parties and social movements are at the end organizations ruled by some specific members that can be defined as the elite of the organization. Those persons are the ones who have the biggest initiative power to define organization's activities and goals and consequently, establish organizational links.

²¹ Based on Appleton's rule of privileged relationships.

Personal relationships make contacts between organizations less costly. "A privileged relationship links two actors in the political arena through a bond other than that formed through formal channels of authority or competence, and allows one of those actors to short-circuit formal procedures through contact with the other" (Appleton, 1994, p.48) When personal connections between party elites and movement elites are higher, it gets easier to find common roads for collaboration.

- **Previous background.** This is not about the influence of social movements on the creation of the party like the socialist parties or the Greens, it is about the existence of a collaborative culture between the two organizations. If a political party and a social movement have previously shared other projects, their connections and their ways to work help new approaches between them (Lane & Bachmann, 1998). So, if they have collaborated before, the probability to do it again is higher. Besides, of course, of the goals' alignment that happens after any common project and pushes the actors to replace their own priorities after the new scenario.
- **Political momentum.** The existence of a window of opportunity for which collaboration is crucial. Despite the moments of the electoral periods when collaboration has a more clear objective, parties and movements can find many other situations when exploiting their relationship through mutual benefits (Appleton, 1994). That is, when it is more convenient for both. Thus, for instance, the use of social movements by opposition parties to attack some unpopular government policies. Social movements obtain institutional visibility thanks to the parties; meanwhile parties obtain public support to their activity, as well as a higher media coverage for both actors. Therefore, when there are potential mutual benefits for the partners, the probability to have an interaction between parties and movements is higher.

2.6 Ways of interaction between political parties and social movements.

After verifying the existence of an interaction between political parties and social movements and seeing how important their interaction has been for politics, it is important to identify the ways parties and movements interact. The potential ways both actors interact are, theoretically speaking, infinite. However, it is certain that it is possible to identify some common patterns when that interaction takes place. That is, the ways that are present more consistently during time in the relationship movements-parties. Della Porta and Chironi specify in that sense that:

Notwithstanding the fundamental differences in organizational structures and forms of action adopted, leftist parties and movements interacted through mechanisms such as: overlapping membership, i.e. double militancy in both movements and parties; the participation of parties in the movements' main initiatives and campaigns and vice versa; the efforts of parties to conquer the new electoral niches opened by movement mobilization through the adaptation of their programs; the positioning on some relevant issues raised by the movements; and the adoption of some less conventional political actions (Della Porta & Chironi, 2015, p.62).

Robert Rohrschneider (1993) talked about the areas where social movements interact more with parties in order to challenge them: programmatic, electoral and organizational. Based on the problems of: being able to include demands that were being ignored or have not even existed; being able to mobilize under-represented social segments to express their preferences in the polls; and to make the internal decisional-making process of the parties more transparent and more open to the bases. With that in mind it seems clear that the presence and actions of social movements affect parties' strategies and can even shape

political systems. Social movements can create opportunities and situations for the parts involved in the political arena, but can also create risky situations for the parties and for movements itself. In that sense, in “Contentious Politics” (2015) Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow argue:

- Social movements can support a specific political party with which the movement has ideological affinity, shared ideals or common goals. Social movements can mobilize its members either as voters or as campaign volunteers. Movements can also transfer their reputation to the party, blessing it with the same values citizens perceive within the movement. In a similar way “as the American trade union movement did with the Democratic party in the 1940s and 1950s” (Charles Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p.63) or, as seen before, the Tea Party did with the Republican party (Williamson et al., 2011).
- Social movements can decide to challenge party’s position or party’s leaders. If the movement does not agree with some decisions, they can have an aggressive behaviour against the party. Even ending up confronting movement’s positions with the party in the elections.
- Social movements are able to change political parties weight in the party system. Either to increase the relevance a party has in a specific political environment or to reduce it. The authors give big importance to that, thus “if we consider major turning points in electoral politics in the United States (i.e., the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932) they were mainly the result of the intrusion of social movements into electoral politics” (Charles Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p.64).
- Social movements can change political parties behaviour. With their social support, they can obligate parties to modify their positions towards some issues and even to reshape party’s own internal organization. That alteration of the position of some parties regarding

some issues can polarize the political system as movements' demands tend to be more extremes than parties' (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005).

But social movements have to be aware that some ways of interaction like deciding to join party positions is not free of risk for them. "Elections can weaken or strengthen movements when they become involved in election campaigns or align themselves with parties' programs" (Charles Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p.64). Thus, movements can lose popular support if they are seen as mere tools of parties. As happened when the movement against the Iraq war took clearly the Democratic side and, due to that, it lost part of the citizens that supported the antiwar movement previously (Heaney & Rojas, 2015).


2.7 Types of relationship between parties and movements.

The position political parties can adopt toward social movements and vice versa are numerous and are based on the perceptions about the other organization. Normally, the attitudes of parties and movements towards each other are based in a combination of two elements: a rational calculus of the utility of the relationship towards the other, and the fact that there is an ideological space where parties and movements are inserted in. But both elements can be reduced to an analysis of how close parties and movements feel about each other. In other words: we have to define if the actors are in favour or against each other and the degrees of that feeling. Therefore, with a scale of the intensity that goes from totally agreeing with the other organization to totally disagreeing, we can build a useful classification of types of relationship between parties and movements that have consequences in their external behaviour.

Thus, based on the previous idea, for Michael Hanagan (1998, p.4) there are "five basic relationship between movements and parties": "articulation", "permeation", "alliance", "independence" and "competition". To which the concept "opposition" can be added to complete the spectrum of collaboration between parties and

movements based on the intensity of that collaboration. Therefore, in an imaginary line that goes from unconditional support represented by 1 in the figure 1, to total rejection represented by 0, we have:

Figure 1. Types of relationships between political parties and social movements.



- **Articulation.** Social movements dependence on parties is extreme. In fact, they act as a section of the party, and “are organized around party programs and articulate the policy positions of parties to constituencies where parties hope to mobilize support and recruit members”(Hanagan, 1998, p.4). Thus, movements are basically party tools, used to activate the own voters about some issues and to have media presence. That kind of relationship implies a certain delegation of functions of the party towards the social movement as it is clear that there is no risk for the party as “movement activists are expected to follow party guidelines and instructions” (Hanagan, 1998, p.5). However, the social movement impact over the party is not irrelevant as can influence it in certain topics -due to its privileged access to the party’s structures- in a way the party did not anticipate. Either introducing new approaches regarding established issues or introducing new ones.

- **Permeation.** There is a strong linkage between the party and the social movements either for ideological reasons or because both share similar goals. There is a stable collaboration but both organizations keep their decision-organs independently. Political parties are very permeable to social movements positions and its capacity to lead some issues in the public debate. There is a previous work of social movements to attract the party to its cause, which is seen by the party as a useful tool to connect with those citizens that are ideologically close to the party but not fully active to vote in each election. “Although permeation implies that the party is not as fully committed to a particular goal as movement activist should wish, it also necessarily involves social movement acknowledgement that they share a broad range of goal with the political party of which they are members” (Hanagan, 1998, p4). This creates a collaborative relationship that has the characteristic of exclusivity for the social movement. That is, the social movement will collaborate with one single party and will remain loyal to it.
- **Alliance.** In this case social movements and parties share part of the same ideology but they just collaborate for specific projects. Both organizations retain very important to keep a fully free structure to act independently when necessary, and for that reason they “negotiate ad hoc alliances”(Hanagan, 1998, p.4). Party and movement are conscious that the other one is a natural ally but both act as completely different actors. Those “coalitions imply that each side expects to obtain specific and concrete benefits; coalitions dissolve if these expectations are disappointed” (Hanagan, 1998, p4). Widely perceived as free actors, these social movements are seen by parties as a good tool to connect with citizens of the same ideological range but who vote for other parties.
- **Independence.** Social movements and political parties are completely independent without any structured collaboration. So even if both can

find some shared positions regarding some issues at some particular moment in time, each actor will develop its strategy without involving the other. Moreover, movements will pressure parties when necessary despite the wear parties can suffer. In fact, movements will pressure parties “to make concessions at the risk of losing voters who supported the movement” (Hanagan, 1998, p.5). The interest of the social movement for its own goal is more important *a priori* than any other political consequence. If this goal is shared with the party, collaboration can be built, otherwise the movement represents a relevant risk to the party. “A willingness to inflict serious electoral losses on those it wants to influence puts a social movement in a strong bargaining position, but, if actually does so, it risks diminishing its own prospects for achieving any measure of reform while at the same time losing support within the party” (Hanagan, 1998, p.5).

- **Competition.** Even if social movement and party's ideology are not necessarily counter posed, positions between them regarding the way problems should be faced are clearly different if not even opposite. Any possible collaboration is broken and the party faces one big risk: another electoral adversary. In that scenario the social movement creates a new political party, which competes for the same potential voters of the party. Maybe they share the final goal -or not-, but clearly not the way to achieve it. This situation of confrontation ends up in an open competition and possible big electoral losses for both actors. The party risk to lose votes and to have a big mobilization against it; and the movement risks to be even farther that its goal.
- **Opposition.** Social movement and political party belong to a completely different ideological space. They are antagonists and the main goal of the movement is the opposition to the public policies that the party proposes and it will battle against their approval. Consequently, party's electoral defeat is important to avoid the implementation of party's policies and the movement will mobilize its

resources to achieve it. The movement will use several actions to achieve his goal, including supporting other political parties. No collaboration is possible as both actors see each other as an adversary to battle against.

The kind of relation is not permanent, through time the relations between a party and a movement can vary from one type to another. Changing from one kind of relationship to another it could be because of several factors, but the main one is the presence of elections and its results. Elections, either if the party wins or loses, are the crucial element to alter the kind of relationship between parties and movements, because it is in that moment when both can potentially have bigger earnings. An expected electoral victory can produce social movements be more interested going “into closer relationship with political parties as the only vehicles capable of winning benefits for them” (Hanagan, 1998, p.6). On the other hand, an electoral defeat can reduce party’s capacity to satisfy movement’s demands and consequently be less appealing for the social movement. But elections are not the only relevant element of change. The other important element that can cause a realignment of the relations between political parties and social movements is the commitment of the last with their maximum goals. The way the movement considers how the party is acting to achieve the shared objectives. If the movement is satisfied, it can go closer to the party because a trustful relationship between the actors has been created. Otherwise, movements “can sunder existing bonds if a victorious party fails to make what a social movement considers “adequate” concessions” (Hanagan, 1998, p.6).

2.8 Summary.

This chapter presented two actors widely studied in political science and sociology: political parties and social movements. However, despite to be two relevant parts of nowadays politics the interaction between them has produced seldom works in the academia. The chapter pays attention to connection of the citizens towards both actors, highlighting that social movements are much more appreciate and close to citizens than political parties. After showing that social movements and political parties represent two different ways to be involved on

politics in the section 3, section 4 does a resume of the history of the interaction between them stressing the most relevant moments of that history. Later, this chapter presented when and how the interaction occurs. Finally, it was presented the various types of interaction that it is possible to find in the relationship between political parties and social movements and what represents every stage of it. This classification theorized by Michael Hanagan will be used later to analyse the cases of Milan and Barcelona to discover the elements that produce alterations in these types of relationship.

Chapter Three.

Methodology.

The general purpose of this thesis is to highlight the elements that can stimulate or obstruct the cooperation between political parties and social movements, a link that is still very understudied. This chapter focuses on the methodology followed to investigate this interaction, explaining the methods chosen to address the issue, how the data used for the study was collected and how the analysis will be performed in the following chapters. In addition, this chapter also presents the two examined cases: the last local elections in the cities of Milan and Barcelona.

Assuming that the actors involved in the events under study are rational and seeking to maximize their own benefits makes it possible to apply the approach named analytic narratives. The analytic narrative is a methodological approach that allows us to extract the common key elements from a series of specific events and to analyse them with the tools of game theory. Thus, “the analytic narrative approach combines a commitment to rational choice, a deep interest in a particular case, a method for devising a generalizable model of the case, and a means of providing empirical evidence, even in unique cases” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p4). It mixes in-depth interviews to obtain the information necessary to frame the relationships of the cases, with extensive-form games to analyse what the key components are that define whether the relationship between political parties and social movements moves from a complete collaboration to declared adversaries.

For a better understanding of the methodology applied, this chapter contains a description of what analytic narrative is, paying particular attention to the two parts in which all research that opts for using this method is divided: the one that define the crucial elements and the one which analyzes them. This chapter includes also the game theory instruments that will be used for the study. Then, a description of the instruments used to collect the data for the study is included.

Afterwards, the chapter moves to an overview about the way the in-depth interviews were conducted. In the next section the explanation about the reasons for choosing Milan and Barcelona as case studies is outlined. Finally, this chapter includes the way the data will be treated in following chapters.

3.1 Research design.

3.1.1 The selection of methodology.

The use of a specific methodology is always a big decision for any research. According to Robert Yin, “different social science research methods fill different needs and situations for investigating social science topics” (2009, p62). Considering qualitative and quantitative approaches not as opposites, but as different parts of a whole (Creswell, 2013), it is important to keep the main difference between these methods in mind: each of them is more suitable to answer a certain kind of questions. The long debate about the two main families of methods and the debate regarding which is the optimal for scientific studies in social science are, however, already overcome and are not the object of this dissertation. Both have proven to contribute to the progress of the disciplines that have used them, showing that they are not opposite but complementary. This is proven by the fact that it is increasingly common to find the use of mixed methods in several projects (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). If the research is conducted under scientific parameters and done accurately and systematically, there is no need to worry about the scientificity of the investigation. Both approaches are equally academically recognized (Neuman, 2006). Deciding for one approach or another should not be arbitrary or based on the preferences of the researcher, but on the question that is faced and the knowledge and data available about an issue. It is equally useless to choose quantitative techniques without previous knowledge about a topic, as is to use qualitative techniques to carry out verifications based on big number of cases (Neuman, 2006).

Consequently, the choice in this research for a not very widespread methodological approach, such as analytic narrative, is due to the object of the study and the information that the researcher tries to obtain from the realities

analysed. The relationship between political parties and social movements is undoubtedly an understudied area -as seen in Chapter Two. Sadly, the few works that deal with this topic do it only tangentially to the main object of study – normally political parties or social movements- or they are largely exploratory in nature. Therefore, before we move to other more specific questions, it is necessary to apply a method that allows obtaining the crucial components of this relationship directly from the actors involved to obtain a clearer overview of the topic. This is a task for which qualitative methods are best prepared, as they try to find the sense of the facts and their meanings for the individuals that intervene in them. Actually, the very features of this research require profound access to involved actors' thinking and unknown facts that could not be studied through quantitative methods. Subsequently, it is of course still necessary to analyse the acquired data with the correct tools to respond to the research question of the present dissertation. As, the purpose of this research is not to measure or quantify something, but to improve the understanding of certain interactions; the method of analytics narratives is shown to be suitable precisely for this. The advantage of this choice is that analytic narrative allows the combination of deep knowledge of the case with the construction of a theoretical model.

3.1.2 Analytic narratives.

Analytic narratives is not a very popular methodology. Hence, it has to be defined before moving to the specific use of it in this project. According to Alberto Asquer, professor at the University of London and user of this method, analytic narrative "is a methodological approach that combines historically oriented research with rational choice models" (2014, p.79). This approach is based on the observation of a series of facts giving them a coherent and understandable meaning. Those facts are presented in a narrative way and included in the definition of the actors, the elements, their evolution and the interrelation between them. Assuming rational behaviours of the actors involved, after the narration an analysis of their options at the strategic level occurs with the use of game theory. In the words of the group of scholars that initiated this approach:

We call our approach analytic narrative because it combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history. Our approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p.10).

The method of analytic narratives seeks to explain human conduct through a series of steps. It aims to clarify how and why events happen. To do that, analytic narratives focus on the choices and decisions of the actors involved, locating the elements that configure interactions. The overall goal is to “identify the actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned and the manner in which the choices generated events and outcomes” (Bates et al., 1998, p.13). Analytic narratives attempt to explain social outcomes on the basis of constraints, incentives, and situations of equilibrium. Using game theory tools, the method intends to connect unique (or apparently unique) events with more standard social science methods (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000b). It works through identifying a puzzle in a specific place and time where the key actors interact strategically, identifying the key decision points, and modelling the interaction among them with extensive-form games while searching for a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Taking the actors as central element of the approach, analytic narrative tries to “capture the influence of history, the importance of uncertainty, and the capacity of people to manipulate and strategize, as well as the limits of their ability to do so” (Bates et al., 1998, p.13). In summary, this method is based on a profound knowledge of a particular reality, aiming at the ability to highlight the key elements and to analytically understand all the options of the actors.

Creating an analytic narrative is a complex process divided into two separated parts, diverse in time, in goals and in procedures. The first step entails “the use of narrative to elucidate the principal players, their preferences, the key decision

points and possible choices, and the rules of game, all in a textured and sequenced account” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p1). Once there is a big familiarity with the events and their features, it is possible to start the second step, “building a model of the sequence of interaction, including predicted outcomes” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p1). The necessity of these two parts is reinforced by the fact that a significant portion of the work is carried out autonomously at each stage. Also, the techniques that are applied in each phase are different. While in the narrative the tools used to obtain information are typically those that are qualitative, such as interviews, the tools used in the analytic part are those provided by game theory. The two processes are completed independent from each other, while still remaining analytically linked: the second step is subject to the findings of the first one, and the first one would have much less sense without the second one. Thus, the method needs this symbiosis between both steps to be useful, as one part has no sense without the other. The conjunction of both steps creates in this way a unit greater than the sum of its parts.

Analytic narrative as methodology has various advantages. The first one is that it provides the researcher with a discipline to face the investigation (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000a). There is a theory behind the research, which is guided by the search of specific elements. This allows the researcher to face an investigation with certain guidance and without being distracted by whatever he or she finds first. Starting from theory the researcher can face the narrative with a better idea of the central points to trace. From there it is then possible to elaborate the narrative based on the theory and the elements connected to it. The second advantage is that despite the existence of a theory, the method allows starting a research without a previous deep knowledge of the topic. This is because the narrative part allows corrections and tools to uncover elements that were impossible to know in advance. In fact, “only after acquiring a significant understanding of the phenomenon -that is, only after much if not all the research has been concluded- can a scholar have any prospect for defining the larger universe of events” (Bates et al., 2000b, p696). The possibility to go backwards to a previous point is connected to that and emerge thus as the third advantage. Discovering unexpected elements in the narrative does not block the

research or invalidate the theory but reinforces the model, because this methodological approach permits to revise the theory and the model and then proceed further with the analysis. “Those implications force the scholar to reconsider the narrative and then to reevaluate the extent to which key elements of the narrative lie outside the proposed theory” (Bates et al., 2000a, p.687). However, if the theory must be revised too many times by the existence of external elements, there is a problem with the theory that not even the method can ignore. Another advantage is the possibility to analyse the viability of the potential options that have not materialized but with another circumstances they could be real. That is, the alternatives that were not chosen but could have been chosen. This is because the method allows evaluating all the possible outcomes based on the changes of single preferences in each actor involved without doing new research or new models. Finally, another advantage of analytic narrative is the opportunity to identify processes or mechanisms that would not be so obvious with other methodologies. The use of extensive-form games permits to show institutions, links and preferences that lead to a specific outcome which otherwise would be hidden. “The advantage of the game is that it reveals the logic of why, in equilibrium, it is in the interest of the players to fulfill their threats or promises against those who leave the equilibrium path”(Levi & Weingast, 2016, p.5).

3.1.3 The narrative part.

The narrative is the first stage in which the analytic narrative approach is divided into. This requires the researcher to be involved in a series of events trying to discover what happened. With this in mind, the main goal of this part is to form a unified story from the various pieces that compound the reality of each case. Yet not any story will suffice, as “narrative is the story being told [...] as a detailed and textured account of context and process, with concern for sequence, temporality and key events” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p7). Narrative is a combination of the delimitation of the elements of the case with a coherent and meaningful presentation.

The narrative is a central step for any research conducted under the rules of the methodology of analytic narratives. It is thanks to the narrative and the exploration connected to it that it is possible to know about the components with which to work. It is in this phase when the investigators delimit “the behavior of particular actors, clarify sequences, describe structures, and explore patterns of interaction” (Bates et al., 1998, p10). Moreover, it is with the narrative that it is possible to observe the whole picture of where the actions take place. Through techniques like in-depth interviews “the narrative of analytic narratives establishes the principal players, their goals, and their preferences while also illuminating the effective rules of the game, constraints, and incentives” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p7). With this, narrative places all the elements of the game on the board.

Deciding what should be included in the narrative is fundamental, because at the end it selects on what is going to be analysed. Immersed in an environment with a multitude of inputs, the previous knowledge of the field and the personal background are the main tools of the researcher to elucidate what is relevant for the case and what is not. It is important to notice that this condition is not always as obvious as it seems, as the relevance of some elements can be veiled at first sight. A priori it is thus not possible to know the exact relevance of some elements, as “some contextual changes may have clear and significant consequences, others have butterfly effects, and others little or no effect” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p12). The narrative part is the moment that defines what is important and for what reason. It is the time to separate the wheat from the chaff in colloquial words. But, although, the election of the key elements is crucial for a good narrative and consequently for a good research, it is not enough to describe a series of events, creating a report of what happened. It is also important to put the elements together in order to discover their sense and connections. In other words, “taken together, a series of disparate, seemingly unconnected happenings can then be constructed into longer event sequences. Narratives thus organize chronologically linked parts into a meaningful analytic whole” (Pedriana, 2005, p351). in this way, a unity with a meaning is created which not simply goes

beyond the elements that compose it, but only appears as a whole through the narrative.

According to the scholars who systematized the approach, the narrative should almost have a literary quality and should be able to convey the reader to a position where it is possible to feel as part of the story. As if it were a novel, none of the elements are constraint to be static and can thus potentially play different roles in the story which makes it more appealing for the reader and more interesting for the researcher. These potential diverse conclusions are what deserve investigation, as without different possible endings there is no analytic interest in a situation. However, the solution to these potentialities of the elements present in the narrative can just be fully solved in the analytic part. Thus, a good narrative includes, as a good novel, not a fixed solution, but several:

A narrative possesses a background or setting, a beginning, a sequence of scenes, and an ending. The construction of an analytic narrative involves mastering the elements of the drama. Narratives fascinate, however, in part because, like dramas, they can be elusive; many possible explanations can exist, and many possible interpretations (Bates et al., 1998, p14).

But the narrative is not just an enjoyable story; it is a valuable instrument too. For James Mahoney it is “a useful tool for assessing causality in situations where temporal sequencing, particular events, and path dependence must be taken into account” (1999, p1164). And Levi goes beyond when she argues that the “narrative offers a means to arbitrate among possible explanations for observational equivalences, that is, two distinct processes that could be leading to the same outcome” (2002, p112). Nonetheless, the relevance of narratives for the entire process is in the analytic stage where the capacity is stronger to observe the potentialities of all possible outcomes.

3.1.4 The analytic part.

As previously mentioned, the narrative part is the phase of the research in which central elements are identified. When it is possible to see the interactions between the actors and some of the consequences of these interactions. However, the narrative has a limited analytical power and often cannot arbitrate between two alternative explanations. In addition, it is the theory through the model that specifies the conditions that must obtain to ascertain which is correct (Levi, 2002). Despite the aim to create a pleasant reading of the events, narratives have as main purpose to provide the key elements not for descriptive reasons but to analyse it. Therefore, narratives in this methodology are more than simple stories; they are analytic narratives, that is, stories with scientific purpose. Because “by modelling the processes that produced the outcomes, we seek to capture the essence of stories” (Bates et al., 1998, p12). Hence a stage when the analysis goes beyond narrative’s analytical capacities is necessary, a stage when all the analysis of the elements highlighted in the previous step are combined. Once the elements of the case have been underlined, the formulation of “a rationalistic theory or theoretical model that fits this story” is possible (Dessler, 2000, p176).

The concept of analytic refers to the decomposition of complex processes into simpler elements, with the goal to understand the causal mechanisms by which these are related. Additionally, it composes processes and phenomena of enormous complexity through a process of analysis (Aguiar, De Francisco, & Noguera, 2009). To analyse means to make what appears initially complicated in front of ours eyes, easier. In others words, it means grasping the reality. But this process must be done with tools that assure the systematization, replicability, clarity and the capacity to make a complex process easier. The tools and the nature of the analytical part are well explained by Levi,

Analytics, in this approach, refers to the building of models derived from rational choice, particularly the theory of extensive form games. This means, first, extracting from the narratives the key actors, their goals, and their preferences and the effective rules that influence actors’

behaviors. Second, it means elaborating the strategic interactions that produce an equilibrium that constrains some actions and facilitates others. The emphasis is on identifying the reasons for the shift from an institutional equilibrium at one point in time to a different institutional equilibrium at a different point in time (Levi, 2002,p111).

3.1.5 Strategic actors.

Consequently with Levi's definition, it is relevant for the method to take in consideration the initial assumption of the method, that is, actors act strategically. Namely, they have a rational behaviour. Rational actors follow one premise: they "try to achieve optimal results within an incentive structure of costs, benefits, and available alternatives for action" (Pedriana, 2005, 354). The internal pathway of building a preference for a specific choice may vary among different individuals, but the authors of the *Theory of Choice* are able to synthesize the logical debate about rational actors in this way,

Each option has cost and consequences. When consequences are certain and cost are equals, a rational agent chooses by the measure of what outcome she or he most prefers. Where they are not, the agent chooses among options by calculating the probable net benefits of each. Rationality is thus a matter of means, not of ends. It is a relation of consistency between preferences, information and action (Hargreaves Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden, & Weale, 1992, pvii).

Rational actors act strategically, that is, their calculus are not just limited to their behaviour, but to the rest of elements and actors that can affect the outcome of their actions. When a rational actor decides on one option, he or she takes into account the reactions that his or her actions have on the other actors too. Based on these reactions, he or she will modulate his or her final choices. Despite the possibility to individualize behaviours, in a real environment, the actor's choices are not isolated, but interconnected. There is no external imposition on the actors that can act freely, but they are conscious of the relevance of their actions on other individuals. They are aware that "the choices of one actor depend on

the choices of the other” (Levi & Weingast, 2016, p5). This means that rational actors do not limit the analysis to themselves as they take into account the possible reactions of others when planning their course of action. Behaving strategically also implies that the players try to find out what the others are going to do. Therefore, “rollback is crucial for strategic behaviour- thinking strategically means looking into the future to predict how others will behave and then using that information to make decisions” (Mathematics, 2015). This calculation is due to an internal process to optimize the players’ payoff in every possible outcome. Knowing that the actors involved have this kind of behaviour allows the researcher to study the theoretically possible options and to understand which option is chosen in each situation and why. William Riker saw in this kind of behaviour already a way to apply powerful analytic tools like game theory to social science research, to understand political behaviour and to generate compartment laws (Riker, 1962). The fact that more than fifty years later social analysts still are using it, confirms its utility in several circumstances.

3.1.6 The tools used in the analytic part: game theory.

Once we have made the assumption about the rational behaviour of the actors involved, it is time to take a look at the tools used for the analysis. These tools are taken from game theory, a technique that “has become an accepted multidisciplinary model for social exchange in decision making” (Salkind, 2010, p523) in several disciplines, among those political science. Game theory has become popular among scholars because it provides a framework for studying behaviours under the assumption of rational actors. It could be defined as “a model of decision making and strategy under differing conditions of uncertainty” (Salkind, 2010, p523). The interactions among involved actors receives the name “games” and the actors are called “players”; hence the name of game theory for the discipline. The use of game theory is helpful because it allows the researcher to understand the reason of past events, but unlike other techniques, it also permits to predict what strategy each player will choose, and to predict future outcomes of the games (Mathematics, 2015). Assuming that each player acts to maximize his own expected pay-off (Watson, 2013) it is possible to trace their

plan of action thanks to the representation of the games. In game theory “strategy refers to a complete plan of action including all prospective play options as well as the player’s associated outcome preferences” (Salkind, 2010, p523). If a player wants to achieve his or her goals, he or she has to do it based on the movements produced or potentially produced by the other actors. However, a dominant strategy is one that works best, no matter what the other player does. The purpose of using games is to make the search of solutions in a complicated field such as human behaviour simpler and easier to follow. Players are decision-makers and “the decision-maker is seen as choosing between a range of options, which have consequences that are uncertain because they depend on unknown states of the world” (Read, 2009, p127). Game theory makes it easier to explore this uncertainty through the different procedures that players use to obtain their preferred outcomes.

The analysis in game theory is based on an important concept: the equilibrium. Equilibrium refers to a stable situation where the players do not take any further actions to modify the status quo. The Noble-prize winner John Forbes Nash theorized about the existence of a “static state, such that all players are solving for optimization and none of the players benefit from a unilateral strategy change” (Salkind, 2010, p524). In other words, “a strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium if no player can benefit from altering his or her choices, given the choices of the other players” (Bates et al., 1998, p9). This concept is extremely useful, as it means that if there is no alteration of the external factors no change will be produced in the players’ choices, as no actor would unilaterally chose to modify his or her behaviour. This permits a conscious analysis of the elements and the expected behaviour of the players. Nevertheless, to keep this state stable the threats and promises need to be credible, otherwise players might see an opportunity to improve their situation if they know there would be no consequences. The reason is that “the players remain on the equilibrium path of play because it would be in the best interests of others to fulfil their threats or promises should they stray off it” (Bates et al., 1998, p10). The possibility of ending up in a worse situation than before is what causes that no movement will be produced. The player knows that an alteration of the status quo produced by

him or her, will also imply a new movement by the other players. The same premise is applied to all the players and as a consequence, the situation remains unaltered.

Game theory has various approaches to study a situation, but the one that fits the most with the methodology used in this dissertation is the game-representation through extensive-form games. For the scholars working with analytic narratives, this game-form is the most suitable,

Because we seek to explore concrete, historical cases, we wish to examine the choices of individuals who are embedded in specific settings. We wish to trace the sequences of actions, decisions, and responses that generate events and outcomes. The individuals we study possess preferences and expectations; they are not isolated, but rather are locked in patterns of strategic interdependence. The extensive form explicitly highlights these features (Bates et al., 1998, p9).

Extensive form games are those that represent the strategic interaction between the actors in a graphical manner, making it, in this way, easier to follow the possible options that each actor has in every moment. This method of displaying the games visually resembles a tree, which is the reason why the various actions that players can choose from are called branches. The branches connect to another element of the graph, the nodes, that are focal points “that represent places where something happens in the game (such as a decision by one of the players)” (Watson, 2013 p10). Each node is connected to the other nodes by the branches in form of arrows. The game starts with an initial node that represents the first moment in which a player has to decide between the various options represented as arrows. In this configuration of the game the traceability is one of its strong points, as it allows the reader to jump easily from one focal point to another. “By tracing backward through the tree from a given node, you can define a node’s predecessors and immediate predecessor” (Watson, 2013, p175). This way to present the various dilemmas that the actors face, allow us to go back and forward in the chain of actor’s decisions, making it possible to analyse

the reasoning of the actors. When such a directed graph “has been properly constructed and labelled” (Watson, 2013, p175) it is possible to define it as an extensive-form game.

3.1.7 The use of aggregates in game theory.

One issue to face in studies produced under the postulates of rational choice is the problem of treating groups of persons as individuals. Game theory’s *modus operandi* is based on how individuals’ preferences are pursued, even though it appears that groups have a different internal way to establish their priorities and the course of action to achieve them. Therefore, the critics of this tool, like Jon Elster, argue that the behaviour of on single person cannot be treated equally to the behaviour of the collectives, and consequently, game theory cannot be used for groups of people (2000). For him, the absence of an external homogeneous behaviour due to the lack of internal coherence would make it impossible to follow rational choice rules and it would have no value to use game theory. In fact, he asks if “aggregates can coherently be said to have preferences, at all” (Elster, 2000, p693).

Although it is true that not all aggregates can be studied under the procedures of the rational choice theory, like the ones who correspond to abstract concepts as the “North” or the “South”²², not all the aggregates have this level of abstraction. It is also possible to find groups that present a homogenous internal decision-making process and strategic calculations in their external behaviour independently of the actions of the individuals that form them. Hence, “whether aggregation is justified depends on the extent to which the problem of decision making within the aggregated unit can be examined separately from the interactions among such units” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000, p698). Thus, the specification under which groups can be studied which rational choice and which ones cannot, should be placed on whether these actors are “capable of formulating and pursuing coherent and sophisticated strategies” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000, p698) or not. Conditions that

²² Or others like the “markets” and “the elites” (Elster, 2000).

both, political parties and social movements fulfil, and which make them apt to be studied from the point of view of game theory.

3.2 Case studies.

3.2.1 The use of case studies.

This dissertation does not seek to normatively evaluate the relationship between political parties and social movements, neither to discuss the potential ways of interaction between them. This dissertation aims to analyse the specific elements that shape the rapport between them to understand how these actors behave in their connections. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to stay in contact with the reality to discover the crucial elements of the relationships. It is essential to observe specific actors in specific times and places, that is, to conduct case studies. For Robert Yin, expert scholar in case studies, “as a research method, the case study is used in many situations, to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena” (2009, p.64). Thus, the analytic narrative method does not just permit the study of actual cases, but it is based on the careful observation of the reality previous to the analysis. The aim of analytic narratives is to develop systematic explanations through case studies (Bates et al., 2000b). Specific events are the key of any research guided under that methodology. The impossibility to work with big amounts of quantitative data should not be a reason to disregard crucial events in politics. In the words of the authors of *Analytic Narratives*, “unique events are too important to leave aside, and we use rational choice, particularly game theory, as a means to study unique events” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000a, p686).

The use of case studies allows a profound exploration of concrete events. A deep interest in a particular case pushes the researcher to collect detailed information about it. This information might be not as explicit as in other scientific research, but thanks to meticulous work of the researcher, it is possible to achieve a profound knowledge about a series of events that occurred in a specific period of time. Unlike other situations, analysts are not required to use a unique source of

data, but they are able to work with a variety of data collections. Case studies, therefore, draw from different sources of evidence such as documents and interviews to develop the analysis (Yin, 2009). The variety of data sources permits to study a large number of events, however not all cases can be analysed by all methodologies. In fact, a particular feature linked to the rational behaviour of actors restricts the case selection under the rules of analytic narratives. Thus, the facts considered adequate to be analysed are only those in which there are strategic interactions between key actors (Levi, 2002).

The phenomenon studied in this research is the dynamics of the interaction between political parties and social movements. To deep-dive into it, two cases were analysed. These two cases are linked to the municipal elections of the cities of Milan and Barcelona. Specifically, they regard the strategic actions carried out by parties and movements around the elections of 2016 in Milan, and around the elections of 2015 in Barcelona. The goal of choosing these two cases was to study the events in-depth, establishing the actors involved, the decisions they took, the alliances they created and the elements that played an important role in their preferences. All this because it is only after acquiring a meaningful comprehension of the phenomenon that it is possible to properly analyse what had happened, and to understand the reasons that produced it. To create the whole picture of both cases, a detailed data collection with a variety of primary and secondary sources was used, including: in-depth interviews with key actors, the campaigns' documents, private and public documents –like manifestos and ethical codes-, documentary movies, books, newspaper coverage, campaign' leaflets, collaboration agreements and surveys.

3.2.2 The choice of case studies.

The choice of Milan and Barcelona as case studies to analyse the interactions between social movements and political parties was not made arbitrarily. The election was based on several factors encouraging the use of these two particular cities. The first of those factors was the existence of interactions between the relevant actors in both cities. The object of study of the present dissertation is

thereby given. On the one hand, in Milan the Movimento Arancione was a very relevant actor in the primary elections of the Partito Democratico, as this movement was behind the candidature of the elected mayor in 2011. On the other hand, in Barcelona several social movements, but in particular the members of Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, were the ones who led the political project created with Podemos and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa that won the local elections of 2015.

The second factor concerns the prior knowledge of the two environments by the researcher. Seldom are the occasions when scholars chose to study a problem absolutely from scratch without a previous familiarity about the facts, the topic or the techniques used. All scholars tend to choose their research based on their field of expertise or an initial knowledge of the elements that are going to be studied. This is also the case here, since the researcher had a previous knowledge of the political realities of Italy and Spain, and with it, of the actors who would play a relevant role in the subject under study. Additionally, the knowledge of the Spanish, Italian and Catalan languages increased the access to information and enabled a close interaction between the researcher and the interviewed. This knowledge proved to be very useful to conduct the interviews since several of the interviewed do not speak English or their levels would not allow them to express themselves comfortably talking about complex situations. This may seem secondary, but the details obtained by sharing the same language and the same cultural space have been priceless.

The possibility of access to the key actors in each case was the third factor in choosing Milan and Barcelona. Political parties tend to be obscure about political negotiations and reluctant to open up about their inside knowledge to external individuals. Further, accessibility to certain public figures, in particular politicians, is never easy, as they are busy people and several are scared of the consequences of their declarations. Besides, there is no political gain in spending time with an academic, as it only takes time away from other activities. Thus, the personal connections of the supervisor and the researcher himself were crucial to being able to obtain them for interviews. Those connections made it possible

to either directly reach out to the actors or to do so through intermediaries. Without such contacts it would not have been possible to carry out this research with the same approach, especially with so little time available.

Finally, Milan and Barcelona, despite their inherent differences, are comparable realities. Both belong to Southern European countries with a Mediterranean culture of understanding public social life (Meñaca et al., 2012). Similar in population, both cities have a rich political history and despite not being the capital of their countries they play an important role in national politics. In economics, both are important business centres at European and Global level. Milan and Barcelona host several universities and have a rich social fabric with several social movements oriented at diverse topics. Politically speaking, in both cities it is possible to currently find winning coalitions between social movements and political parties. In addition, the two cities have new mayors who arrived after the elections. In the case of Milan coming from the same party that previously held the mayoralty, while in the case of Barcelona, from the new coalition that overcame the incumbent mayor. At the same time, the elections in Milan and Barcelona are held under different electoral rules. This element alters the way actors interact with each other. Nevertheless, all of the above factors show why these two cases were chosen and outline their comparability.

3.3 Data collection.

3.3.1 In-depth interviews as a research tool.

In order to obtain the necessary information on the two cases under study, several in-depth interviews were conducted with persons involved in political parties and social movements. The choice of using in-depth interviews is motivated by the fact that it allows a proper exploration of the respondent's point of views, experiences, feelings, and perspectives. The nature of the method is well-defined: "in-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation" (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p3). Hence, an in-depth interview is an open-

ended, discovery-oriented method, which aims to obtain detailed information about a topic from a stakeholder.

The interview is as a communicative process between the researcher and other individuals from who he extracts valuable information about the object of investigation. Interviews are thus, a process with a goal: the transmission of knowledge based on the personal experience of a stakeholder. That knowledge can be derived from various origins, like years of study, or personal experiences, and its transmission allows the researcher to create or confirm a picture of specific situations that would otherwise not be possible. These interviews are crucial for exploring new topics in depth since it permits identifying the key stakeholders who were involved in the studied events and other information that is essential to understand those events. The interview is configured, hence, as an interaction capable to create new material for the analysis. It is through the answers of the interviewed that new questions are generated, and so it is possible to “explore fully all the factors that underpin participants’ answers: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs” (Legard et al., 2003, p141). Also, the interaction between interviewer and interviewed enables both parties to reflect about issues and discover concepts that would not be present without their mutual collaboration. But using in-depth interviews does not mean leaving all to the future. In-depth interviews have an objective and “carrying out good in-depth fieldwork requires a high degree of planning, both about the overall shape or structure of the interview” (Arthur & Nazroo, 2003, p109).

In-depth interviews have several advantages, but what makes them especially interesting is the amount of information that can be collected through them. Moreover, this data is much more detailed “than what is available through other data collection methods” (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p3). In fact, one of the limitations of the technique is that it is sometimes difficult swimming in such big quantities of material deciding what is relevant and what is not. However, in-depth interviews are very convenient, especially when it is necessary to shape the whole picture and the details of a case at the same time. This technique can provide detailed information about a person’s thoughts and behaviours

otherwise difficult to obtain. Therefore, interviews were also very suitable in the present research as “interviews can provide insights that are not available to researchers working with large survey samples and are known to be the most suitable approach when seeking rich data illuminating individuals’ experiences and attitudes” (Gorra, 2007, p101).

One of the features of in-depth interviews is that they combine structure and flexibility, which allows the researcher to adapt to new information that is appearing at the moment of the interview (Legard et al., 2003). This kind of interview allows clarifications to the answers of the interviewed and to ask spontaneous questions based on the new information appearing from those answers. With this format, the respondents are more likely to open and to provide more complete explanations (The Wallace Foundation, 2007). Interviewed are more accessible to explain sensitive issues when a trustful environment is created and when they are able to use all the time and the details they consider necessary to describe complex situations. Explaining a story is complicated enough when we try to frame it in previous assumptions as researchers often try to do. For that reason, allowing the interviewed to use nuances to make their points freely and clear can reveal valuable insights. Finally, in-depth interviews are worthwhile, as they bring to light those circumstances that were previously unknown.

3.3.2 Conducting the interviews.

The interviews were held face-to-face between the researcher and the interviewed with a semi-structured format. This implies that the interviews were based on previously prepared questions and on the introduction of other questions grounded on the data collected through the answers of the interviewed (Leavitt, 2001). As the previous knowledge of some issues were by definition restricted to just the individuals involved on the acts –like private meetings-, it was required to provide a big degree of freedom to the interviewed to respond the way they considered most appropriate. Consequently, with the goal of uncovering hidden information, the researcher tried to create a trust

environment with the interviewed. The interviews were held in relaxed places chosen by the interviewed, without limitation of time and without cutting any answer even if topics were not directly relevant for the research. All the interviews were recorded for academic reasons with the agreement of all participants. The purpose of recording the interviews was re-listening possible, with the objective to highlight the crucial elements and to not lose importance pieces of information. Recording the interviews allowed the researcher to devote his full attention to listening to the interviewed and probing in-depth. Furthermore, recording the interviews enables also others scholars to corroborate the correct use of the interviews conducted by the researcher. In addition to the registrations, the researcher also took notes during the interviews in order to keep track of the conversations and to reask when necessary. The use of notes was however limited, as “note-taking can give participants unintended cues - that they should slow down or pause if the researcher is writing; that they have said enough if the researcher is not” (Legard et al., 2003, p167). Various quotes from the interviews are presented in Chapters Four and Five to contribute and support the points in discussion. The interviews were held in Italian, Catalan and Spanish and for this reason, they are not – except in some cases- literally presented. However, the quotes used fully preserve the intention of the interviewed in all the cases, and can be consulted in the Annex in form of audio files.

The Annex I and the Annex II contain all the names and a brief description of the persons interviewed. The individuals were chosen based on their capacity to contribute, due to their knowledge and personal experience, and to determine the elements of the cases of Milan and Barcelona. Some of them were personally involved in the events under study and others had a deep knowledge of the matters for professional or academic reasons. In both cases - Milan and Barcelona- the interviewed persons include politicians, academics and activist. A total of sixteen in-depth interviews were conducted, eight for the case of Milan and eight for Barcelona. As per usual in all investigations using this technique, the interviews were very laborious to organize and to conduct. Likewise it was as well arduous to extract the required information from the words of the

interviewed. The professional or political positions of several of the interviewed made it quite difficult to find the right moment to proceed with the interview as their agenda was considerably occupied. For almost all of them several contacts were necessary to organize a personal meeting, as for them, this work was not a priority. However, it is also fair to say that some of the interviewed were very open and accessible. Unfortunately, despite the personal contacts of the researcher and his supervisor, it was finally not possible to interview the two current mayors of Milan and Barcelona after several attempts.

The interviews were conducted leaving room for the interviewed to express their positions, nonetheless, the interests of the researcher to know about specific events made it necessary to prepare a script to channel the interviews. The risk in in-depth interviews, especially in politics, to lose the original track cannot be ignored. Thereby, a set of questions was prepared in advance, always with the aim to be open enough to dispense them when they were clearly useless for a specific interview or to add new ones due to the feedback of the interviewed²³. Thus, those questions prepared on the prior knowledge of the matter by the researcher -with the essential help of the supervisor of this dissertation- were used to guide the conversations, always being aware that those questions “should be used flexibly and should enhance rather than inhibit responsive questioning” (Arthur & Nazroo, 2003, p136). Otherwise the risk of losing relevant information for the case is too high.

Notwithstanding having a common core and one single purpose -learning more about the interaction between political parties and social movements-, each case-study was approached with a specific set of questions. Thus, both case studies shared several questions and included exclusive questions for each of them. The particularities of each case made it necessary to make some adjustments on the questions to obtain the maximum of information. The aim of the research was to obtain general information about the relationship between political parties and social movements but from very specific dynamics: the ones of Milan and Barcelona around the local elections. Consequently, due to this

²³ The initial questions can be found in the Annex III (Milan) and in the Annex IV (Barcelona).

specificity and despite using analogous questions the interviewed themselves led the talks towards the particular elements of each analysed relationship. From there, new questions were born from responses of the interviewed. Despite the case particularities, the questions were structured in similar groups:

- The background of the project and the evolution of events.
- The role of social movements in politics.
- The role of each actor in the collaboration.
- The political campaign.

Additionally, the case of Milan included specific questions about the primary elections of the Partito Democratico, the importance of the groups that did not win the primaries, and the capacity of influence of the civic list in the mayoral elections. For Barcelona, the specificities of the questions were related to the creation-process of the coalition and the designation of an activist as a mayoral candidate. Both sets of specific questions in which the interviews were based are available in the Annex.

3.3.3 Data treatment.

Once the data is collected thanks to the interviews and the other sources, the information needs to be analysed under game theory framework keeping in mind the original objectives. The overall purpose of this work is to contribute with more information to the relationship between political parties and social movements, specifically the elements that alter their framework of interaction. To highlight the circumstances that makes that relationship being closer or more distant. Thus, based on the classification made by Michael Hanagan (1998), the two cases will be analysed with the ambition of discovering the key facts that displace the rapport between the actors from one type to relationship to another. That is, trying to discover what makes that the relationship moves across the axis that goes from *articulation* to *opposition* through *permeation*, *alliance*, *independence* and *competition*. The goal is to test the crucial elements that incentivize the agreement between the various parties, and evaluate the role of these elements in the dynamics of the interaction. The use of game theory offers

an interesting approach as it generates propositions through the model that are refutable. Also, it permits to work with a variance on the players' preferences and to adjust the outcome when it happens. The key elements will be analysed under the rules of game theory using the extensive-form games.

3.4 Summary.

This chapter presented analytic narratives as the methodology chosen for this research, starting by introducing the method and explaining its two different parts. After the exposition of the convenience of the method to face the relationship between political parties and social movements, its tools are explained. That is, in-depth interviews for the narrative part and game theory for the second one. Then, the chapters Four and Five contain the narrative part of the two case studies, Milan and Barcelona. The chapter Six contains the analysis of the findings.

Chapter Four.

The case of the city of Milan.

After analysing the interaction between political parties and social movements, this chapter focuses on one specific case of this interaction, namely the municipal elections of the city of Milan in the year 2016. In particular, this case looks at the existing relationship between the social movements and the centre-left coalition that was able to win the 2016 local elections and the municipal government. Already in 2011, a big centre-left coalition driven by a social movement was able to impose their project in Milan, an arduous environment for leftist positions. It is therefore significant to take a deeper look at the historical complex relationship of a major political movement for the city such as the *Movimento Arancione* with the main party of the left, the *Partito Democratico*. In this context, it is important to pay special attention to the processes of finding agreements between both actors from the primary elections of the coalition until the last round of the municipal elections. These findings will be analysed later in Chapter Six dedicated to the strategic decisions of the actors involved in the case of Milan.

4.1 The background.

Milan is the main industrial and financial centre of Italy (Meijers, Hollander, & Hoogerbrugge, 2012), and it has been defined as a bourgeois city focused on the affaires and a stronghold for the right parties (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). Home and headquarters of the companies of Silvio Berlusconi, Milan's electoral results have always been personally very relevant for the most successful politician of last decades in Italy. Due to this, he was always very active both in the electoral campaigns of Milan, and those of Lombardy, the Italian region of which Milan is capital²⁴. But despite this dominance of right-parties, in the municipal elections of the city of Milan in 2011, the centre-left coalition was able to win against the incumbent mayor and

²⁴ For instance: Berlusconi makes election in Milan all about him. NYTimes. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/europe/12italy.html>

former minister of Berlusconi, Letizia Moratti. Until that moment, the centre-right had held the government of the city for almost twenty years. Traditionally the victory of the centre-right was so secure, that Paolo Limonta, one of the leaders of the social movement *Movimento Arancione*, says that before 2011 centre-left candidates were just working to lose with some dignity and not to win (24th of June 2016, personal interview). Furthermore, Letizia Moratti was not a new and inexperienced politician that was occupying the position of mayor by chance. She was able to win the 2006 elections in the first round with 52% of votes. Before being Milan's mayor, she had had a long professional and political life²⁵ and she was well known for the citizens of Milan also due to her marriage with a member of a popular and rich family dedicated to the oil business and owners of the football-team "Inter de Milan"²⁶. Thanks to her family wealth, Moratti was able to do very powerful electoral campaigns spending a substantial amount of money more²⁷ than her opponents in both municipal elections she was part of²⁸. But meanwhile this advantage brought her a notorious success in 2006; it was not enough against the candidate of the centre-left coalition, Giuliano Pisapia, in 2011.

In 2011 Letizia Moratti was the incumbent mayor and the left parties counted twenty years of electoral defeats. In addition, the left was incapable of gaining the position of mayor since this one was established in the 1993 elections as an independent vote from the rest of councillors. With this situation in mind, the centre-left coalition prepared its primary elections, choosing its mayoral candidate for Milan in the battle against the centre-right. In these primaries, four candidates ran for the nomination, but it was Giuliano Pisapia, the candidate supported by two small parties, *Sinistra Ecologia Libertà* (SEL) and *Federazione della Sinistra* (FdS), who won with 45% of the votes against the candidate

²⁵ She was a businesswoman who had worked in the insurance and telecommunications sectors. She was president of the Italian state television company RAI and chairwoman of News Corp Europe.

²⁶ Moratti family.

²⁷ The numbers of the Italian newspaper *Il Corriere della Sera* points out a record budget for a candidate to any municipal election in Italy before. Thus, in 2006 Moratti spent 6.335.000 euros in opposition of the 694.000 euros spent by her opponent. For the Italian newspaper *Repubblica* in 2011 she spent 12 million euros in confront to 700.000 euros of her opponent.

²⁸ 2006 and 2011.

supported by the main party of the coalition, the *Partito Democratico* (PD), Stefano Boeri. Giuliano Pisapia is a known lawyer, son of another respected lawyer of the city of Milan, who was the author of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. As a lawyer he was in charge of some famous trials but he had also a long political life: first as an activist and defending in court his party colleagues and later as member of the parliament. His defence of the legality beyond political believes –from within and from without the Parliament- made him a very respected figure also between his political adversaries (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). This condition of person of common sense resulted in the fact that he had no political enemies (Ibid.) and the citizens saw him as a reflective and sensitive person (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). Additionally, belonging to a well-known family, placed Pisapia in a bourgeoisie position that helped him to be accepted also by the more centrist members of the coalition, as Piero Bassetti, former mayoral candidate for the Christian Democracy party, argues (5th of July 2016, personal interview). Thus, due to his family and financial background, the economic powers considered him an equal and he did not have the inferiority complex that had suffered several candidates from the left before him (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). Those features made Giuliano Pisapia rapidly an accepted candidate by the members of the coalition.

Pisapia had, already from the beginning, a big support of relevant public figures from outside parties' environment. In fact, his candidature was presented as a candidacy of the citizens, as an external candidacy to political parties (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). Several intellectuals and notable people²⁹ of the political and cultural elite of Milan sustained the candidature (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). However, the most significant difference between Pisapia and the other primary candidates was the existence of a social movement supporting and boosting his candidature: the *Movimento Arancione*. This combination created a candidature of a party but without the party, based on external elements: social movements. In fact, the *Movimento Arancione* proved to be very important, not just in the

²⁹ Around 40 people according to Fernando Dalla Chiesa.

primary elections, but also in the municipal elections. This movement was formed by a group of active citizens who believed in a different concept of city than what Moratti represented. These people recognized in Giuliano Pisapia their own values and their same ideas about how Milan should be. They had the feeling that the candidate they had been waiting for was finally arrived (Limonta, Paolo; 24th of June 2016, personal interview). That commitment was crucial, because at the end, they were the mobilizing factor that gave strength to Pisapia's campaign (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). The *Movimento Arancione* born from transforming the protest movement against the school model, into a movement that has as main goal making the implementation of a more participative and egalitarian society possible (Limonta, Paolo; 24th of June 2016, personal interview). This movement gave an important impulse to Pisapia's campaign based on to the hope for change of its members and its capacity to mobilize leftist supporters.

Giuliano Pisapia became the chosen one by the centre-left coalition to confront Letizia Moratti, the centre-right candidate and maximum favourite³⁰. Despite starting from a position behind Moratti in the surveys, Pisapia's campaign started to mobilize sectors of the society that were against the policies developed by the right governments at national and local level, to a point where he became a serious threat for Moratti's chances to keep being the mayor of Milan. Moratti's term has had some problems linked to transparency and the arrests of figures close to her (Ambrosoli, Umberto; 7th of June 2016). Despite this, she was still in a good position to win again and she had a strong and organized campaign. Additionally, the amount of money she was able to spend in publicity before the campaign made her face present around the entire city (Bassetti, Piero; 5th of July 2016). Unfortunately for her political ambitions, this excess of public presence³¹ made her the target of several jokes and she started to be seen as a caricature of

³⁰ http://www.ilgiorno.it/milano/politica/2010/11/19/416828-comunali_moratti_favorita.shtml

<http://www.bolognanotizie.com/news/2011/05/15/39483/elezioni-milano-la-quiete-dopo-la-tempesta-moratti-favorita-pisapia-cresce-nei-sondaggi/>

³¹ Even too much in the electoral campaign as she received a fine for this excess of publicity: <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/05/24/milano-multata-letizia-moratti-per-occupazione-abusiva-degli-spazi-elettorali/113392/>

herself³². Furthermore, this excess of public exposition triggered a feeling among some moderated voters that understood that as too much, and activated the centre-left voters to fight against her (Mangano, Dario Mangano, & Terracciano, 2012). Thus, for first time in several years, the left was attending elections in Milan not as mere guest, but as a contender. At that moment, the mood within Pisapia's campaign was confident that victory was possible. This was demonstrated by the feeling of hope among the people attending Pisapia's final campaign act on of May 27th 2011 at Piazza Duomo, where despite rain the square was completely full and where people saw a rainbow in the sky that was interpreted as a sign of an inevitable victory (Lener, Gad; 9th of June 2016, personal interview). That iconic moment has been remembered and used several times by Pisapia's followers as a way to legitimize certain persons or acts during Pisapia's term (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview).

For Fernando Dalla Chiesa, former candidate of the left to the city of Milan, Letizia Moratti was not able to build the necessary consensus around her figure meanwhile she was the mayor of the city (13th of June 2016, personal interview). Despite not making any big mistakes her figure was not very appreciated even between her own electorate (Lener, Gad; 9th of June 2016, personal interview). Thus the centre-right voters were expecting something else different from Moratti. Giuliano Pisapia was that something else, and his particular political background made it possible for those centre-right voters, which were not happy with Moratti, to support him (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). Pisapia won unexpectedly already the first round of the municipal elections in 2011³³ (Corriere della Sera 16th of May 2011). He was able to beat Moratti with 48,04% of the votes against 41,58% of his opponent, and then he confirmed these results in the second round with 55,11% to 44,89%. Thus, he became mayor of the city of Milan carrying the feeling of a political change and big social excitement. In that way, Pisapia became the first leftist mayor in Milan taking also a leftist majority in the City Council (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of

³² <http://espresso.repubblica.it/visioni/satira/2011/05/23/news/moratti-la-beffa-sucate-1.31673>

³³ <https://archive.is/e6fD#selection-889.0-893.1>

June 2016, personal interview). The expectations about his management of the city were hence very high.

Pisapia held his position as a mayor with high rates of citizen approval during the 5 years of his mandate. This fact made many believe he would be interested in repeating candidature. However, he made clear already one year before the elections of 2016 that he would just be mayor for one term. Thus, the centre-left coalition had to confront the situation where the only person able to beat the centre-right after so many years would not run again for the position. The centre-left coalition had to look again for a candidate able to win the municipal elections meanwhile trying not to break the coalition through internal battles of placing ideas and candidates within the coalition. Also the *Movimento Arancione* deprived of the figure that symbolized their fight against the right policies of Moratti, had to figure out what to do, whether to continue supporting the coalition or not.

4.2 The primary elections.

Once it was clear that Giuliano Pisapia would not run again for a second term as mayor of Milan, the centre-left had to face choosing a candidate capable of maintaining the city for the coalition. This problem was not easy to solve, as Pisapia was very appreciated by the citizens of Milan³⁴ and his victory in a traditionally stronghold of the right, had been extremely symbolic (Ambrosoli, Umberto; 7th of June 2016, personal interview). In the words of Piero Bassetti, “Pisapia was a liberation flag, an emblem of honesty in a country where politicians are seen as selfish and corrupts” (5th of July 2016, personal interview). Thus, Pisapia was an important element that had to be replaced, but without losing the forces that made him to become mayor. With this in mind, the centre-left organized the primary elections that would have to end with choosing the candidate of the coalition for the municipal government of Milan. To make the society of Milan feel part of that process, the primaries were open to all the citizens of the city that would like to be candidate, except for those already

³⁴ An example of Pisapia's numbers:
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/02/19/news/ricerca_piepoli_sindaci-79037585/

members of centre-right parties (article 6 of the primary elections regulation). The only requirement to become candidate was to submit at least 2.000 signatures of citizens of Milan supporting the candidature (art.7). Moreover, to increase the connection of the process with the youth (Bussolati, Pietro; 6 of July 2016, personal interview), all the residents of the city that were going to be 16 years old at the moment of the municipal elections had the right to vote at the primaries (art.9). This included the European citizens and third countries citizens in regular situation in Italy. The primary elections took place the 6th and the 7th of February 2016, in 150 station polls prepared around Milan. To attend, it was enough to go to the electoral poll of the area of residence and give two Euros as a contribution to help paying the expenses of the organization of the primaries.

Four candidates decided to compete for the nomination of the centre-left in the primary elections. The four candidates were:

- Francesca Balzani, deputy mayor of Milan and former European MP. Explicitly supported by the mayor Giuliano Pisapia;
- Giuseppe Sala, former municipal manager and former CEO of Expo 2015 (the universal exposition held in Milan in 2015). Informally supported by the Prime Minister and leader of the *Partito Democratico* Matteo Renzi;
- Pierfrancesco Majorino, member of the City Council and the City Government of Milan. Supported by the left sectors of the coalition;
- Antonio Iannetta, manager and former president of USIP (Italian Sport Union for Everyone) Milano. An unknown candidate at the time of his presentation and who also did not have the support of relevant public figures.

The profiles of the three principal candidates, Majorino, Sala and Balzani, are rather different³⁵. Firstly, Pierfrancesco Majorino was the first candidate to announce that he would be running to become the candidate of the coalition after Pisapia said he would not run for a second term as a mayor. Majorino was

³⁵ Antonio Iannetta just had in the previous surveys less than 1% of expected support by the voters of the primaries elections.

very well liked by the more left voters³⁶, especially due to his past as adviser of the Minister of Social Solidarity and his position in the City Government in charge of Social Policies and Health Culture. He had had public relevance managing the civic unions register, the opening of the House of Rights dedicated to avoid any kind of discrimination, and the action plan that the city implemented to improve the conditions of the needy persons who arrived in Milan in the refugees waves of 2014 and 2015.

Secondly, Giuseppe Sala arrived to politics after a long and successful career in the private sector. Although, he was not a stranger in the public sector, in which he also worked for several years in managerial positions. However, the fact that his professional life had been especially linked to business made the leftist members of the coalition seeing him as not the most appropriate to continue with Pisapia's project (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). For them Sala was a person concerned about economic profits and not about common benefits. Undoubtedly, the time he spent in the private sectors occupies the largest part of his career, but he had also spent time working for the public sector from where he jumped into politics. After his degree in economics and commerce, he started to work for the chemical company Pirelli, where he held various positions for 10 years. Later, he worked as Chief Financial Officer of the telecommunication company TIM and as CEO of Telecom Italia Wireline. Then, he founded and worked in consulting firms until Letizia Moratti appointed him municipal manager of the city of Milan³⁷ in 2009. One year later he started working as head of the universal exposition Milan 2015, until the closure of it, when in December of that year he announced his candidature for the primaries.

Finally, Francesca Balzani had an intense political career very related with the public finances. However, she had also a private occupation as she worked for several years as a lawyer before she assumed her first relevant public position. Born in Genoa, her first political appointment was in her hometown as a responsible for the budget. After two years in that office, she entered in the list of

³⁶ <http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politica/2016/2/6/PRIMARIE-PD-MILANO-2016-Sala-occhio-a-Renzi/676889/>

³⁷ Direttore generale del Comune di Milano.

the *Partito Democratico* to become member of the European Parliament, a position that she was able to achieve. Her time as European parliamentary was also very linked with budget policies, as she was part of the economic committees as the committee to study and accept the Multiannual Financial Framework of the European Union, crucial to approve the annual budget of the EU. With that background, Giuliano Pisapia invited her in 2013 to be the responsible of the City Government of Milan for the areas of budget, public heritage and taxes. Additionally, in 2015 she was also appointed deputy mayor of Milan. The ideology of her potential voters would be in-between Majorino and Sala's voters as the survey of the POMLAB (Public Opinion and Media Laboratory) showed us.

Giuseppe Sala was the expected candidate by the media³⁸ and the establishment³⁹ of the *Partito Democratico*. His name came into play after Giuliano Pisapia confirmed he would not run again for a second term. The success in terms of organization and public of the Universal Exposition of Milan in 2015 managed by Sala, put him in a position of high popularity. He appeared to be a good manager able to deal with complex situations and to work with a big number of people. Sala was seen for the leader of the *Partito Democratico*, Matteo Renzi as the right choice to beat the centre-right in the elections⁴⁰. This idea was based on the central political positions of Sala and the perceptions that the citizens had about his managerial capacities (Bassetti, Piero; 5th of July 2016). However, the fact that he was perceived for several centre-left voters⁴¹ as the chosen candidate by the rulers of the *Partito Democratico* -especially Renzi⁴²- already before the celebration of the primaries, and his positions that those voters considered far away for the traditional left ideology (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview); made that the primaries were held without a

³⁸ <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/05/25/il-sindaco-dellexpo-io-dopo-pisapia-non-ci-penso-proprio-19.html>

³⁹ http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/09/02/news/renzi_milano_sala_sindaco_expo-122053645/

⁴⁰ <http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politica/2016/2/6/PRIMARIE-PD-MILANO-2016-Sala-occhio-a-Renzi/676889/>

⁴¹ Some surveys show that up to 84% believed he would be the final candidate of the centre-left.

⁴² <http://it.blastingnews.com/milano/2016/01/primarie-milano-2016-candidati-centrosinistra-e-pd-quando-e-dove-si-vota-00751257.html>

clear candidate to win. In fact, the critics towards Sala started even before he announced his candidature. The argument was based on the delay of the celebration of the primaries to favour that Sala could finish its participation in Expo 2015 in the most appropriate way. This argument appeared because there was a pre-candidate, Pierfrancesco Majorino, that already announced his intention to run for the candidacy and was more appreciated by the lefties members of the coalition but with less initial support from the rest of the centre-left voters.

Once it was clear that Sala was the favourite to win the nomination, Francesca Balzani also decided to run for the candidacy with the support of the mayor at that moment, Giuliano Pisapia⁴³. Pisapia was not in favour of Sala in the primaries, as they come from different worlds (Bassetti, Piero; 5th of July 2016). Thus, Pisapia went to Rome with Balzani to an interview with Renzi to show that she would be a good candidate for trying to retain the city in the hands of the centre-left. Renzi agreed that she could be a good candidate when he met her, and decided that he would not support explicitly any candidate, despite being in favour of Sala (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). Nevertheless, Renzi's support for Sala was clear as several high members of the *Partito Democratico* belonged to Sala's campaign staff⁴⁴. Pisapia's active support for Balzani made her the favourite for the leftist sector, but the lack of agreement to join forces with Majorino reduced her possibility of victory. The leftist voters were consequently divided between the candidates. Also, the decision of Balzani to candidate was probably too late as almost all the City Government members had already given their support to Sala or Majorino. Notwithstanding this late arrival, this did not suppose fewer possibilities to win the primaries as all the electoral campaign took place without a clear winner. Moreover, the campaign issues were quite common among the candidates and despite Balzani was the

⁴³ <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/01/28/primarie-milano-2016-pisapia-balzani-mia-preferita-vorrei-che-prossimo-sindaco-fosse-donna/2415217/>

⁴⁴ <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-sala-candidato-sindaco-col-42-dei-voti-harakiri-della-sinistra-maggioritaria-ma-divisa/2441539/>

one who played more explicitly the card of Pispaia's project ⁴⁵, all three tried to be seen as the heirs of the centre-left term.

The final results of the primary elections produced the designation of Giuseppe Sala as candidate for the centre-left coalition. He won with 42% of the votes, followed by Francesca Balzani with 34% and Pierfrancesco Majorino with 23%⁴⁶. The fact that Balzani and Majorino represented similar kinds of voters, those more worried about social issues or more leftist, made some say that both candidates together would have been able to defeated Sala⁴⁷. This claim was based on the premise that left positions were majoritarian within the electorate of the coalition⁴⁸. However, the survey conducted by Luciano Fasano and Paolo Natale for the POMLAB (Public Opinion and Media Laboratory) with over 3.000 persons voting in the primaries denies that victory of one single candidate over Sala. The survey shows that Sala would have won the primary elections anyway, even with just one adversary. The POMLAB group asked about voters' second preference, and the result of analysing them, shows that Sala would receive a lot of these second preferences, whether candidate Balzani or Majorino [see table 15].


⁴⁵ <http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Milano/2016/2/7/BALZANI-Chi-e-Programma-del-candidato-Sindaco-di-Milano-Oggi-mi-rilasso-coi-miei-bimbi-primarie-PD-Milano-2016-7-febbraio-2016-/675594/>

⁴⁶ Antonio Iannetta received 0,73% of the primary voters.

⁴⁷ http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/02/07/news/primarie_milano_risultati_sala_balzan_i_majorino-132924308/

⁴⁸ <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-dietro-gli-abbracci-a-sala-la-resa-dei-conti-della-sinistra-e-ora-con-il-candidato-ci-saranno-problemi/2442232/>

Table 15. Balzani's and Majorino's voters' second preference.



Source: POMLAB.


This data prove that it is not automatic that the voters of one of those candidates would have gone directly to the other. The lack of automatic transfer of voters between those two candidates is also shown by the existence of some hostilities among their voters. Thus, several of Majorino's supporters said that he was the truly candidate for the left and that Balzani just arrived later to make Majorino's campaign harder, consequently they would have not voted for her under any circumstance⁴⁹. Those supporters claim that her attempt to become the candidate of the coalition was just because Pisapia did not like Majorino as candidate. The numbers so, end with the discussion about the dispersion of the leftist vote and the idea that either Balzani or Majorino, would have better represented the members of the coalition than Sala.

The profile of the voters of each candidate reveals different priorities and interests. The crucial point was whether, knowing these differences, it would be possible to keep the centre-left coalition together after the primaries. The people that voted for Sala in the primaries defined themselves in the majority as centre-

⁴⁹ <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/08/primarie-milano-2016-dietro-gli-abbracci-a-sala-la-resa-dei-conti-della-sinistra-e-ora-con-il-candidato-ci-saranno-problemi/2442232/>

left⁵⁰, meanwhile the people who voted for Majorino and Balzani identified them as left wing [see table 16].

Table 16. Political identification of voters by candidates.




Source: POMLAB.

When asked about the Renzi government, considered in Italy as centre-left, 90% of Sala's voters had a positive opinion about it. The numbers on the same question reduces up to 50% within Balzani and Majorino voters [see table 17].

⁵⁰ Also according the survey of elaborated by POMLAB.


Table 17. Judgement about Renzi's government.



Source: POMLAB.

These numbers show clear two different groups of voters, but when asked about whether they would support the winning candidate, in case their own candidate lost, the fidelity is high among the voters of all three candidates. However, according to this survey, in case of Sala being the final candidate, he would have to convince around 30% of the voters of the other two candidates [see table 18]. Those voters were still doubting about giving him their final support or not. This lack of confidence by some members of the left highlights the importance for Sala of the negotiations post-primaries to attract towards his figure that type of voters. Hence, some kind of agreement or collaboration with the more leftist sectors to sustain the centre-left coalition together was necessary. Otherwise the electoral system facilitates for the losers of the primaries to build a new political project to confront Sala's candidature.

Table 18. Fidelity of the voters towards the coalition by candidates.



Source: POMLAB.

Once designated, the candidate of the centre-left coalition had to face the organization of the electoral campaign. But before that Sala had to work on the stability of the coalition threatened by his designation as candidate. He was seen as too liberal for the leftist sectors of the coalition, which were not sure whether to support the centre-left project with this candidate. Nevertheless, just after the primaries Sala expressed his will to continue with the basis of Pisapia's project fighting for the same principles and including all the groups of people that were present in Pisapia's coalition. Likewise, as a gesture of commitment towards the lefties members of the coalition, he refused to include centre-right actors into his candidacy⁵¹ -at that time the *Partito Democratico* was in a coalition in the national government with *Nuovo Centrodestra*, a centre-right party.

4.3 Electoral system.

⁵¹ <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/02/04/primarie-milano-2016-cinesi-pronti-a-votare-sala-lultimo-tarocco-delle-elezioni/2439634/>

The municipal elections of the city of Milan in 2016 were held under the complex rules of the Italian electoral municipal law⁵². Under this normative, the voters of the city of Milan elect the city council and directly the mayor at the same time, in a two-round election. This is possible because the electoral law allows the voters to cast various votes and preferences at the time of voting. Additionally, it permits the existence of lists of independent candidates for the City Council, even if those lists support the mayor candidates from other lists. The possibility of supporting candidates from other lists opens the door to a different kind of pacts between the various social and political groups. Moreover, the electoral law is just partially proportional, as it reserves –despite the actual number of votes– more than the absolute majority of the City Council seats to the list that supports the elected mayor in order to guarantee the city’s governability.

Thus, each voter when going to the polls has the right to express various preferences at the moment of the first round:

- One vote to express the direct preference for the mayoral candidate.
- One vote to express the preference towards a list of candidates for the City Council.
- A maximum of two votes for two candidates of different gender within the chosen City Council list.

The mayoral candidate that obtains more than 50% of the votes in the first round is automatically elected mayor of the city. In case that no mayoral candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes in the first round, the two most voted mayoral candidates go to a second round of voting, where the one with more votes is elected mayor. In this second round the voters just have to express their preferences for one of the two candidates to become the mayor of the city, and not anymore for the City Council members. Except in very exceptional cases⁵³, the lists linked to the elected mayor receive -with an electoral threshold

⁵² Decreto legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n. 267 – “Testo unico delle leggi sull'ordinamento degli enti locali”.

⁵³ There are two scenarios when that rule is not applied: either the citizens give an absolute majority to a different coalition from that of the elected mayor; or the mayor is elected in the first round but his coalition obtains a fraction less than two-fifths of the valid votes.

of the 3% of the votes for each list- a majority bonus of three fifths of the members of the City Council. The most voted candidates within the lists linked to the elected mayor are elected into the City Council. In case that some of the elected members resign from their post, places would be covered with the next most voted candidate of the linked lists, keeping the mayor's political majority in the City Council intact. The rest of members of the City Council are appointed proportionally -following the D'Hondt method⁵⁴- from the rest of the lists. Therefore, it is crucial to know in advance the name of the mayor, as the number of seats that correspond to each list it is contingent to the majority bonus that the elected mayor receives. That way an important opportunity window for pacts and negotiations between the first and second round is created, as between them it is possible to link new lists to the mayoral candidate.

Every mayoral candidate has to be linked to one or more electoral lists. The candidates for the City Council compose these lists. This link is important, because in case of victory of a mayoral candidate; his or her list receives an electoral premium. However, it is possible to vote for a mayor and at the same time for a list that not support him or her or to not vote for any list at all. But if the voter expresses a preference for a list and not for a mayor, the mayoral candidate receives the vote in any case. Thus, the Italian municipal law allows and even stimulates (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview) the presence of independent lists that, although supporting the candidate for mayor of another list (normally party's lists), do not want to be integrated into that list. In big towns, this system allows the civic lists to have an independent profile of the main list. Meanwhile civic lists in small towns are forced to exist by the electoral law, and in those places, the parties are within those lists (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). Civic lists are either interested in clearly delineating that there is not a complete agreement with the policies of the main list, or in remarking the kind of persons or ideas that represent the list and support explicitly the candidate for mayor. Civic lists allow critic movements towards political parties to express their

⁵⁴ The D'Hondt method is a technique of distribution of seats based on the creation of coefficients. It divides the votes each list has received by full numbers up to the number of seats to be distributed.

concerns and try to change part of the society through political influence (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). But the presence of these independent lists allows the possibility of an open collaboration between the candidate and the different lists, without losing voters for the mayor, as it would be in the case of completely separated lists. Reducing the potential losses for the mayoral candidate means that he has to do efforts to include the members in the coalition but not necessarily within a specific list, leaving bigger capacity of arrangements, as full agreements are not necessary. This situation allows the presence of several independent lists. For example in the elections of Milan in June 2016, there were 9 candidates for the position of mayor but the number of lists rose up to 17.

The electoral law permits to establish pacts between the first and the second round. The article 72.7 of the law says that successful candidates on the ballot, despite having run for an established coalition of lists, have the right, within seven days from the first vote, to declare the connection with other lists than those with which they were connected in the first round. This allows the two contenders in the second round to look for the support of other candidates not able to achieve passing to the second round. Also, it permits the existence of a negotiation time between the two rounds of the elections, possibly enlarging the electoral coalition. Thus, those newcomers will be considered in the same way than the previous lists in the distribution of the seats in the City Council, in case their mayoral candidate wins the second round.

The City Council is jointly elected with the mayor every five years. It is the top-tier administrative body of the municipality of Milan, and the mayor of Milan and 48 members composes it. It is in charge of the legislative acts of the city as well as the control of the activity of the City Government. The governing coalition always has 29 seats of the 48, and despite the mayor not being member, he or she has the right to attend all sessions and to vote. Additionally, all the defeated mayoral candidates that obtained over 3% of the votes are automatically elected members of the City Council. Its political relevance is high, because the City Council can remove the mayor from his or her functions through a motion of no

confidence, if necessary. In this case also the City Council seizes all activities and new elections are being called.

4.4 The elections.

The first round of the municipal elections in the city of Milan were held the 5th of June 2011, and counted with the 9 mayoral candidates and 17 lists linked to those candidates. Each of the candidates was linked to one single list except Giuseppe Sala who was linked to four and Stefano Parisi linked to six lists.

The mayoral candidates were:

- Nicoló Mardegan.
- Natale Azzaretto.
- Marco Cappato.
- Basilio Vincenzo Rizzo.
- Luigi Santambrogio.
- Gianluca Corrado.
- Maria Teresa Baldini.
- Stefano Parisi.
- Giuseppe Sala.

The surveys conducted before the elections were consistently featuring Giuseppe Sala in a preeminent position. Since his declaration as the centre-left candidate he had been leading the polls in front of the candidate of the centre-right and the other favourite for the elections, Stefano Parisi. However, Sala's initial lead constantly reduced as the election day was arriving [see table 19].

Table 19. Opinion polling Milan local elections 2016.

Date	Polling firm	Sala	Parisi	Corrado	Others	Lead
9–17 May 2016	Demos&Pi	39.2	35.8	13.3	11.7	2.4
11 May 2016	Tecnè	37.5	37.0	18.2	1.9	0.5
5–6 May 2016	Quorum	38.5	35.2	14.1	12.2	3.2
4–6 May 2016	Index Research	38.5	38.0	16.0	7.5	0.5
2–5 May 2016	ScenariPolitici	38.5	37.0	15.5	9.0	1.5

2 May 2016	Tecnè	38.0	37.5	16.5	8.0	0.5
27 Apr 2016	Tecnè	38.0	37.9	15.0	3.3	0.1
20–22 Apr 2016	ScenariPolitici	39.5	37.0	15.0	8.5	2.5
18 Apr 2016	Tecnè	38.0	38.0	16.0	8.0	0.0
16 Apr 2016	SWG	47.0	36.0	12.0	5.0	11.0
16 Apr 2016	Ipsos	38.8	37.1	16.5	7.6	1.7
4–8 Apr 2016	Index Research	37.0	36.0	14.0	13.0	1.0
12 Apr 2016	Eurometra	33.0	30.0	19.0	18.0	3.0
7 Apr 2016	Demopolis	40.0	37.0	14.0	9.0	3.0
1 Apr 2016	Termometropolitico	40.5	35.5	12.0	12.0	5.0
29 Mar 2016	Tecnè	38.0	35.0	18.0	16.0	3.0
17 Mar 2016	Tecnè	38.0	34.0	6.0	23.0	4.0
10–11 Mar 2016	Index Research	42.0	35.0	N/A	23.0	7.0
25 Feb 2016	Tecnè	37.0	33.0	17.0	13.0	4.0

Source: sondaggiipoliticoelettorali.it (Governo Italiano).

The results of the mayoral candidates were very diverse. Some of them were able to achieve a considerable popular support, like Parisi and Sala, meanwhile others did not even arrive to 1% of the votes. Giuseppe Sala received 224.156 votes for the position of mayor, that is, 41,7% of the total votes, and finishing in first position, although not reaching the absolute majority of the votes. Those results of the vote made it necessary for the centre-left coalition and its candidate to prepare for the second round of the municipal elections. In that second round, they were facing Stefano Parisi, the centre-right candidate, who received 219.218 votes, representing 40,78% of the total votes. The surveys predicted the victory of Sala, however, the two top contenders were much closer in votes than the surveys were predicting before the election. Thus, without a mayoral candidate reaching the absolute majority of the votes, the second round of the elections to decide who would be the mayor of Milan became necessary.

The other candidates received the following results:

- Gianluca Corrado: 54.099 votes, 10,06%.
- Basilio Vincenzo Rizzo: 19.143 votes, 3,56%.
- Marco Cappato: 10.104 votes, 1,88%.
- Nicolás Mardegan: 6.018 votes 1,12%.

- Natale Azzaretto: 2.220 votes, 0,41%.
- Luigi Santambrogio: 1.483 votes, 0,28%.
- Maria Teresa Baldini: 1.143 votes, 0,21%.

As mentioned before, the electoral law favours the existence of broad coalitions around the more strong candidates for the position of mayor. Using this possibility, four lists supported Giuseppe Sala's candidature. Those lists were:

- Partito Democratico per Beppe Sala Sindaco.
- Italia Dei Valori Per Beppe Sala Sindaco.
- Sinistra X Milano.
- Beppe Sala Sindaco Noi Milano.

The electoral support of these lists was quite different. Meanwhile the list of the Partito Democratico reached almost 29% of the votes, the list of Italia dei Valori received less than 0,70% of popular support. The two lists not directly linked with any political party, Sinistra per Milano and the list Beppe Sala Sindaco, received 3,83 and 7,68% of the votes, both clearly with more support than the list supported by a party, such as Italia dei Valori. Consequently with those results, all the lists that supported Giuseppe Sala as candidate, except for Italia dei Valori, reached the electoral barrier of 3% of the votes indicated in the electoral law as necessary to allow members in the City Council.

The two weeks between the first and the second round of elections allowed the candidates to look for extra support from the defeated candidates. The fact that the distance between Sala and Parisi was so small made those contacts even more important. Sala was able to retain the support of Marco Cappato and his Radicals, as well as Basilio Rizzo. The second round of the elections took place on the 19th of June, and ended with the election of Giuseppe Sala as mayor of Milan with a total of 264.481 of the votes against 247.052 of Stefano Parisi, that is, 51,7% over 48,3%.

4.5 The Movimento Arancione.

The *Movimento Arancione* is a movement interested in the active participation of the citizens in public matters (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). It is concerned with issues like the environment, the egalitarianism, a sustainable and habitable city, the involvement of people in managing the common goods, and decent public services for all citizens. Originally, it was founded and driven by a group of people who were previously fighting for the survival of the public education system. The debates generated within the “Committee for the Defence of the Public School” end up generating the conviction among the members of the committee that something had to change in Milano (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). They wanted the regeneration of the civic sense of belonging to the city and for that they jumped from their initially limited protest to a more comprehensive project (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). They saw in Giuliano Pisapia the right candidate to implement those ideals and when they started to encounter people interested in participating in the transformation of the city, the school movement shaped from its original purpose into an electoral machine, that is, into the *Movimento Arancione* (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). Fighting for their idea of community the movement significantly boosted Pisapia’s campaign. Being very active, the movement’s members acted as volunteers in the 2011 elections to help switching the political colour of the city after twenty years. People were so convinced about the possibility to implement their ideals, that the “Committee for the Defence of the Public School of the area 3 of Milan” was automatically transformed into Pisapia’s campaign committee for that area (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). They passed, in a very natural way, from being one thing to being another, because they felt that transforming themselves in an electoral tool was the best way to help the feeling of change growing all over the city (Ibid.).

Since it was very linked to Pisapia’s project, the *Movimento Arancione* had to face a big dilemma when he decided not to run for the position of mayor of Milan again. Potentially a very active movement in Milan’s local politics, the *Movimento Arancione* lacks a formal organization and in the words of Dalla Chiesa: “the only

social movements that survive in time, are those that are organized and have a structure” (13th of June 2016, personal interview). An undeniable fact for him is that, “with a permanent structure the possibilities of success from social movements exist, without it no” (13th of June 2016, personal interview). The members of the movement were aware that with the negative of Pisapia to continue as a candidate they were facing a critical point and they needed to decide the options they had (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). Thus, an internal debate about continuing their activities arose, as there were members that they did not feel recognized in the new project of the centre-left coalition. The continuity of the *Movimento Arancione* was no not assured, but if social movements are temporal, there is no possible accountability regarding the promises expressed by the candidate they are supporting. Moreover, without a detailed monitoring of the activities of politicians by social entities, there is no future electoral penalization over candidates that have broken their promises (Dalla Chiesa, Fernando; 13th of June 2016, personal interview). The continuity of the movement, was so, required necessary by its members, but they still needed to decide the way they would participate.

In the interview with Gad Lerner he highlights that the *Movimento Arancione* is not composed of many people, but they are nevertheless very active (9th of June 2016; personal interview). They are a group of people able to activate political campaigns mobilizing citizens and attracting a lot of attention (Lerner, Gad Eitan; 9th of June 2016; personal interview). According to him, the *Movimento Arancione* is built on three different components, which allows it to be a group of people inspired by leftist ideals and at the same time an inclusive movement able to incorporate persons beyond any ideology. Each component corresponds to a specific group of people with defined features. The first component corresponds to the group of the former communists and former socialists that do not accept the moderation of the rest of the left. Inspired by the partisan ideals of resistance and egalitarianism, they are ready to fight against what they consider unfair. This group is the one that gives more importance to the social policies, as it is the component of the traditional left. They do not consider that its political

principles have to be left behind despite not being so popular nowadays as they were in other times. The second component corresponds to the people with strong libertarian ideals. It is basically fed by the new ideals of a community, where working as a volunteer means working for the common goods. These people want to be free and not constrained by the institutional powers. At the same time, they are open to involve themselves in solving problems of the society in which there are living. The last component is the solidarity with the members of the judiciary that fights against the institutional corruption and the mafias⁵⁵. The people from this group follow the ideal of a republican society where the rules have a meaning and not following it have consequences. They believe in the meritocracy where the people can freely live and prosper in relation with their capacities and their work, without being worried to suffer a state on bribes and dark loyalties. This one is a very bourgeois component, composed of intellectuals and members from the universities who believe that the respect for the legality must be a goal to be pursued in Italia. Those all three components are what give to the *Movimento Arancione* its particular features of a movement based on the free common city.

At the moment of choosing the candidate for the centre-left coalition for the municipal elections of 2016 in Milan, the majority of leaders of the *Movimento Arancione* supported Francesca Balzani because she best represented the continuity of the social project started with Pisapia (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). The final designation of Giuseppe Sala as candidate thus produced several tensions within the movement and with the PD. The *Movimento Arancione* expected someone as candidate of the centre-left coalition who was from within the original project, and Sala was clearly an outsider (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). This new situation necessitated a reflection within the movement to decide the next steps to follow. Also, the relationship with the PD had to be reevaluated as the chosen candidate had a different political profile than Pisapia and was not anymore so close to the ideals of the movement. For the Paolo Limonta, one of the leaders of the movement, Sala had too liberal positions in several political issues and was thus

⁵⁵ Like for instance the judges of Mani Pulite.

initially considered not good enough to represent the ideals of the movement (24 of June 2016, personal interview). This made it complicated to create an agreement of collaboration between the PD and the *Movimento Arancione*. The last ones were finally contemplating various options, from integration in Sala's list, to creating their own candidature to compete with him, passing from different kinds of external alliance like giving him public support or just to some of his political proposals.

After talking several times with the chosen candidate of the centre-left coalition, the majority of the *Movimento Arancione* decided to support Giuseppe Sala as their mayoral candidate. Both parties had the opportunity to know each other better and to arrive to the conclusion that an understanding was the best for all, and the best option to maximize the electoral results. In these talks the arancione could observe the personal interest of the candidate to keep working the social aspects of the project of Pisapia which they perceived as very important for their concept of the city: a big interaction between politics and the politicians with the citizens (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). Some leaders of the movement also pointed out that despite Sala not being their candidate of choice, once they decided to support a candidate for the primaries, they had to be loyal and available for the final winner (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). The electoral calculus helped also to achieve an agreement between both parts as for the members of the movement; Giuseppe Sala was the only real alternative to beat the centre-right candidate, Stefano Parisi (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). Moreover, the manifesto of the candidature was made collectively, including the ideas of several encounters with citizens that wanted to discuss it. This led the program being fully supported by all members of the coalition and consequently all of them were capable to defend it (Ibid.). It is important to notice the existence of the previous collaborative culture between the movement and the parties, which was crucial to achieve this final agreement. The fact that both parties knew each other and their modus operandi was a powerful incentive to reduce the uncertainties of future behaviours. The relationships within the coalition were very good, and five years working together helped to recognize the work done by the different

members, parts and personalities (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview).

The final configuration of the agreement was that the members of the *Movimento Arancione* would have their own list but supporting Sala as mayoral candidate. This list was called “Sinistra per Milano”, and was formed by several figures that had previously been working in Pisapia’s project. For Limonta, “the list allowed some people to vote for Sala that otherwise would not have done it” (24 of June 2016, personal interview). For him, the list Sinistra per Milano was necessary because Sala was not seen well by the leftist citizens (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview) and with this list the movement wanted to include the voters they thought they could represent. However, the fact that at the time of the negotiations Sala was clearly leading the surveys over Parisi, made both parts believe that the collaboration was not crucial from the electoral point of view, as the gap in the surveys was much greater of what the *Movimento Arancione* could a priori contribute (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). The final results of the elections, where Sala and Parisi were separated by less than 1% of the votes, showed that the reached agreement was more important than the parties thought at the time of the negotiations (Limonta, Paolo; 24 of June 2016, personal interview). Therefore, the list was especially useful for the second round, as a lot of leftist voters were pushed to vote for Sala due to the support and the public acts of the members of the list Sinistra per Milano (Ibid.).

4.6 The Partito Democratico.

The *Partito Democratico* (PD) was founded on October 14th 2007 as a result of a merger of various centre-left parties. The project started after a previous partnership in several electoral coalitions between centre-left parties under the name of “Ulivo” or “L’Unione”, creating a collaboration culture between the elites of the various parties. The two main parties that lead the creation of the PD were the “Margherita” a social-Christian party heirs of the left-wing members of the once hegemonic “Democrazia Cristiana”; and the “Democratici di Sinistra”, heirs

of the powerful Italian Communist Party⁵⁶. The PD was the main centre-left party in Italy at the moment of the municipal elections of 2016. The PD was not just member of the coalition that was ruling the city of Milan with Giuliano Pisapia, but it was also the party in Italy with most voters and members in the Italian Parliament at that time⁵⁷. At national level the PD was leading a coalition government with the New Center Right and the Centrists for Italy. The PD leader Matteo Renzi, elected national secretary in 2013, was the Italian Prime Minister and the most important political figure at that moment.

The PD was leading the centre-left coalition in the city of Milan in 2016, not just from the political point of view, but also in terms of organization. The PD was the main supplier of campaign resources to the centre-left project. The organization of the electoral campaign in 2016 was very different from the one in 2011. On the one hand, the campaign lead by Pisapia in 2011 included much more external actors, such as social movements like the *Movimento Arancione*, in the campaign structure. Pietro Bussolati, head of the PD in Milan⁵⁸, defined it as a “campaign with parties, but without using the parties’ structures” (Bussolati, Pietro; 6 of July 2016, personal interview). Instead, Sala’s campaign in 2016 used more of the personal resources of the PD. The PD was very involved in the mayoral campaign; putting its electoral resources to win the mayoral competition instead of running a specific campaign for its own list (Bussolati, Pietro; 6 of July 2016, personal interview). The members of Sala’s campaign core were almost entirely members of the PD; meanwhile with Pisapia’s campaign the members were mainly external (Bussolati, Pietro; 6 of July 2016, personal interview). In fact, this close interrelationship between Sala’s campaign and the PD was so strong that it was not possible anymore to distinguish between the campaign structure and the party structure. Moreover, the PD headquarters were effectively inside Sala’s campaign offices during the electoral period (Bussolati, Pietro; 6 of July 2016, personal interview).

⁵⁶ The other parties were: Southern Democratic Party (centrist); Sardinia Project (social-democratic); European Republicans Movement (social-liberal); Democratic Republicans (social-liberal); Middle Italy (centrist); and Reformist Alliance (social-democratic).

⁵⁷ Chamber of Deputies and Senate.

⁵⁸ Secretary of the PD of the metropolitan area of Milan.

Despite the PD being strongly involved in Sala's electoral campaign, it was also running with its own list for the City Council. Pierfrancesco Majorino, the rival of Sala in the primaries elections, headed this list. The fact that a rival of the mayoral candidate had such a relevant position was seen as a way to win back leftist voters for the coalition (Comincini, Eugenio; 28th of June 2016). Using the figure of Majorino was a way to create a link for them with Pisapia's project and to highlight the left essence of the new project.

4.7 Basilio Rizzo and "Milano in Comune".

After the first round of the elections the campaign of Sala started conversations with another candidate, Basilio Rizzo, to obtain his support in the second round. Basilio Rizzo had been the president of the City Council of Milan between 2011 and 2016 and member of the *Movimento Arancione*. He was supported by the list "Milano in Comune" in 2016, a mix of people from the Communist Refoundation Party, and some people from the *Movimento Arancione* that did not consider Giuseppe Sala as the right candidate to keep working on the citizen project started by Giuliano Pisapia.

Rizzo was originally part of the *Movimento Arancione* and, despite being loyal to the mayor Pisapia and his city government; he was shaping his own profile by criticizing certain decisions of Pisapia's government. In that respect, he had a leftist profile and he considered that the coalition was turning too much towards the centre. So, instead of deciding to run along with the majority of the members of the movement in the list "Sinistra per Milano", he created his own list with himself as mayoral candidate. The list and the project of "Milano in Comune" were defined by its own members⁵⁹ as heirs of the change that started in 2011. That is, the citizen movement that supported Giuliano Pisapia: the *Movimento Arancione*. Milano in Comune is, in its own words, a new plural proposal from the left: secular, civic and environmental. However, the project is described more as a common space than as a party, putting special emphasis on the participation of

⁵⁹ <http://milanoincomune.it/milano-in-comune/>

the citizens. Their members want to “collect the best of 2011’s experience” and go beyond in what was still unfinished of that project. In fact, they used in their electoral advertisements the mythical meeting of Piazza Duomo in 2011, when the citizen’s support for Giuliano Pisapia seemed unstoppable. Its motto was “the hope for change⁶⁰”. Using this slogan as a way to connect with the voters that saw Pisapia’s project as a way to change the traditional policies implemented by the right parties.

In the first round of the mayoral elections of 2016 Rizzo received 19.143 votes in the first round, up to 3,56% of the total. Consequently, he was unable to go to the second round as two other candidates received more votes. Even though 3,56% could seem a small number compared to the 40% of Sala and Parisi, Rizzo got a bigger percentage of public support than the gap between Sala and Parisi in the first round (0,9%). He was the fourth most voted candidate after the two that would pass to the second round and the candidate of the 5 Stars Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle). Thus, the quantity of votes he received, the fact that the 5 Stelle decided to not endorse any other candidate and the equilibrium of forces between the two principal candidates, made Rizzo an important and the most desired piece. The fact that Rizzo had collaborated in the past with the centre-left coalition made him a potential ally in the second round of the elections for Sala, but the endorsement was not taken for granted. Few days after the first round, both teams had a meeting to make the endorsement of Rizzo towards Sala possible, but the result was not very satisfactory for any party. In fact, Rizzo said that “non do indicazioni di voto per la lista, ho sempre detto che gli elettori sono liberi” (Corriere della Sera, 17th of June 2016⁶¹) denying any possible public endorsement of Sala. However, he pointed out that

“non vi sarà alcuna trattativa e tanto meno apparenamento e che la conquista del voto libero degli elettori di Milano in Comune resta nella capacità di sussumere nel ballottaggio parte delle proposte già note in tema di valorizzazione del lavoro pubblico e della qualità dei servizi

⁶⁰ Electoral leaflet for the 2016 Milan municipal elections.

⁶¹ <http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml>

comunali, salvaguardia del patrimonio comunale, impegni di spesa concreti sulle periferie e sulla casa, l'attenzione alla salute dei cittadini e come rendere amichevole e attrattiva Milano per studenti e giovani lavoratori.”⁶²

At the time of negotiations Rizzo had already assured his presence in the City Council under the rule that any mayoral candidate that receives more than 3% of the votes and is not elected mayor, becomes part of it. Thus, in the possible pact with Sala between the first and the second rounds of the elections, the appointments were not a strong incentive for Rizzo. However, he was indeed interested in reaching an agreement about the future implementation of some social policies by the new City Government. This was a clear case of policy seeking over office seeking. His statement opened a door to achieve an agreement between both parts only if Sala accepted some of the ideas defended by Milano in Comune. Sala stressed the following days his positive position about some of Rizzo's claims and Rizzo ended saying that,

“Non voglio che ritorni a governare il centrodestra nella nostra città. Parisi è il candidato del centrodestra e quindi per me è meglio che governi Sala, al quale sarò comunque all'opposizione, piuttosto che il centrodestra che ho conosciuto e non voglio tornare alla situazione precedente il 2011. Quindi voterò Sala.” (Repubblica, 17th of June 2016).⁶³

That was a public endorsement without asking his voters explicitly to vote for Sala, as he said that “in quanto lista non prendiamo una posizione” (Corriere della Sera, 17th of June 2016⁶⁴). Sala was pleased about Rizzo's decision, meanwhile Sala's opponent in the second round, Stefano Parisi, attacked Sala for that endorsement trying to make him seem allied with the left: “la sinistra radicale

⁶² <http://milanoincomune.it/milano-in-comune-il-voto-e-gli-orientamenti/>

⁶³ http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/06/17/news/elezioni_milano_rizzo-142213118/

⁶⁴ <http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml>

vota Sala” (Corriere della Sera, 17th of June 2016⁶⁵). Furthermore, the centre-right candidate linked Rizzo’s endorsement, with personal appointments; suggesting a classic votes for offices pact between Sala and “Milano in Comune”. Parisi claimed that the endorsement of Rizzo was produced due to the future appointment of Gherardo Colombo as a president of a committee to look for the transparency and legality in Milan announced by Sala. In Parisi’s words: “Ora capisco perché ha messo Gherardo Colombo: non perché vuole la legalità ma perché vuole i voti di Rizzo” (Corriere della Sera, 17th of June 2016⁶⁶). Gherardo Colombo a former magistrate was a well-known public figure in defence of the legality⁶⁷ and was asked to be the mayoral candidate for part of the left. Rizzo appreciated publically that announcement made by Sala, as for him Gherardo Colombo would have already been the candidate of the left: “Io avrei voluto Colombo come sindaco. È ovvio che questo coinvolgimento rappresenta una garanzia più che per la mia parte politica per tutti i cittadini milanesi” (Corriere della Sera, 10th of June 2016)⁶⁸.

4.8 Summary.

This chapter presented the story behind the creation of the *Movimento Arancione*: from where it comes, the importance of the original candidate and its relationship with the *Partito Democratico*. It continues explaining how both created an agreement for a mutual collaboration and how the alteration of the candidate of the centre-left coalition produced internal tensions within the *Movimento Arancione*. Despite that the majority of the *Movimento Arancione* decided to collaborate with Giuseppe Sala sharing the same project, part of the movement decided to create its own candidature. The interests of those two groups of the movement were different and consequently their bargaining position was different too. In Chapter Six the analysis will try to explain using game theory, the

⁶⁵ <http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml>

⁶⁶ <http://milano.corriere.it/amministrative-2016/notizie/ballottaggio-rizzo-appoggia-sala-non-voglio-ritorno-centrodestra-653cde08-3479-11e6-a404-40e2630a61a7.shtml>

⁶⁷ He participated in the anti-mafia process known as Mani Pulite.

⁶⁸ http://milano.corriere.it/notizie/politica/16_giugno_11/colombo-dice-si-giuseppe-sala-d0b1e802-2f3a-11e6-bb6d-75d636c22361.shtml

different situation of both groups and why one decide to join Sala meanwhile the other created its own list.

Chapter Five.

The case of the city of Barcelona.

After analysing the interaction existing between political parties and social movements in the municipal elections of the city of Milan in the year 2016, this chapter focuses on the events that took place in the elections of June 2015 in the city of Barcelona. In particular, the following focuses on the leftist coalition named “Barcelona en Comú” and its internal dynamics. This multipart coalition formed by political parties and social movements was able to win the municipal elections in Barcelona defeating the incumbent mayor. The project was lead by Guanyem, a civic platform created by the activist of “The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca”, a social movement against the housing eviction of needed families born out of the social struggles caused by the economic crisis. Moreover, the mayoral candidate of Barcelona en Comú, Ada Colau, was the leader and spokesperson of this social movement. Furthermore, the fact the coalition included three relevant political parties, “Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds”, “Esquerra Unida i Alternativa” and “Podemos/Podem”, which accepted the leading role of the social movement instead of being the main players themselves, makes this case particularly interesting.

5.1 The background.

The city of Barcelona is a major cultural and economic centre in south-western Europe and known for being an open city to new trends (Bakici, Almirall, & Wareham, 2013). Barcelona is a powerful brand⁶⁹ and is “modern, efficient, and cosmopolitan” (McNeill, 2005, p. 1). In fact, it is one of the world's leading tourist, economic, trade fair and cultural centres⁷⁰. Its leadership in broad areas such higher education, entertainment and all kind of arts and business

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<https://web.archive.org/web/20130927073641/http://www.citymayors.com/marketing/city-brands.html>

⁷⁰ <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2016t.html>

<https://web.archive.org/web/20131010004859/http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2010t.html>

contribute to its condition as one of the world's major global cities (GaWC, 2012). The largest city on the Mediterranean Sea is very popular thanks to its social dynamism and its particular modernist architecture that makes the city easily recognizable. All of that places Barcelona as model for other cities that try to imitate its successful model. But despite being considered socially and politically progressive, it has been defined also as very bourgeois with an important role of the traditional economic powers (Permanyer, 2008).

Since the reestablishment of the democracy in Spain, Barcelona had been almost exclusively ruled by the left. The “Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya” (PSC)⁷¹ has led the coalition governments in the city for 32 years, from the first municipal elections in 1979 until 2011. During this period, various persons held the position of mayor, nonetheless all of them belonging to the PSC. Moreover, since the restitution of the right to vote the PSC had been the most voted party until 2011, when for the first time “Convergència i Unió” (CiU)⁷² was able to break the hegemonic position of the PSC. Barcelona, a city defined as progressive and traditionally leftist from the sociological point of view (Balibrea, 2001), had for the first time a nationalist mayor with a liberal agenda.

In the first municipal elections following the approval of the Spanish Constitution after the dictatorship of Francisco Franco on the 3rd of April 1979, the PSC was the most voted party in Barcelona and its candidate was able to achieve the position of mayor thanks to a pact with the communist Catalan party PSUC⁷³. Narcis Serra was the candidate at that time, but in 1982, after three and a half years as mayor of Barcelona, he left his position to become Minister of the first national government of Felipe Gonzalez. His substitute was Pascual Maragall. Pascual Maragall was the mayor of Barcelona for 15 years until 1997, being crucial in the substantial transformation of the city and becoming an iconic

⁷¹ Catalan social-democratic party linked with the national social-democratic party Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).

⁷² Nationalistic party traditionally considered from the centre-right despite their interest in being defined just as catalanistic and being considered by several of its voters as centre-left (Culla, 2001).

⁷³ Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia).

figure for his successors, no matter the political party⁷⁴. Under his management, the city prepared and celebrated the symbolic Olympic Games of Barcelona 92', one of Maragall's personal projects that put him in a position of being considered a high-profile politician, ending up allowing him to be President of Catalonia. His balance as mayor of Barcelona included an important city renovation based on "urban reforms, improvement of the historic centre and suburbs, construction of nodal points to decrease the traffic, the recovery of the city's forgotten areas such as Montjuïc, construction of museums, theatres and cultural centres..." (Spena & Forti, 2016).

After two other mayors belonging to the PSC followed Maragall, finally one candidate of CiU was able to become mayor of Barcelona in 2011: Xavier Trias. But breaking the dominant position of the PSC was not an easy path for him. Trias was announced as candidate for the first time on 17th of May 2002 starting an electoral campaign that ended up with him in the City Council in June 2003. He was however not able to be mayor until July 2011, after his third election as mayoral candidate. Only in 2011 CiU was the most voted party and was able to achieve 15⁷⁵ City Council members against only 11 of the incumbent mayor of the PSC. At the moment to vote for the various mayor candidates within the City Council, Trias received the support of 17 of its 41 members, more than any other candidate. In addition CiU's 15 votes, the pro-independence party "Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya" (ERC) with two councillors also supported Trias' candidature. Thus with the minority support of the City Council, Trias was elected mayor of Barcelona.

Xavier Trias was not a newcomer to politics, as he had a long political career before his attempts to becoming mayor of Barcelona. Trias had been regional minister from 1988 to 2000, and four years national MP. Medical doctor in profession, when he entered politics in 1981 was appointed to direct the construction of the Catalan public health system. The fact that the Catalan health

⁷⁴ For instance, Ada Colau, knowing the power of Maragall's figure for the citizens of Barcelona, said in the electoral campaign that he had been the best mayor of the city.

⁷⁵ Originally there were 15 councillors but after a judicial sentence of the Spanish Constitutional Court they were reduced to 14.

system was universally based⁷⁶ and internationally recognized as a model⁷⁷ (Comin, Antoni, press interview in *La Vanguardia*; 26th of July 2016)⁷⁸, made Trias be known as the social democrat of CiU a label that he would never shied away⁷⁹. That reputation was very useful as mayoral candidate in a progressive city as Barcelona. However, the leftist parties considered his policies as mayor as very liberal, business-friendly and found that he ignored the traditional workers neighbourhoods (Gomà, Ricard; personal interview; 9th February 2017). Therefore, Trias was perceived by a big part of the citizens as the mayor of cuts in the social policies budget and of privatizations (Spena & Forti, 2016) despite not being necessary for budget reasons as the city of Barcelona had the best financial situation among the big cities in Spain (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). This situation was the reason why several people from social movements and the left started to be more active against his policies, thinking about possible political alternatives to his government (Martín, Lucía; personal interview; 28th January 2017).

5.2 The electoral system.

The Spanish local electoral system is less complex than the Italian one in terms of electoral lists and the elections have just one round. However, in Spain the election of the mayor is indirect, that is, the mayor is not elected directly by the voters, but by the members of the City Council in their first meeting. Every electoral list has the same number of positions in the City Council⁸⁰ and is headed by the person who is that list's candidate for mayoral. In other words, the citizens elect the City Council and its members elect the mayor among them. This creates two interesting periods to achieve pacts between the various actors: the first one before the elections to create a pre-electoral coalition; and the second one after the elections to impulse the formation of the City Government.

⁷⁶ The system guarantees healthcare to everyone regardless his or her personal contributions.

⁷⁷ Recognized even for the European Commission: http://aquas.gencat.cat/en/detall/detall-noticia/Catalonia_ReferenceSite_Eng

⁷⁸ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160726/403488086908/siete-consellers-de-salud-defienden-la-calidad-del-sistema-sanitario-catalan.html>

⁷⁹ He openly defined himself as a social democrat: <http://www.vozbcn.com/2011/01/13/51761/trias-me-siento-socialdemocrata/>

⁸⁰ Barcelona's City Council has 41 members, and each electoral list is composed by 41 councillors candidates.

The Spanish municipal elections are mainly held under the rule of two laws: the one regarding the holding of the elections⁸¹, including the specific procedures for voting in the local elections; and the one that specifies the configuration of the municipalities⁸², like the number of members to be elected and the procedure of electing the mayor. Under the guidelines of the Spanish Constitution the system pursues the representation of the diversity of the society within the municipality. Consequently, the electoral law foresees a proportional distribution of seats based on the votes of every candidature. Besides, contrarily to the Italian municipal law, the Spanish rules do not contemplate an extra prize for the winning party or winning pre-electoral coalition. Nevertheless, often an exact proportionality is not possible because these divisions produce fractional numbers of seats (Benoit, 2000). For this reason, the mathematical formula to translate the votes to the seats is not perfectly proportional and follows the D'Hondt method which despite aiming to preserve proportionality as far as possible (Schuster, Pukelsheim, Drton, & Draper, 2003), partially favours the most voted lists to help the government's formation. The total votes casted for each party is divided by the number of seats to distribute, creating thus a series of coefficients. Posteriorly, the seats are assigned to the biggest numbers. In case of a tie in these coefficients, the seat in question is assigned to the list with more votes. Additionally, any candidature that overcomes 5% of the votes in the elections is able to be part of the distribution of seats under the D'Hondt method. This use of this electoral method encourages pre-electoral agreements between parties to join in a common candidature. Otherwise, the votes for each formation counted separately with a logical diminution of seats. Additionally, the D'Hondt method favours the two most voted list, another incentive to run in the elections with a pre-electoral coalition. In fact, in the elections of Barcelona in 2015, just three out of seven formations that had seats in the City Council were single parties⁸³.

⁸¹ Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General (LOREG).

⁸² Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (LRBRL).

⁸³ Ciudadanos, Partido de los Socialistas de Catalunya and Partido Popular.

The entire municipality is the same electoral constituency; there is no distribution of seats based on the votes of the districts or neighbourhoods despite Barcelona being a big city. Each candidature is composed by a list of people equal in number of seats to cover in the City Council. These lists are closed and blocked –that is, it is not possible to add names or to change the order of names- and the position of each person on the list is very relevant. Hence, the first person of the list is by law the candidate to the mayoral position of this list. If for any reason he or she leaves the City Council, the second person of the list would be the candidate; successively going down in the order of the positions on the list. To be more precise, it is not possible to appoint the number three of the list as mayor meanwhile the persons that hold place one and two are still in the City Council.

Barcelona's City Council is the top-tier administrative body of the municipality and has forty-one members with a four years term. It has several functions, like being in charge of the legislative acts of the city and controlling the activity of the City Government. However, its first task is to elect the mayor and to do that, its members have to choose amongst themselves. Candidates that can be elected mayor are all the councillors that lead their list⁸⁴. To become mayor, the candidate has to achieve the absolute majority of the votes of the councilmen, that is, 21 out of 41. In case that no candidate is able to achieve this absolute majority, the councilman that led the most voted list by the citizens, is appointed as mayor⁸⁵. Thus, despite being a proportional system with indirect mayoral election this tiebreaker rule strengthens the importance of being the most voted list to be able to hold the position of mayor. This rule allows the municipality to elect a mayor even in hang City Council when there is not an absolute majority support for any candidate. A minority local government is not blocked in its activities, as in the Spanish system the mayor has important competences that allow him or her to govern in minority with the support of the other groups in the City Council in specific matters. The time elapsed between the elections and the first meeting of the City Council shows to be the proper period to discuss the

⁸⁴ As seen before, that post can be filled by other members of the list in case that the previous members are not anymore in the City Council.

⁸⁵ This procedure is regulated in the article 196 of the LOREG.

support in the mayoral election and to receive in exchange political positions or the support for certain policies. Thus, the existence of this transactional moment configures the investiture as the authentic second-round of the mayoral election according to the political science professor Gabriel Colomé (personal interview, 18th of May 2017).

The mayor is still part of the City Council when he or she is elected, and chairs its meetings. This function can however be delegated. The City Council has the possibility to remove the mayor from his or her position, in which case no new elections are called, as in the same vote a new mayor is also elected. The connection between the Council and the Government is high and goes beyond the mayor's figure. The members of the City Council, which the mayor decides to appoint into some managing functions, compose the City Government. The councilmen do not lose their place in the City Council when they are appointed for these offices so they must combine both positions. Additionally, the mayor is responsible for appointing deputy mayors that can directly help him or her and can coordinate certain municipal areas, creating important political positions with big media relevance which are very appreciated at the time of negotiating pre and post electoral coalitions (Matas Dalmases, 2015).

5.3 The elections.

The last elections in Barcelona were held on the 24th of May 2015. That day the forty-one City Council members were elected. 703.590 residents in the city went to the polls to express their preferences, representing about 60,6% of participation. Barcelona en Comú, the list led by the former activist and speaker of the social movement against the evictions PAH, Ada Colau, was the most voted list. This list received 25,21% of the total votes from the citizens of Barcelona⁸⁶ against 22,75% of votes received by the list of CiU⁸⁷, led by the incumbent mayor, Xavier Trias. This difference in votes between the two most voted list represented 11 seats in the City Council for Barcelona en Comú and 10 seats for

⁸⁶ 176.612 votes. All the numbers according the Ministerio del Interior validated by the electoral authority: the Junta Electoral Central.

⁸⁷ 159.393 votes.

CiU. The former hegemonic party in the city of Barcelona, the PSC fell until the fifth position with only 9,63% of the votes and 4 seats in the City Council⁸⁸. Other four political parties also achieved seats in the City Council [see table 20] making it, with seven political groups, the City Council with the biggest number of them since the return of the democracy. This political reality created a difficult situation for the future mayor, since any agreement needs the approval of several parties.

Table 20. Results of the local elections in the Barcelona in 2015.

Candidatures	Logo	Votes	%	City Council members
<i>Barcelona en Comú</i>		176 612	25,21	11
<i>Convergència i Unió</i>		159 393	22,75	10
<i>Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía</i>		77 272	11,03	5
<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</i> Moviment d'Esquerres Barcelona Ciutat Oberta Avancem-Catalunya Sí Acord Municipal		77 120	11,01	5
<i>Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña</i>		67 489	9,63	4
<i>Partido Popular</i>		61 004	8,71	3
<i>Candidatura d'Unitat Popular</i>		51 945	7,42	3

Source: Ministry of interior.

After the local elections, the City Council met to chose the mayor. The election of the mayor was held the 13th of June 2015, and Ada Colau received the support of 21 from 41 of the members of the City Council, -the minimum absolute majority-, and was elected the first female mayor of Barcelona. She received the 11 votes of her group, Barcelona en Comú, the 5 of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) –a leftist independentist party-, the 4 of the PSC, and 1 -of the 3- from the CUP –an anti-capitalist party. The other two councilmen of the CUP voted null to show symbolic options⁸⁹. Ada Colau was not the only candidate; also other

⁸⁸ 67.489 votes.

⁸⁹ One councilman voted for the workers of a telecom company, and the other for the liberation of the anti-fascist protesters arrested.

candidates received votes from councillors, but simply the votes of their own political parties [see table 21].

Table 21. Number of votes per mayoral candidate (Barcelona 2015).

Candidate	Votes
Ada Colau (BeC)	21
Xavier Trias (CiU)	10
Carina Mejías (C's)	5
Alberto Fernández Díaz (PP)	3
Non valid votes	2

The ceremony of election of Colau generated a lot of expectation among the citizens and social movements and it became necessary to install a big screen outside the town hall to broadcast it. As a novelty in the municipal institutions, Ada Colau invited various social movements –such the PAH- to the main hall to show her intentions to include social movements as new interlocutors with the local institutions and to “give visibility to entities that do not have protocol rank” (Colau, Ada; *La Vanguardia*; 9th of June 2015).

5.4 The pact with the PSC.

When Ada Colau became mayor she had to form the government, a more complicated task than it seems, since all the members of the government have to be members of the City Council. Initially she formed a single-party government, and just the eleven members of Barcelona en Comú formed part of it. That represented a difficult task, because in addition of the government responsibilities, each councilman or councilwoman of Barcelona en Comú had to be in charge of one district. The mayor is not linked with any district, hence, as there are ten districts in Barcelona, each member of the city Government had to be also linked with one district, creating some difficulties in the councillors' agendas. Additionally, the councillors are also the heads of several public

companies, the metropolitan area of Barcelona⁹⁰, public-private partnership... Thus, BeC had big problems to rule the city with so little number of city councillors, and they soon realised that they needed more people in the City Government (Colomé, Gabriel; personal interview; 18th of May 2017).

Later, the 25th of May 2016, this situation partially changed with a pact between Barcelona en Comú and the PSC. The PSC had already voted for Colau as mayor almost one year before, and with a compatible ideology and with a long expertise within institutions, they were the ideal candidates to enter in the government (Andrés, Carmen; personal interview; 17th of May 2017). The PSC was not interested in supporting the government of BeC from the City Council; they wanted to be included in the government. For Gabriel Colomé, former president of the PSC in the City Council, this would give them the necessary visibility to face the elections and would reinforce their position as alternative to CiU (personal interview; 18th of May 2017). For the members of the PSC the local executive is where it is possible to implement real changes, and for that reason they wanted to run offices as Carmen Andrés one of the members of the PSC in the City Government maintains (personal interview; 17th of May 2017).

Thus, the four councilmen of the PSC accepted to join the City Government with Barcelona en Comú. In addition, its leader, Jaume Collboni, became the second deputy mayor, an important position in the City Government's structure. This agreement entailed a power redistribution within the government as three deputy mayors of Barcelona en Comú, had to descend in the ranking (El País, 10th of May 2016) ⁹¹. However, at the same time, the entry of PSC into the City Government also meant having more room for manoeuvre for BeC, as with the pact three of the ten councilmen were released from their duties in the districts. But more important, the numbers of the government in the City Council rose from 11 to 15. This still meant being far away from the absolute majority of 21, but with more capacity to arrive to specific pacts with the rest of parties and giving more stability to the City Government. This political decision was seen as

⁹⁰ The Metropolitan Area is an entity that includes several municipalities around Barcelona and that is in charge of some relevant policies such transport, urbanism or economic development.

⁹¹ http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/05/10/catalunya/1462872678_853476.html

an important step towards the consolidation of the leftist project of Barcelona en Comú. An impulse that was necessary, since the City Government was until the entrance of the PSC the one with the least number of councillors in democracy (El País, 27th of May 2016)⁹². The agreement also included some commissioners in specific areas and some other senior positions in the city administration⁹³.

5.5 The elements that constitute Barcelona en Comú.

Barcelona en Comú is a citizen platform, formed for various political parties and social movements. Its leaders avoid using the term “coalition” and prefer to use the term “confluence” to define it. The document signed by the various members that created BeC is named “Agreement of Confluence”⁹⁴ to reinforce the idea of being part of a political subject different to a political party. However, despite the intentions of its leaders BeC was legally configured as a pre-electoral coalition to compete in the elections of 2015 in Barcelona. Its activity started approximately one year before, in 2014, with the negotiations between the actors wanting to know if a common project was possible. Barcelona en Comú is mainly formed by: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Guanyem, Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, Podemos, and the support of Equo⁹⁵ and Procés Constituent⁹⁶. But before analysing Barcelona en Comú as uniform actor, it is relevant to analyse the elements conforming it, to understand its internal dynamics.

⁹² http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/05/25/catalunya/1464163819_843765.html

⁹³ Some former PSC members had been already appointed for Barcelona en Comú in managerial positions before the pact. For instance the City Manager, Jordi Martí.

⁹⁴ Available in the Annex.

⁹⁵ Equo is the result of joining forces between various Spanish green parties in one single party. Its aim is to be "the seed and source of debate about political ecology and social equity, originating a socio-political movement" (<http://partidoequo.es>). In Catalonia the referent of Equo is Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds.

⁹⁶ Procés Constituent is a Catalan social movement that was created to promote a change of the political, economic and social model implying the end of capitalism and the independence of Catalonia. Some of its members were also members of Guanyem and is going to be analysed within this actor.

5.5.1 Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds- Esquerra Unida i

Alternativa.

Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa⁹⁷ (ICV-EUiA) is a leftist Catalan electoral coalition formed mainly by two parties, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds and the brand of Izquierda Unida⁹⁸ in Catalonia, Esquerra Unida i Alternativa. ICV-EUiA is formed by various sectors of the left with an important weight of the ecology on its ideals. It has been involved in the Catalan institutions since its formation, being part of several municipal governments around Catalonia and also two terms –between 2003 and 2010- in the coalition of the Government of Catalonia. In Barcelona, ICV-EUiA –or its predecessors- have been the small partner of the coalition that ruled the city together with the PSC since the 80's and until the victory of Xavier Trias. When its time in the City Government ended, and despite being the fourth out of five parties in the number of seats in the City Council of Barcelona⁹⁹, ICV-EUiA was the real opposition to Xavier Trias and the CiU municipal Government between 2011 and 2015 (Gomà, Ricard; personal interview; 9th February 2017). The reason of holding this role is due to the fact that all other political groups eventually ended up reaching relevant collaboration agreements with CiU and backing its actions in the government. This particular background of ICV-EUiA was a distinctive feature within BeC. Of all the members of Barcelona en Comú, ICV-EUiA is the only element that had been in the public institutions before ¹⁰⁰, giving its members an important knowledge and an advantage that other members lacked. This advantage was recognized by the rest of actors of Barcelona en Comú that did not hesitate exploiting it in the initial moments of the City Government (Segovia, Susana; personal interview; 15th March 2017).

ICV-EUiA is the result of an evolution of various parties inspired by the post-communist ideals. The first step of ICV-EUiA, was taken when Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds was formed in 1987 out of the fusion of the Partit Socialista

⁹⁷ In English: Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United and Alternative Left.

⁹⁸ Spanish leftist party born from the Spanish Communist Party among others.

⁹⁹ With the 10,39% of the votes and 5 out of 41 seats.

¹⁰⁰ Podemos had five European MP's at the moment of the creation of Barcelona en Comú, but none of them were Catalans, had any relation with the creation of Podem, would be part of the electoral list or was member of Barcelona en Comú.

Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) with other small communist and socialist parties. The objective of this grouping was to put together the maximum possible number of forces with a similar ideology, to modernize political parties that were created for another reality, and to redefine the ideology of the parts towards a more eurocommunist position. The communist space was fragmented between various parties and Iniciativa per Catalunya was the attempt to group all of them under the same name (Rius, 2005). The more relevant of those parties was the PSUC. The PSUC was created in 1936 and had been the central party of the communists in Catalonia. It was iconic for the population beyond its political ideals as was an essential component of the anti-Franco fight in Catalonia (Molas, 2000). Despite being communist, the PSUC fought for the return of the democracy in Spain, in line of what was called the eurocommunism in the same way as the PCI of Berlinguer¹⁰¹ (Molas, 2000). PSUC's internal organization beyond the traditional circles of other communist parties highlights its goal to reach more citizens and ultimately to become a mass party (Molas, 2000).

Iniciativa per Catalunya was born from the impulse of various elements: the PSUC, the Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya (PCC) - created by members expelled from the PSUC in 1982- and the Entesa dels Nacionalistes d'Esquerra (ENE), plus independent public figures and social movements' members (Rius, 2005). Those parties thought that despite the values of communism still were perfectly alive and necessary, the approach to achieve the implementation of these values had to change. The revolution of the proletarians was not anymore an option for them. For the founders of Iniciativa per Catalunya was necessary to work within institutions to reform the system instead of breaking it. Also, there was the crisis of the communist parties around Western Europe, but its birth was related to the intention of having different discourses and political approaches, thus, it was "not an urgent product to built an electoral brand that blurs the former bonding with the sunken communist space" (Rius, 2005). At that moment Iniciativa had a confused ideology and was looking for its own identity that step by step was being clarified towards the eco-socialism (Rius, 2005). Gradually,

¹⁰¹ The PCI opted for the position of making changes from within the system not breaking it in opposition to the traditional communist positions.

Iniciativa positions tended to go more towards post-materialisms ideals, which is what their members define as “eco-socialism”. Its ideology is based on the ideals of the social democracy of the XXI century, pacifism and environmentalism. This last part was especially strengthened with the agreement of collaboration with the Greens, which ended up forming one single party. After that, the party changed its name from Iniciativa per Catalunya to Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds to show clearly its positions in environmental issues. The battle for social rights, the pacifism and feminism played also an important role in the political action of ICV. The choice for the feminism is shown in the decision of having two heads of the party with the same power, one man and one woman.

The other part of the ICV-EUiA is Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, a party born from the members of the communist Spanish and Catalan parties that at the moment of the creation of Iniciativa per Catalunya were against the collaboration with other non-communist parties and contrary to redefining the communist ideology¹⁰² (Molas, 2000). Some of the communists and post communist parties of that time did not support the ideology and organizational turn that was implied with the creation of Iniciativa per Catalunya. They thought that the old political parties of the communist movement should be preserved and did not want the existence of Iniciativa as a party, but just as an electoral platform to connect all the already existing communist parties (Rius, 2005). Thus, some of those individuals decided not to join the project and to keep the pacts just between communist parties, meanwhile at the same time they started talks with the Spanish party Izquierda Unida to have a closer interaction with them. Thus Esquerra Unida i Alternativa was created in 1998 and contrarily to Iniciativa per Catalunya, EUiA is the brand of the communist Spanish party in Catalonia (Molas, 2000). However, despite this opposite approach between ICV and EUiA, in 2003 both parties decided to join together in an almost permanent electoral coalition. A possible unification between them in one single party was postponed to the future and nowadays both parties still maintain their independent organizational structures. EUiA ideology is closer to the traditional communists positions, as for its members the story of the class fight and the social gains is

¹⁰² Col·lectiu Roig, Verd i Violeta, PCC, PSUC Viu and others small collectives and parties.

very relevant. Consequently with those believes the party holds the principles of socialism, secularism, anti-capitalisms and the federation between the different regions of Spain¹⁰³.

5.5.2 Podem/Podemos.

Podem is the brand of the Spanish party Podemos in Catalonia. Podemos was founded in 2014, and became notorious already in its first elections due to its significantly high results for a newborn party. The party was originated under the spirit and with the antiestablishment ideas of the Indignados movement (15M), that rejected the policies of the two Spanish bigger parties –PP and PSOE (Iglesias Turrión & Monedero, 2011). Its start is marked by a manifest¹⁰⁴ signed by 30 intellectuals, social activist, and other public figures in a Spanish newspaper¹⁰⁵, which highlighted the necessity to build an electoral candidature for the European elections to show the discontent towards how the European Union was facing the economic crisis. Podemos was born in January 2014, and just after its foundation it started to prepare for the European elections, held four months after its establishment. Podemos emerged in the Spanish political system with almost 8% of popular support in the elections, large numbers if we considerer that as a new-born party was not entailed of free electoral spaces in the media as the other consolidated parties did. To understand its social relevance, it is important to notice that in its first 20 days of existence it was already the third largest Spanish party by number of members, and nine moths after its formation, it was already the second biggest¹⁰⁶. On February 23rd 2017 the number of members counted 480.466, although it is important to mention that the membership in Podemos does not imply the payment of a membership fee, which is voluntary for the ordinary members.

The significant electoral support in the European elections, with 8% of popular support and five European MP's, strengthened the project and the conviction of

¹⁰³ From EUiA webpage: <http://www.semprealesquerra.cat/valors/>

¹⁰⁴ Named: Mover ficha: convertir la indignación en cambio politico.


¹⁰⁵ Público. 13th of January 2014.

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.elboletin.com/nacional/106784/podemos-psoe-segunda-fuerza-militantes.html>

the citizens and its own members about its viability. However, the situation in Catalonia needs a separate analysis. Meanwhile Podemos was the fourth largest party in Spain by number of votes; it was just the seventh largest in Catalonia¹⁰⁷. Its results in Catalonia clearly show its meagre vigour in that region, as it was over there, where Podemos received the lowest percentage of votes in all of Spain [see figure 2]. The existence of a specific party system in Catalonia (Culla, 2017) was one of the main reasons leading to those particular results (Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017). Firstly, there are more parties competing in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain and the Catalan parties face, apart from the traditional left-right axis, another axis that contrasts nationalism versus no nationalism (Aragonès, 2014) (Balcells i Ventura, 2007). This particular situation creates problems for all the political parties that are present in all Spain. Additionally, the fact that Podemos' electoral campaign was almost exclusively addressed to media based in Madrid and was almost inexistent in the Catalan media, did not help to its success in this region (Gomà, Ricard; personal interview; 9th February 2017; and Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017).

Figure 2. Percentage of vote for Podemos in the European elections of 2014 by region.

¹⁰⁷ Fount: Boletín Oficial del Estado. Ministry of Interior.



Source: Tarantino, Saulo.

Regarding the ideology of Podemos, its leaders avoid defining the party with the traditional labels of “left” and “right”. They reject to be included in the left-right axis, instead trying to move the debate towards a people-elites axis. The party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, even claims that the debate is about democracy against dictatorship¹⁰⁸. Since Podemos is such a novelty phenomenon, there is yet to be written academic works that deeply analyse its ideology. Consequently, it is important to instead pay evaluate to the way the general population sees it. The Spanish public office dedicated to surveys, the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), has conducted several surveys where the Spanish citizens

¹⁰⁸ http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2014/02/16/pablo-iglesias-entrevista-podemos_n_4787408.html

place Podemos between 2 and 3 on a scale of 1 to 10¹⁰⁹, where 1 represents the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. Thus, despite the intention of their leaders, Podemos is clearly seen as a leftist option and increasingly so, as can be seen in the history of these surveys¹¹⁰. Moreover, in the European Parliament, Podemos is part of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) sharing a group with the French Communist Party, Die Linke, the Sinn Féin or the Coalition of the Radical Left of SYRIZA, reinforcing in that way its profile as a leftist party. However, it is true that its classification is not entirely obvious. For instance, despite belonging to the GUE/NGL, Podemos has displayed a singular behaviour in this group by not following the options of the majority of the other members in some votes. Thus, meanwhile some newspapers like the Financial Times¹¹¹, ABC¹¹², The Economist¹¹³ or The Wall Street Journal¹¹⁴, define Podemos as “extreme left”; the New York Times¹¹⁵ or Público¹¹⁶ point out that Podemos is a “new reality” in Spanish politics based on ideals of anti-establishment, anti-austerity, and the increase of young and female citizens in politics as main ideals.

Gero Maass, political researcher and director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Madrid office¹¹⁷, sees Podemos as a “populist left-wing movement” (Maass, 2017). However, the complexity of the internal relations of Podemos, displaying various political streams, leads to the internal moderates trying to avoid left

¹⁰⁹ For instance: 2,29 in April 2015; 2, 18 in October 2016; 2,02 in February 2017 [Complete surveys available in the annex].

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ <https://www.ft.com/content/783e39b4-e4af-11e3-9b2b-00144feabdc0#axzz32oj7FqqR>

¹¹² <http://www.abc.es/espana/20140318/abci-villarejo-podemos-201403171921.html>

¹¹³ <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21603040-socialist-leader-quits-after-humiliating-election-defeat-exit-rubalcaba>

¹¹⁴

<https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304811904579585834108798694?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304811904579585834108798694.html>

¹¹⁵ https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/europe/spanish-upstart-party-said-it-could-and-did-now-the-hard-part-begins.html?_r=1

¹¹⁶ <http://www.publico.es/politica/cuatro-vias-izquierda-elecciones-europeas.html>

¹¹⁷ The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is a non-profit German foundation funded by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and is named after Germany's first democratically elected President. The FES is the oldest political foundation in Germany.

labels to be more competitive within the social democratic traditional voters pool. But despite the effort of these moderates, Podemos

Is closely involved in left-wing populist organisations and debates in Europe and Latin America. They certainly fit the definitions of populism developed by the late Ernesto Laclau, the intellectual grandfather of left-wing populism. In Laclau's theory, democratic demands form a "chain of equivalence" that leads to a collective progressive will being formulated that aims to create "a people" opposed to the ruling caste or elite (Maass, 2017).

The way Podemos sees itself is not always the same way in which the rest of the people sees them: "Podemos sees itself as a new type of party that does not fit the old categories" (Maass, 2017). This was for example the case in the negotiations with Guanyem, who saw Podemos as a party meanwhile the members of Podemos did not see themselves as members of the party system, as argued by Marc Bertomeus the head of Podemos in Barcelona (personal interview; 14th of February 2017). In this conflict, the followers of Pablo Iglesias, less moderate, wanted "Podemos to retain its character as an extra-parliamentary social movement. They say politics should be worked out in "the streets"" (Maass, 2017).

Podemos decided to not participate directly in the Spanish municipal election of 2015¹¹⁸. The party decided that even if their members could form part of candidatures for the municipal elections and the party itself could support specific electoral options, Podemos would not be directly part of the elections. That meant that the brand Podemos would not head any candidature in any city. This decision was motivated for the fact that Podemos was still non-existent in some parts of Spain, and the leaders were worried that including local free-riders in the party's electoral lists to expand the party's presence could damage party's image at national level. It is important to highlight that the party started

¹¹⁸ http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Podemos-candidaturas-generalizadas-elecciones-municipales_0_286622050.html

to be organized just after the European elections. Therefore Podemos' leaders began the construction of a the party around Spain, out of what was until then little more than an electoral platform supported by external movements. Thus, in 2015 the party was still under construction and with an important number of new arrived people after the good electoral results. This created several doubts among Podemos' leaders about the capacity of these new members to meet the ethical requirements and to follow the national party's strategy. Under this situation the rulers of the party decided to not to risk the brand and just to participate in the regional elections, which were held the same day, where the risk of outsiders was lower. The position to avoid risks in the local elections was approved in an assembly where the party decided to not prepare any local candidature to save the prestige of the brand. With this, the still small structure of the party had the possibility to focus on the main goal, which was the national election¹¹⁹. Instead, the party agreed to join forces with other parties in citizens' platforms –like the ones in Madrid or Barcelona- or to go for citizens lists where those pacts were not possible¹²⁰.

When Podemos decided not to run with its own name in the local elections at the national level, Podem looked for another way to participate in the municipal elections of Barcelona. The most convenient way to participate was to join forces in a project with other political actors, but the fact that other actors knew about the limited capacity of Podem to participate alone, left the formation with restricted capacity of bargaining. This common knowledge among the actors had limited Podem's capacity to pressure or negotiate with the other actors especially those from Barcelona en Comú. This was because the other actors knew that if Podem did not accept the deal, it would finish with almost nothing, and consequently Podem was very weak at the time when the coalition agreements and power distribution were made. Thus, a bad deal for Podem was expected, and it is the main reason why Podem is the smallest party in the

¹¹⁹ http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2014-12-03/podemos-no-quemara-a-sus-lideres-en-las-municipales-y-las-bases-preparan-lista-propia_533016/

¹²⁰ http://www.vozpopuli.com/actualidad/nacional/Podemos-Pablo_Iglesias-Regeneracion-Elecciones_24M-Circulos-Siglas-elecciones-municipales-siglas-marca-regeneracion-Ganemos_0_758024196.html

coalition -in terms of institutional representation- that formed Barcelona en Comú (Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017). Despite knowing this, 91% of the citizen assembly of Barcelona of Podem -where all the members of the party residing in the city can express their opinions and vote- decided to join the project of Barcelona en Comú¹²¹.

5.5.3 The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca.

The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH)¹²² is a Spanish social movement dedicated to fight for decent and affordable living space as a common right for all citizens. Born in Barcelona in 2009 as a consequence of the economic crisis of 2008, it rapidly became very known by the Spanish society due its most notorious *modus operandi*: organizing groups of citizens to stop housing evictions. With a strong grassroots organization, the PAH rapidly expanded around all of Spain becoming very present in the media for their numerous acts defending the people that could not continue paying the mortgage, even if that meant facing the police. Its spokesmen became a well-known figure, not only because they were in front of the crowds trying to stop evictions, but also because they were the public figures who proposed alternative policies to deal with economic austerity. The best known of all activist was Ada Colau, real leader of the PAH and the person who would become the mayor of Barcelona in 2015.

The PAH formed as a consequence of the burst Spanish real estate bubble. The movement was born confronting the reality of several families that were not able to pay their mortgage due to the effects of the economic crisis and remained without a place to live and still in debt, despite having given their home to the bank¹²³. The public reputation of the financial entities suffered from these actions, but without apparent real consequences as they were receiving a lot of

¹²¹ Source: own numbers of Podem. Can be consulted in:

<http://www.podembcn.cat/index.php/confluencies/eleccions-municipals-podem-barcelona-en-comu/193-barcelona-en-comu-eleccions-municipals-de-maig-de-2015>

¹²² In English: Platform for People Affected by Mortgages.

¹²³ This situation was treated in a different way in other countries that also suffered the same problem. For instance, in the USA the debt with the bank was cancelled with the delivery of the house (Marco, Ernest in the documentary *La Plataforma*).

money from the public budgets at the same time. Thereby, given the lack of solutions from the public institutions that kept treating this situation as individual problems when it had already grown into a social problem, a group of persons with no party affiliation but with personal experiences in social activism¹²⁴ started a movement to provide support to those in need. Thus, the PAH tried to provide help in different ways to those who had difficulties to pay the mortgage or who were going to be evicted due to the massive job loss in Spain.

The PAH defines itself as a horizontal movement, non-violent, organized by deliberative assemblies and not linked to any party¹²⁵. Their members are organized to support people regarding their needs, going from legal advice to emotional care. Thus, the PAH works in various ways, which made the movement being appreciated by diverse kinds of people with different problems, regardless of their political ideas. For Ada Colau, the PAH “è stata sicuramente il movimento sociale più trasversale degli ultimi anni, o forse decenni” (Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 180). One of the activities is the mobilization to stop housing evictions. The movement uses non-violent resistance to confront actions of the police forces. When the PAH is trying to stop evictions, it calls on its members to gather at the door of the homes of people who have been notified with eviction. The objective is to protect those people from the law officers forcing them to withdraw from the eviction. The public numbers of the PAH show that the movement has been able to stop 2.045 evictions until March 3rd 2017¹²⁶, directly helping people from losing their houses (Colau & Alemany, 2013). To show the citizens’ support to the PAH’s fight, the social movement organized in 41 cities in Spain the 25th September 2011 manifestations that confirmed PAH’s views¹²⁷. The campaign for the nonrecourse loan is another example of the effort of the PAH for placing the evictions problem in the public agenda. In this

¹²⁴ Several of its members, as for example Ada Colau, came from the Observatorio de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (Desc) (Observatory of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), a “group of individuals and organizations created in 1998 with the objective to show that civil and political rights- freedom of speech, the right to life, to vote etc.- are not the only fundamental rights, but that economic, social, cultural, environment rights- the right to housing, work, education, health, food- are just as fundamental”. Source: DESC website.

¹²⁵ From its website: <http://afectadosporlahipototeca.com>

¹²⁶ Source: webpage of the PAH. <http://afectadosporlahipototeca.com>

¹²⁷ http://elpais.com/diario/2011/09/26/espana/1316988013_850215.html

campaign the PAH tried to lobby the Spanish Parliament to regulate the cancelation of debts with banks after the transfer of a house, annulling any other possible extra compensation due to the decrease of value of the house. When the Spanish Parliament rejected this, the PAH started a campaign to collect signatures to force political parties to debate again and to legislate about it. They were able to collect more than 1,4 millions signatures of people demanding to debate and to regulate the issue¹²⁸. In the words of its former speaker and current national MP, Lucía Martín, the PAH changed the life of thousands of people and was able to have an important impact in the Spanish society (personal interview; 28th January 2017). For her, the PAH changed not just legal aspects, also the mentality of some people who were emotionally destroyed and then better able to recuperate hope for things to be done in a better way (personal interview; 28th January 2017). So relevant was the activity of the PAH for keeping the wellness of the people in risk of losing their homes, that the social movement's task has been recognized for various collectives. Among the recognitions of the work done, it is important to highlight two: the Spanish National Award for Human Rights delivered by the Asociación pro Derechos Humanos de España in January 2013 and the European Citizens' Prize by the European Parliament in 2013.

Due to its work done trying to solve the problems of what was seen as an unfair situation, the popularity of the PAH among the society was very high¹²⁹. For instance, the citizens' initiative regarding the nonrecourse loan that of the PAH had 90%¹³⁰ of public support, regardless the ideology or party preferences of the citizens. Moreover, the PAH received more credit than political parties and institutions -like the Government- in all the advances that Spain has lived to solve housing problems linked to the economic crisis¹³¹. Besides that, through what the movement called "Obra Social", various social initiatives implemented

¹²⁸ <http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1725145/0/dacion-pago/desahucio-hipotecas/iniciativa-legislativa-popular/>

¹²⁹ Survey done by Metroscopia the 17th of February 2013 for the newspaper *El País*. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/02/16/actualidad/1361053281_008924.html

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ The citizens consider with the 70% that the PAH has been the actor who has had more relevance to solve the problem for 29% that consider that the Government has had relevance in that issue.

by the PAH and directed at problems of families not able to avoid eviction, helped the movement to be seen with an unselfish attitude. The program therefore tried to use empty housing to give a place to stay to those evicted families with no place to live. This initiative pressured the banks to offer social rents to some families to avoid the bad publicity that entails an eviction process. Thus, the number of persons that had been reallocated thanks to this program, 2.500 according to the PAH, must be added to the number of housing eviction stopped as an achievement of the PAH¹³². Additionally, the work done by the PAH to change the dimension of the problem was very recognized by the citizens too.

The PAH was able to show that the responsibility of not being able to pay the mortgage was not from the families themselves, but from the financial and banking system (Martín, Lucía; personal interview; 9th February 2017). Thereby, the problem transformed from having individual cause, to being understood as a collective problem. Consequently, the solutions that should be applied to solve the problem would have to be different, and thinking more about people needs (Martín, Lucía; personal interview; 9th February 2017). Hence, this level of acknowledgment towards the task of the PAH put the movement in a privileged situation to connect with the citizens during the elections.

5.5.4 Guayem Barcelona.

After years of seeing several of their demands ignored by the existing parties, the activists of the PAH realized that if they wanted to achieve their goals, another approach was necessary. For them, doing more with the PAH was not possible, as the social movement had showed its limitations (Spena & Forti, 2016). The big public demonstrations and the singular PAH's acts were not enough, and so, it became necessary to make a leap into politics to change the balance of power in the institutions that until then had overlooked them (Spena & Forti, 2016). Their fight showed to the activists the importance of social movements, but also their weaknesses:

¹³² Numbers are published in the PAH website: <http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com>. ([Consulted: 3th of March 2017](#))

When the PAH was in its higher rates of popularity, active around all Spain, everyday on the news, in prime time programs, meaning, when the PAH was a very strong and present movement, able to pressure like no one had done before, political parties in institutions still blocked any possibility for real change. Of course, the pressure created by the PAH was indispensable, otherwise those issues would not have ended up in the on the political agenda and in the citizens debates. But at the end it is still the institutions that create the legal norms. Consequently, if you want to change the world, that is where you have to be (Martín, Lucía; personal interview; 9th February 2017).

Thus, based on the support they knew they had from several citizens PAH-activists decided to form a new political subject: Guanyem¹³³. Guanyem was the civic platform which the members of several social movements -mainly formed by people of the PAH¹³⁴- used to organize their political project for Barcelona. Reflecting about this, Ada Colau said that “si è passati dall’indignazione di piazza ad una proposta politica: volevamo far parte della soluzione e attuare il cambiamento grazie al protagonismo cittadino” (Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 77). Hence, motivated by the feeling of being left aside, the former social activist decided to jump into the electoral competition against those political parties that previously had not attended to their demands. Thus, not being attentive enough to the social movement’s demands generated a new adversary for the establish parties.

The decision to form Guanyem was not an isolated choice of its founders. It was located in the feeling of some citizens that the street fight had to have a translation into institutional politics. The Indignados movement played an importance role in the decision of the activists of the PAH to decide to use other channels to participate in politics. The social movements that shaped Guanyem already had enormous political relevance, but its members saw the demands of

¹³³ In Catalan: Let’s win!

¹³⁴ Also members from l’Observatori Desc, Proces Constituent, and other social movements of the city of Barcelona joined the project lead by the members of the PAH.

the citizens that the 15M raised and were still unsatisfied. Analysing this lack, they decided that a new kind of political interaction was necessary in the Spanish society. For Colau “senza la mobilitazione del 15M non ce l'avremmo mai fatta. Quel movimento ha politicizzato la crisi e ha portato nella società un cambiamento della coscienza e della mentalità della gente” (Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 204). The political parties “sanno che devono contare sui movimenti dopo l'esplosione degli Indignados; sono coscienti che si devono trovare punti di incontro, ma allo stesso tempo sono gelosi della propria autonomia”(Spena & Forti, 2016). But the members of Guanyem were not afraid of the relevance of social movements in politics. For them, there must be a permanent dialogue between social movements and the rest of political actors. Colau believes that now “è il momento di aggiornare le nostre istituzioni, renderle più trasparenti e aprire a nuove modalità di cogestione: dobbiamo esplorare oltre la dicotomia pubblico/privato, investendo su una terza gamba che è il “comunitario” nel quale ci si “corresponsabilizza”” (Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 136). Due to this mind-set it is not surprising that the first people interested in the project of Guanyem, apart from the social movements activist, were the ones who had been involved in the 15M. These people approached the new project because they knew about the job previously done by the activist. The founders of Guanyem believe that these people were approaching them because the PAH had built a credible, serious and consistent path especially recognized by the social activists of every movement in Spain (Colau, Ada in Spena & Forti, 2016).

The good rates of approval towards the PAH actions¹³⁵ and public notoriousness of Colau fighting in defence of what was perceived as an unfair social situation, made her a respected figure and a coveted political instrument for political parties. Based on this, in previous local elections, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds and the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Cup) tried to include Colau in their electoral lists (Spena & Forti, 2016). Even though she rejected to join those projects, these proposals highlighted the potential of Ada Colau as political figure. For her, those projects were however too closely linked to traditional

¹³⁵ See the PAH numbers in the previous section.

parties and were constructed by ignoring the citizens' real concerns. Consequently, with their past as social activist, the role of the social movements in the dialogues between citizens and institutions was crucial for them. They believed that the social movements are the key of social and political change playing an essential role in renewing the forms and practices of politics (Colau, Ada in Spena & Forti, 2016). But being a social movement is not the same as being a political party. So they reflected about how to built a new political actor to comply with the citizens' demands. "Ci siamo chiesti: come si costruisce un movimento popolare fino a farlo diventare un'opposizione sociale e politica ad un governo complice della finanza?" explained Lucía Delgado, one of the founders of Guanyem (Spena & Forti, 2016 Kindle position 399). To built this project, they began with restricted meetings with just twenty or thirty persons from the PAH (Spena & Forti, 2016). Step by step the number of people grew and started to include activists from other social movements and well-know public figures linked to academia. After the project seemed viable, the formal contacts with political parties started, and Barcelona en Comú was born.

5.6 Barcelona en Comú.

Barcelona en Comú was the final configuration of the political project shared by Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, Guanyem, Esquerra Unida i Alternativa and Podemos to contest the local elections of 2015 in Barcelona. It was presented to the public the 10th of February 2015, less than four months before the elections¹³⁶, with the objective to win the post of mayor. The project started one year before, driven by the creation of Guanyem and the demands of social activist that raised the hypothesis that there is an opportunity window to solve the democratic crisis Spain was suffering (Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017). They had the feeling that the crisis was bigger at local level and decided that they had to focus on the cities, in particular on Barcelona. To achieve this goal, conversations with several actors started to create a confluence between them to remove the government of Xavier Trias from the

¹³⁶ 24th of May 2015.

municipality. The initial idea of the founders was to create a new political subject with political parties, but without being controlled by political parties.

The formal contacts between Guanyem and the already existing political parties started immediately after the emergence of the first. However, the cause of these formal contacts was mainly the existence of several previous informal contacts between the members of the various organizations. Ricard Gomà, the leader of the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa in the City Council of Barcelona for three terms and one of the persons who started the contacts of the parties with the social movements and Guanyem, says that “the importance of existing personal connections between various actors was crucial for the confluence, as they realize that they were talking about the same thing in different spaces: the parties, social movements and community and neighbourhood associations” (personal interview; 9th February 2017). The analysis done by ICV-EUiA showed that it would be difficult to repeat a government with the PSC because there was the feeling that it was an exhausted model (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). But to attract the former PSC voters ICV-EUiA explored if it would be possible to create a candidature that goes beyond ICV-EUiA and could connect with a broader space (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). After forming a few contacts, they realized that others have had similar reflections about the situation of the city, and the name of Ada Colau started to appear and with her the rest of the people of PAH and Guanyem. Thus, the potential partners started to talk about a possible collaboration. But despite the discussions about the same issues, the groups had heterogeneous backgrounds that would have to be managed. The various actors were politically socialized in different spaces and realities, with different ways to address problems, potentially creating internal tensions in the negotiations (Sanz, Janet; personal interview; 25th January 2017). On the positive side however the final goals were the same from beginning on (Sanz, Janet; personal interview; 25th January 2017).

The initial idea of the former activist of the PAH was that all the actors would join together under the brand that they had created, that is, Guanyem. They

believed that this way, they would be able to better control the fusion process between the various actors and would avoid the traditional fights that have characterized the internal life of political parties (Segovia, Susana; personal interview; 15th March 2017). The rest of the actors involved did not see this option as viable as it would leave them in a clear subordinate position compared to the activists that created Guanyem (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). The parts were still debating, when they heard that a member of a right-wing party had recently registered in the Spanish public office the brand Guanyem as his own. Julià de Fabián López was a councillor in a small municipality close to Barcelona and had manoeuvred to take advantage of the situation. His confessed objective was not to create a proper party, but to hinder the existence of Guanyem¹³⁷. The talks with him to reach an agreement to release the brand were not satisfactory and the search for a new electoral brand started¹³⁸. What was seen at that moment as a threat to the survival of the project was instead used as a way of bringing all the parties together under the new political subject with all of them entering in an equal position. The parties that were reluctant to enter in a project clearly lead by social activist felt in that moment much more comfortable with the new configuration (Gomà, Ricard; personal interview; 9th February 2017). Consequently, the confidence between the parts grew and also the feeling that all of them were deciding and jointly building a new political subject. Barcelona en Comú was born.

For Ada Colau the purpose behind the creation of Barcelona en Comú was to rethink political parties as concept, making it more horizontal, less bureaucratic and less depended on electoral triumphs (Spena & Forti, 2016). The members of Guanyem were not interested in the unity of the left under one single brand, neither to create additions between the various members, but to create something new and different (Spena & Forti, 2016). For Colau, the aim was “ripartire dal protagonismo delle persone e realizzare una rivoluzione democratica con nuove forme del fare politica, più trasparenti, che impedissero

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http://www.eldiario.es/politica/persona-disputa-marca-Guanyem_0_336667236.html

138 Posteriorly, after several bureaucratic impediments, the members of Guanyem regain the use of the brand.

la corruzione e mettersero al centro le priorità della cittadinanza, non quelle dei partiti” (Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 97). But despite their goal of not being dependent on electoral results, Barcelona en Comú had a clear ambition: removing Xavier Trias as mayor. Its *raison d’être* was the victory in the local elections, not just putting some issues on the public agenda. “Sì, bisognava vincere. Non volevamo fare un partito politico per ottenere una rappresentanza testimoniale col 6-7 per cento, per far questo potevamo aggregarci a una forza già esistente” (Cola, Ada in Spena & Forti, 2016, Kindle position 95). This approach created a lot of tensions with another party, the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP), which initially was also part of the negotiations but left because its goal was not the victory in the local elections, just the protest (Segovia, Susana; personal interview; 15th March 2017). The aim of Barcelona en Comú on the other hand, was going further than the traditional leftist voters, it wanted to involve the people that despite not being leftist voters were involved in the association tissue of the city. Guanyem’s manifesto when it was presented showed clearly those values,

That’s why we are launching this citizen platform. To build a joint candidacy that represents the majority, with the aim to win. A candidacy that excites, that is based in neighbourhoods, workplaces, the cultural community, and that allows us to transform institutions for the benefit of the people.

We don’t want a coalition or an alphabet soup of political parties. We want to avoid the old logic of parties and build a new space that, while respecting the identity of everyone involved, are more than the sum of the parts that make it up¹³⁹.

The formal negotiations between the various actors involved in the project started with debates about how politicians have to behave in public institutions. One of the reasons motivating several of the individuals that initiated Barcelona en Comú was their concern about the lack of “real democracy” and proper

¹³⁹ Available at <https://guanyembarcelona.cat/lets-win-barcelona/>

accountability in Spain¹⁴⁰. “Democratic regeneration” was one of the terms most used by the Indignados and other social movements and it was a very demanded issue for part of the Spanish citizens (Iglesias Turrión & Monedero, 2011). The feeling between the members of Barcelona en Comú that corruption was a constant in political parties made this one the first topic to face (Segovia, Susana; personal interview; 15th March 2017). Before agreeing on what to do, it was necessary to see if all of the potential members shared the same idea about how politics have to be (Sanz, Janet; personal interview; 25th January 2017). For that reason, the first meetings were dedicated not to possible policies to implement but to the creation of an ethical code that all future candidates of Barcelona en Comú would have to follow. The ethical code was “intended to be a step forward in carrying out the democratic revolution”¹⁴¹, which the members of Barcelona en Comú considered that was necessary in Spanish politics. The ethical code, named “Governing by obeying” “comprises a code of practice and concrete actions that people holding elected and appointed political positions must respect in order for the political system to be responsible and responsive to citizens”. Further, “It also includes a range of commitments and measures with the aim of guaranteeing that everyone can dedicate the necessary time to public service and, at the same time, putting an end to the privileges”.

The elaboration of the ethical code lasted two months, a significant part of the formal negotiations time¹⁴². But apart from the original goal of the ethical code regarding democratic regeneration, it also had other utilities. It was a powerful tool for the Barcelona en Comú’s members cohesion too, helping to get to know each member and their different work cultures (Sanz, Janet; personal interview; 25th January 2017). For one of the two campaign managers, David Cid, working together every day side by side and sharing space, was an important element that strengthened the will of keeping together and deciding together between the members of the project (personal interview; 2th February 2017). Marc

¹⁴⁰ In March of 2017 the people that answer with a no to the question “are you satisfied with the functioning of our democracy?” was still a 65%. Survey available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/04/08/actualidad/1491668182_128365.html

¹⁴¹ Governing by obeying, the ethical code of Barcelona en Comú (available in the annex).

¹⁴² Between 4 and 6 months.

Bertomeus, one of the persons in charge of the negotiations for Podem said that starting with the code of ethics was useful from two point of views: externally and internally. On the one hand, it was useful, to make the project public and to explain its essential objectives to the citizens. On the other hand, and more relevant for Bertomeus, it was useful to create internal collaborative synergies. Those previous works helped to create an environment of trust and helped to facilitate the subsequent discussions about the most delicate issues with a confident attitude (personal interview; 14th of February 2017). Thus, the code of ethics was a valuable tool to achieve the agreement between the various members of Barcelona en Comú.

Barcelona en Comú is the result of the addition of various groups of people with difference priorities and different personal path. Consequently, they have different visions that must be handled correctly to allow the parties to continue working together; otherwise the risk of breakage is high. Nevertheless, that difference has shown to be a great opportunity too, especially in the campaign. Meanwhile the coordination unit had to work hard to keep the electoral machine working due to the discussions about how to face campaign decisions -like the use of the face of Ada Colau in the electoral ballots- the majority of the time all groups were surprised about the quality and approaches of the other groups (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). Thus the people of ICV-EUiA contributed with experienced elites, the knowhow of working within institutions, electoral campaign experience and a big background of all the municipal issues. For Bertomeus ICV-EUiA was a base from which to start building the project either from the political cadres, or electoral platform as they had previous representation and with that, access to electoral free advertisements, or financial support (personal interview; 14th of February 2017). Guanyem contributed with an important amount of people that knew how to connect with the citizens and how to use all the media and social networks to communicate the ideas of the confluence (Cid, David; personal interview; 2th February 2017). They had a very clear strategy in mind, and an activist army to activate the society, thanks to the close links with the neighbourhoods and the social movements. The fact that the members of Guanyem have been doing politics before but far away from the

institutions entailed that they arrived with different mental frameworks that supposed to see new solutions to old problems (Sanz, Janet; personal interview; 25th January 2017). For Janet Sanz the only member of the government of Barcelona en Comú that had been member of the City Council before and in charge of the transition team, Podem contributed with its momentum. At that time, Podem had the powerful image of its national leader Pablo Iglesias and the feeling of the existence of an alternative that could really win. Moreover, thanks to them, it was possible to reach some popular city districts with high labour voters and new voters that had never felt attracted by politics before and were not connected with social movements (personal interview; 25th January 2017). Podem's leader in Barcelona thinks that they were the reason of the mobilization in some areas rather than the figure of Colau, who was not able to connect by herself (Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017).

Meanwhile, the external social movements –that is, the ones that were not the PAH, Guanyem and the connected to them- also played a big role in Barcelona en Comú. By nature, the members of Barcelona en Comú put a lot of trust in the function of social movements not just for effective democracy, but also for the management of the decisions of the city. Ricard Gomà, linked for a long time with a political party¹⁴³ and now without managerial party duties, had analysed the project he helped to create from his current position as a political science professor stating that “without the social movements Barcelona en Comú does not make sense, moreover, it would not existed” (personal interview; 9th February 2017). For him, in Barcelona “social movements are doing things that political parties do not do, like connecting with people, caring about their concerns, and trying to solve citizens problems. In summary, they build a community” (personal interview; 9th February 2017). Further, the Spanish MP Lucía Martín believes that “it is impossible to have the existence of feedback from the institutions unless there are strong social movements” (personal interview; 28th January 2017). For her, the people from social movements contribute with a different personal experience from those of political parties. The activists “have spent a lot of time touching the street, debating in assemblies

¹⁴³ ICV.

every week, feeling peoples' bad experiences as if those were their own personal experiences" (Ibid). Martín firmly believes that living others people's reality changes your conception of life, and that is how activists learned new approaches about how public policies should be done, especially social policies (Ibid). Marc Bertomeus also support this when he explained that social movements supplied the project with ideas and arguments to defend it, and a big part of Barcelona en Comú party's manifesto (personal interview; 14th of February 2017). Additionally, Gomà believes that Barcelona is not an isolated case, as now social movements are interested in being active in politics and are more present than ever in Spanish institutions.

Finally, the figure of Ada Colau is an important element to understand the existence of the Barcelona en Comú. She was a very known and respected person for her past as activist, and her political potential was clear for all the members of Barcelona en Comú. Her leadership of the list was not under discussion as a big majority firmly believed that she should be the public face of the common project (Gomà, Ricard; personal interview; 9th February 2017). According to Joan Herrera, the former leader of Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, no one denied the political and moral leadership of Ada (Spena & Forti, 2016). In fact, her presence in the project encouraged some other actors to join it. The main objective of Podemos once it was clear they would not run under their own brand in the local elections was to associate the figure of Colau to the Podemos project (Bertomeus, Marc; personal interview; 14th of February 2017). For Podem there was no other person with the same degree of approval from the citizens and her mere presence in the project assured that several citizens would feel attracted to Barcelona en Comú. Despite she could be consider an extremist and not a politician by her past *modus operandi*, in the eyes of her early followers, this should not be a problem for citizens to vote for her, since it was not an impediment for the political parties to approach her. In fact, these followers believe that "the parties came to us for Ada, not despite her" (Segovia, Susana; personal interview; 15th March 2017). David Cid, the leader of Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds and at the moment of the negotiations in charge of discussing the participation of his party in the project stated that,

“Ada Colau was the face of the most interesting social movement in reaction to the economic crisis. She was very known, and with a high legitimacy for her acts to confront the economic powers. Consequently, her leadership was the most natural and least complicated issue in the negotiations. We have to be aware that her degree of knowledge was very high, even before the presentation of the project, between 70 and 80% therefore higher than the majority of politicians. She was a person that was every week present in the TV channels. And of course that was a plus to the project” (Personal interview; 2th February 2017).

5.7 Summary.

This chapter presented the story behind the creation of “Barcelona en Comú” a joint venture between social movements and political parties. It focuses in the situation that finalized in the decision of different actors to create a new political subject. It continues explaining the construction process, its difficulties and the profile of the actors involved in its creation. In the chapter it is possible to observe crucial elements for the process, as the existence of a strong candidate and an ethical code to define members’ public behaviour. Additionally it is highlighted the influence of the new political subject on the local elections of Barcelona when it was created and the leadership of the project by the social movements members. Finally, it presents the later pact between BeC and the PSC in the City Government. In Chapter Six the analysis will try to explain using game theory, why the agreement between the parties was possible and the effect of some elements over the kind of relationship between the actors involved.

Chapter Six.

Analysis of the elements that affect the interaction.


This chapter represents the second part of the analytical narrative approach: the analysis. It builds on the narrative of two specific series of events that involve the interaction between political parties and social movements presented in the previous chapters. Thus, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the elements that have been extracted from those chapters: the elements identified through the in-depth study of the events that occurred around the municipal elections in Milan and Barcelona. The specific roles these elements play in influencing the relationship between political parties and social movements will be highlighted to determine each one importance. To achieve this I will use tools from game theory, since they permit the systematic presentation of the events based on the strategic choices of the actors involved. Using Michael Hanagan's categorization of the various types of relationships between political parties and social movements, this chapter will try to give insight into how some elements are capable to alter these relationships from one type to another.

6.1 The six types of interaction.

This work attempts to analyse the role of some elements in shaping the interaction between political parties and social movements. To do this, the research takes into consideration various possible configurations of this interaction. The classification of the stages I use here is based on Michael Hanagan's (1998) five types, plus one additional type I added to complete the full range of possible stages between these actors. This classification, as seen in Chapter Two, is grounded in showing how close political parties and social movements feel about each other. Thus, depending on the degree of collaboration that actors are interested in, the relationship between political

parties and social movements can vary from various stages¹⁴⁴. From an unconditional support of the social movements towards a political party, to becoming a complete ideological adversary, there are 6 stages: “articulation”, “permeation”, “alliance”, “independence”, “competition” and “opposition”. Figure 3 displays the classification graphically. Here, the spectrum of relationship ranges from totally agreeing with the other part, represented by 1; to totally contrary, represented by 0:

Figure 3. Types of relationships between political parties and social movements.



A brief reminder of the various types of interactions¹⁴⁵:

- **Articulation.** In this scenario social movements are political parties' tools and follow completely the parties' orders. Movements may even be created by parties, and they act as a channel to impulse some of party's ideas.
- **Permeation.** Both, political parties and social movements act independently, however, their level of connection is so strong that there is a relation of exclusivity between them. Hence, the social movement will not collaborate with another political party.

¹⁴⁴ See “7. Types of relationship between parties and movements” in Chapter Two.

¹⁴⁵ For a more extended explanation see “7. Types of relationship between parties and movements” in Chapter Two.

- **Alliance.** Political parties and social movements are each other natural allies. They negotiate each collaboration autonomously, and they expect to obtain specific benefits from every agreement.
- **Independence.** Social movement's highest priority is achieving its own goal. If this goal is shared with the party, collaboration can exist. Otherwise the movement will act without paying attention to the political consequences for the party.
- **Competition.** The social movement decides to create a new political organization to compete in the elections against the political party.
- **Opposition.** Social movement and political party are ideologically contrarian. They see each other as political adversaries and the intentions of both actors include the defeat of the other's ideas.

It is important to notice that the two extremes of the classification, that is, "articulation" and "opposition", can be found in every political system and are, thus, no ideal types included for theoretical reasons. However, for the present dissertation their utility is limited. On the one hand, the fact that a social movement follows completely the lines of one specific political party -as in the case of "articulation"- limits the possible choices of the movement as an independent actor. In practice, in situations of "articulation", there is just one decision centre, despite the existence of two different actors. Hence, the political party has all the power, no existing a credible threat from the social movement, and consequently, there is no possible strategic behaviour that we can observe. On the other hand, "opposition", the other extreme, is very useful to define when collaboration between actors is possible. The analysis of the element "ideology" in section 6.4 highlights this, showing that when two actors are in this stage, no collaboration is possible. Nevertheless, the fact that when two actors are in this stage it is not easy for them to move to another stage, limits its utility for this dissertation beyond the point of establishing when it is possible to collaborate

and when not. Therefore, the other four types of interactions are the ones that are going to be the most used in this dissertation.

6.2 Preliminary assumptions.

In all works that use game theory as analytical tool, it is important to accurately define the kind of actors under study and the conditions in which these actors are inserted before starting the analysis. This dissertation is not different in this aspect. Thus, the analysis considers that the actors fulfil the following features:

- All actors are rational in their behaviour and decisions. I assume that they act in their own self-interest, but they not necessarily seek immediate benefits since they can plan long-term.
- The actors know their own preferences and these can be ranked. The fact that the preferences can be ranked does not exclude the possibility of a tie between two or more options.
- The actors are assumed to maximize their expected utility.
- The actors know who is playing the game, that is, who other actors are.
- It is common knowledge to all actors that other players are rational too.
- The actors are aware of their actions and of their decisions, including their consequences.
- The actors know and are able to evaluate all possible alternatives.
- The actors act strategically. Through strategic decision-making, individuals seek to anticipate the effect that their own actions will have on the behaviour of others. Given this expectation, each individual then determines his or her optimal response in order to achieve the most desirable outcome.

Additionally, in the games used to analyse the relevance of the elements, I consider that there is a sequence of actions executed by the actors. That is, the decisions of the actors are taken one after the other, not all at the same time. Consequently, at the time of their choice, the actors know what others have decided previously and they act according to this knowledge. In this situation,

players are capable of observing the actions of other players before deciding on their optimal response. In this kind of games, players can thus, condition their optimal actions based on what other players have done in the past or anticipate what they will do in the future based on their rational behaviour. This is called conditional strategy, describing how one player conditions his or her actions upon the actions of other players in the game.

Concerning the amount of information which actors have, it is possible to find situations of complete information and situations of incomplete information. It is said to have complete information if all players' payoff functions are common knowledge. This means that everyone knows everyone's payoffs, and everyone knows everyone knows this, and so on. In contrast, incomplete information means that players are not sure about other players' payoffs. Unless otherwise stated, the games used in this chapter are considered to have complete information.

In some moments of this chapter Barcelona en Comú will be treated as if it were a social movement, even though political parties and social movements form it. So far, the exact nature of BeC is not clear. It is not a classic political party, but nevertheless participates in institutional politics. But since their leaders are former activists and the strategic decisions are made by the former members of the PAH, their behaviour is more similar to a social movement than to a classical political party. The analyst and scholars that have followed this new political phenomenon, like Gabriel Colomé¹⁴⁶, believe that "BeC is undoubtedly a movement, and the parties that integrate BeC apart from ICV, are also movements. Moreover, it acts as a movement not as a political party" (personal interview; 18th of May 2017). Consequently, especially in the analysis of the relationship between the PSC and BeC in sections 6.7.2, and 6.9.1, and Podemos and BeC in section 6.5.3, Barcelona en Comú will be treated as a social movement.

¹⁴⁶ Political science professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

6.3 The elements to analyse.

By creating an account of the events surrounding the local elections of Milan and Barcelona it has been possible to identify some key elements that influence the relationship between political parties and social movements. Emerging from both the interviews and the other sources, these elements have to be tested and examined to establish their role in the alteration of the type of relationship between the actors object of the present study. These elements can for example make the actors more likely to opt for a stronger collaboration or to decide to look for a more independent kind of relationship.

First, the interviewees indicated some elements that, for them, had a relevant role in helping or obstructing the interaction between political parties and social movements. Those elements deserve to be taken into account and properly analysed. However, there are also elements that just appeared after creating the narrative of the events through connecting the dots from different sources. Those elements are normally hidden for those who are involved in the events and can only be properly observed from a more objective point of view. Both types elements, those more visible and those more hidden will be analysed accordingly to their importance for the relationship under observation.

The individualized analysis of each of these elements allows, in addition to observing their joint role as done in the narrative part, to evaluate the real relevance of each one of them. This delimitation consents to separate the crucial elements from those that have little or no influence on the determination of the relationship between the actors. To do this, this dissertation makes use of models of game theory. Reality is always complex and through models we can simplify it, making it more approachable for the eyes of the researchers. Additionally, the analysis permits to extract specific features of these elements that we were not possible to observe just with the narrative part. Undoubtedly, the use of modelling to simplify the reality entails the loss of some parts of the object of study. However, it is a necessary price to pay, since otherwise the use of models would be useless, as they would just reproduce the entire reality. Thus, the creation of good modelling lies in the ability to include all the essentials

while suppressing the superfluous to build a complete picture of the elements that have a crucial role.

The elements that are going to be analysed are:

- The ideology.
- The figure of the candidate.
- The capacity of influence in the elaboration of public policies.
- The electoral system.
- The capacity of making public appointments.
- The existence of trust among the actors.

This list does not intend to be a comprehensive list of all the elements that influence the relationship between political parties and social movements. The existence of other elements is more than possible, in fact, almost certain. As such, the elements included in this analysis are specifically and only those which appeared as relevant after in-depth studies of the events surrounding the two last local elections of the cities of Milan and Barcelona.

6.4 Ideology.

Ideology is the first element we discuss that shapes the relationship between political parties and social movements. The role of the ideology is particular and different from the other elements since it displays its influence in a sort of stage zero, that is, before modelling the type of relationship that will be established. Previously to the influence of the other elements that will define the type of relationship between the actors, ideology acts as a gatekeeper allowing or denying the existence of collaboration. Since we understand ideology as the collection of ideas about how the society should be organized (North, 1990), if the actors do not recognize each other as at least ideologically compatible, no collaboration is possible. Thus, instead of shaping the relationship, ideology impacts by allowing collaboration or by impeding it.

Both actors, political parties and social movements have ideologies (Inglehart, 1990). Although it tends to be easy to frame a political party within a specific ideology as “parties organize themselves around ideologies, not policy positions” (Hinich & Munger, 1996, p.3), it is not so obvious with social movements. Social movements tend to be interested in changing a specific part of the society and they do not necessarily need to have a project for the whole. They are interested in certain issues, and their acts tend to be focused on producing transformations in these issues not in developing a complete ideology. However, normally the core of social movements’ demands can be framed within the ideology of a specific political party’s family (Tucker, 1989). For instance, the demands of the environmental movement tend to be part of the ideology of left-wing parties, whereas the demands of the pro-life movement tend to be part of the ideology of right-wing parties. Obviously, these assumptions have to take in consideration the specificities of each political reality and each State, since each political environment has its own particularities and its own ideological alignment. Thus, some issues can be accepted across the entire political spectrum of a specific country, as it is for example the case of social security in the Nordic countries.

Even though social movements’ demands are normally transversal to parties’ voters, the possibility of including the demands of social movements within a particular political ideology results very useful because it allows to understand why some social movements tend to collaborate more with one group of parties rather than others. Therefore, it is possible to use a similar classification regarding the political positions of both types of actors. However, the specific ideology of the actors is not crucial for their interaction, since the important thing is that both actors recognize each other as a valid potential partner, as “ideological beliefs are often concerned more with feelings and values than with verifiable facts” (Goertzel, 1992, p51). On the one hand, if both actors recognize each other by sharing the same ideology, it is possible to define this as an ideological identity. For instance, if both actors recognize each other as left-wing, they share an ideological identity. On the other hand, if the actors recognize each other as bearers of a contrary ideology, they are ideologically incompatible. For instance, if one actor identifies as leftists and the other as rightist, and they agree

on that, they are ideologically incompatible, and they recognize it in this way. However, since there are several ideologies and they are not necessarily all contrary to others, actors can also feel that they are in an intermediate position ideologically speaking. In those cases, when the actors do not share the same ideology and neither the contrary, it is possible to talk about the existence of a compatible ideology between them. Thus, meanwhile contrary ideology prevents collaboration between actors since the only possible type of relationship is “opposition”; identical or compatible ideologies make collaboration possible. Consequently, actors pay special attention to ideology in the first moments to assure this is compatible. Once this filter is passed, ideology becomes secondary. The definitive type of relationship between the actors is still to be established by other elements, but sharing a compatible ideology opens a door to collaboration. The reason why actors use ideology to decide which other actors they are not going to collaborate with, is because, as Anthony Downs argues, ideology serves as a means of reducing the costs of collecting information (1957). Acting as a sort of reputation, if the actors know that the ideology of a potential partner is not compatible with their own, they are not willing to collaborate. However, unless the own ideology clearly conflicts with some political position of the other party, actors will try to reach agreements with the maximum possible numbers of actors based on the idea that “ideologies are more about future potentialities than current realities” (Goertzel, 1992, p51).


When political parties interact with a social movement both actors have their own ideology, which is configured previously to their first contact. When analysing the interaction between political parties and social movements in the games, their political positions can be expressed in three different ways:

- a) Ideology X.
- b) Ideology Z, contrary to X.
- c) Ideology Y, a position in between of X and Z and consequently sharing part of both.

Each actor can have one of these kinds of ideologies, X, Z or Y, and can interact with another actor with the same range of ideological options X, Z or Y. This

creates a series of multiple combinations that are possible to be observed in the figure 4.

Figure 4. Ideological combinations of the actors.




Firstly, when both actors share the same ideology, that is, when the combination is XX, ZZ or YY it can be described as a case of identical ideology [see figure 5]. In this scenario, collaboration is possible because the actors have similar ways of understanding the society. However, it is important to highlight that even though common ideology allows collaboration, it does not guarantee it. The actual type of relationship will be determined by other elements, which are not ideology. Ideology, thus, acts as a pre-emptive element able to foster or obstruct the collaboration before it begins. Sharing the same ideology does therefore not lead to an immediate agreement between the actors. In fact, two organizations sharing the same ideology should not be confused with two organizations sharing the same goals. Despite the existence of an identical ideology, the actors can be electoral adversaries competing for the support of the same kind of voter. The types of relationship possible to find between actors that share the same ideology are thus all but “opposition”. Therefore, the type can vary from “articulation” to “competition”.

Secondly, when the interacting parties have contrary ideologies, that is XZ, or ZX, it can be described as a case of ideological incompatibility [see figure 5]. When the ideologies of the actors are in opposite parts of the ideological spectrum, collaboration is very difficult. This implies that the type of relationship between the actors is going to be “opposition”. The ideology places the actors in facing positions, defining each other as adversaries. This setting determines a kind of relationship that can hardly be altered, since it would require a complete modification of the positions of one of the actors or the existence of exceptional circumstances that foster the collaboration between them. Therefore, ideology reveals itself as such a crucial element for relationships that Norman Schofield holds that “strong ideological disagreement within one of the two [actors] can lead to collapse” of any potential agreement (2008). It is at the end the definition of “opposition” itself, when social movement and political party belong to a completely different ideological space. They are antagonists and the main goal of the movement is the opposition to the public policies that the party proposes, battling against their approval. Hence, ideology is an element that in some circumstances it can prevent any possible collaboration between political parties and social movements.

Finally, when one of the actors, either the political party or the social movement, has an ideology defined as Y, it creates the potential combinations XY, YX, YZ, and ZY. Since ideology Y is not contrary to X nor Z, it is possible to talk about the existence of a compatible ideology between the actors [see figure 5]. This does not mean that they share a common ideology, but they are close enough to allow them to collaborate on common projects. In these combinations of ideology, this one does not preconfigure the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. Ideology might facilitate or obstruct understanding between the actors, but it does not determine the type of relationship between them, since with the same ideological assumptions, the type of relationship can vary among various stages. Like in the cases of identical ideology, there are other elements that will configure the type of relationship. Thus, when the ideologies do not

coincide among the actors, but remain compatible, the type of relationship can vary between “alliance” and “competition”.

Figure 5. Outcomes of ideological combinations in a two-actors game.




6. 4.1 The role of ideology in the cases of Milan and Barcelona.

In the two case studies of this dissertation, ideology played a relevant role in the interaction between the various actors. In the cities of Milan and Barcelona the collaboration between the actors involved was possible due to the existence of an identical or compatible ideology between them. The ideology did not produce the collaboration, but it allowed it. Hereinafter, to observe the role of ideology it is convenient to use the traditional political spectrum left-right, emphasizing the centre as the political space that shares ideas with the other two ideologies (Heywood, 2015). As it is a common scale, actors can usually recognize themselves and recognize other actors in this typology. This makes it possible for them to know whether they are facing an ideological adversary or an actor that shares at least part of their ideas.

Thus, in Milan the main studied interaction is the one between two actors: the Movimento Arancione (MA) and the Partito Democratico (PD). The Movimento Arancione is a social movement born with a left-wing ideology, defending leftist policies. The Partito Democratico on the other hand, is a political party born from the union of leftist and centrist parties. The political orientation of the PD depends on the actors who define it, but normally it is considered as leftist or centre-left. Therefore, the possible equilibriums of the game of ideology involving these actors are, the one where the political party is either “left” or “centre”, and the social movement is “left” [see figure 6]. In both equilibriums the final outcome represents the existence of a possible collaboration between the actors¹⁴⁷. If both actors are “left” there is an identical ideology, while if the actors are “centre” “left” the result is a compatible ideology. Once shown that the collaboration is possible, the type of interaction that is finally implemented depends on other elements, not on the ideology of the actors.


Figure 6. Game of ideology: Milan.



¹⁴⁷ In figure 6 the possible options are highlighted in bold to facilitate the observation.

In Barcelona, ideology also played an important role in fostering the collaboration between political parties and social movements. There, the interactions studied are those that involve the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) and the political parties that wanted to collaborate with this movement. On the one hand, the PAH is a social movement with clear policy-goals and despite being a transversal organization¹⁴⁸, its ideology could be defined as “centre” or “left”. On the other hand, the ideology of the political parties involved can be defined as “left” or “centre”¹⁴⁹, too. This disposition of ideologies among the various actors created four possible outcomes, as can be seen in figure 7¹⁵⁰. Two of these outcomes imply an identical ideology between the actors and the other two a compatible ideology. All options make collaboration possible. However, as in the case of Milan, the actual type of this collaboration depends on other elements.

Figure 7. Game of ideology: Barcelona.



¹⁴⁸ To see more about the PAH go to Chapter Five.

¹⁴⁹ This is the case of the PSC.

¹⁵⁰ In the figure 7 the possible options are highlighted in bold to facilitate the observation.


Ideology has shown to be an important element in the interaction between political parties and social movements since the set of ideas defended by the organizations facilitate or hinder possible collaborations between them. Thus, while opposite ideologies prevent any kind of collaboration between the actors, identical or similar ideologies allow collaboration without configuring it. Hence, ideology is a particular element that acts as a necessary but not sufficient condition for defining the type of relationship between political parties and social movements.

6.5 The figure of the candidate.

Another relevant element capable to alter the type of relationship existing between political parties and social movements is the figure of the candidate and the dynamics that produces his or her choice. The election of a specific person to hold this role is critical because it challenges the power-balance between actors. Externally, it is not a minor decision, and the parties are aware of it. But its internal relevance might even be more important for the parties (King, 2002). Choosing the candidate has important consequences for the viability of a project, even if the actors have previously collaborated. Thus, although the actors are the same, the choice of one specific person over another to lead the project can make the project vastly different. There is the conviction among the parties that being able to place your candidate is the greatest guarantee you can have that your project would be properly pondered. As public face of a political project, the candidate represents the connection with a certain political option through his or her personal story and ideas. Additionally, the candidate usually has the ultimate decision-power over controversial issues, as nowadays the electoral campaigns are more candidate-centred (Webb & Poguntke, 2005). The final choice of one or another person lead actors to feel more inclined to have one type of relationship over another. On the one hand, if all parties accept the candidate, the type of collaboration that is going to be produced is likely to be a closer one. On the other hand, if the candidate is not considered as the right choice to lead the project by an involved party, it is likely that the parties will have a weaker collaboration.

The primacy of political parties at the time of choosing a candidate is due to the fact that legally they are the ones who present the candidate. Political parties are those that organize the procedures of choosing the candidate. Using their administrative structure, which social movements may lack, parties can opt for choosing the candidate through primaries or other more restricted methods. Political parties have an electoral and pre-electoral infrastructure dedicated to prepare elections, and one of the main tasks is the election of the leader of the electoral list. Consequently, the first move in the game is the choice of the candidate by the political party. The party has to choose between two or more candidates and after that the social movement has to decide between staying with the party or not. In figure 8 we can observe the options of both players resulting of this.


Figure 8. Electoral candidate game.



When the candidate is elected through primaries, the political party has no control over the choice of one particular person. Some of the members of the establishment might have preferences, but the party as an entity acts neutrally. In that scenario, the social movement cannot influence the decision of the party since it is not the party who chooses the person, it just presents it. Thus, once the party chooses, the social movement has to decide whether the candidate is the

right one for its interest or not, and chose between staying with the party or not. Figure 9 represents the candidate game with letters, each representing the specific payoff of the actors. When the payoff A is higher than B, the social movement will stay. On the other hand, if the payoff B is higher than A, the social movement will not stay. The payoffs for the political party are here represented by C and D and are equal for each candidate, showing that the party has no preference for any specific candidate, because as organizer of the primaries it has to keep a neutral position. However, for the party C is always higher than D as the party's main preference is for the social movement to stay.


Figure 9. Electoral candidate game with literal payoffs.



When the candidate is not chosen through primary elections but somehow designated by the party, the social movement can influence this choice. Assuming that the social movement is a relevant actor for the political party, and its presence in the project is important for the party, the social movement can threaten to defect when the party proposes a candidate that is not considered as suitable by the social movement. In figure 10 this situation, is depicted and payoffs have been added for clarification. The party can anticipate the decision of the movement and propose a candidate that assures the presence of the movement in the project. This can lead to a candidate that is not the preferred

one of the party. Therefore, the party will choose a less preferred candidate in prevision that if the chosen one would be rejected by the movement, the movement would not stay. If the party considers the threat of the social movement to leave if the party chooses the candidate Y as credible, the party has to choose the candidate X even if it is not its optimal choice. Thus, the equilibrium in figure 10 is the one where the party chooses the candidate X, anticipating the decision of the movement, and then the movement decides to stay. This situation creates de facto a potential veto capacity of the social movement over the candidate of the party when the weight of the movement is significant.

Figure 10. Electoral candidate game with number payoffs.



In the case of Milan the election of the candidate of the centre-left coalition for the local elections of 2016 altered the type of relationship existing between the PD and the Movimento Arancione. The decision of the incumbent mayor to not continue as candidate, created two different reactions within the Movimento Arancione that deserve to be analysed. To understand better the two options of the Movimento Arancione, the following sections use the name of the leaders that headed those choices: Basilio Rizzo and Paolo Limonta. Meanwhile, the

existence of a strong possible candidate in Barcelona in the local elections of 2015 became crucial for the very existence of BeC. The possibility to have Ada Colau as mayoral candidate was a solid incentive for some parties –especially Podemos/Podem- to be involved in BeC.

6.5.1 The case of Basilio Rizzo and his followers.

An example for when a candidate proved to be a crucial element shaping the relationship between movement and party can be founded in the mayoral candidate choice for the elections of 2016 in Milan. There, two groups with different political goals within the Movimento Arancione could be observed. This duplicity of goals and loyalties implied different behaviours when facing the choice of the electoral candidate and finally produced a rupture in the unity of action within the movement. In this section, the choices of the group led by Basilio Rizzo, one of the public faces of the original movement, are analysed.

After four years of the first term of Giuliano Pisapia as mayor of Milan, the centre-left coalition had to decide if he would repeat being the mayoral candidate or not. Even though he said when running for his first term, that he would just be mayor for one single term, the PD was hoping to convince him to run again. At the same time, also the Movimento Arancione had to face what to do: still being part of the project or not. The movement was very linked to the figure of Pisapia for what he represented as a politician and as committed citizen with the civic values. Both, the movement and Pisapia, shared the same political goals creating an important association between them. However, sharing the same goals does not mean accepting every political act of the other and renouncing to your own political views. Thus, the part of the Movimento Arancione closer to Basilio Rizzo built his own profile during Pisapia's term, openly expressing some disagreements with some governmental decisions and also voting independently in certain issues within the City Council. Therefore, if the PD had to decide about the candidate, the activists closer to Rizzo had to decide whether they wanted to remain part of the political project of the centre-left or to abandon it.


Pisapia repeating as mayoral candidate meant three important things for the PD: having the incumbent mayor with the relevance of the office and with good citizens evaluations; a candidate that had already proven to have the citizens support in the elections; and the figure that assured the permanence of the centre-left coalition of 2011. Choosing another candidate would open questions about whether he or she would be able to visualize the job done by the centre-left government in the city and whether he or she would be able to receive a majoritarian support. Nevertheless, what the PD knew for sure was that the relationship with Rizzo's group would not be as fluent with another candidate as it would be with Pisapia. Therefore the PD was interested in the continuity of Pisiapa. Additionally, the PD also wanted the continuity in the coalition of the whole Movimento Arancione, including Rizzo and his group of activists. Unfortunately for the PD, that would only happen if Pisiapia would continue as mayoral candidate. Thus, the order of preferences for the PD was: first Pisapia continuing and Rizzo remaining, followed by another candidate and Rizzo remaining, followed by Pisapia repeating and the movement leaving, and finally the choice of another candidate and the movement leaving. The PD was the one who had to decide on the first move: appointing Pisapia as candidate or opting for another person. However, Pisapia's firm stance on not repeating the mayoral candidature left the party without much bargaining power.

Once the PD decided on its first move, the social movement had to decide between leaving or remaining inside the coalition. Since Pisapia proved to be the right candidate to defend their ideas in the institutional arena, they preferred outcome was a continued collaboration with Pisapia. However, if Pisapia were to decide to not run again, their preference was to leave the coalition. Given that the main party of the coalition was at that time lead by Matteo Renzi at the national level, whose political positions they felt far away, they considered that their ideas would not be properly defended. Consequently with the identification wof the movement with Pisapia, the worst outcome for the movement would be leaving while him continues as candidate. Thus, the order of preferences of this group of the Movimento Arancione led by Basilio Rizzo was:

1. Pisapia is the candidate and the social movement remains, followed by,
2. Another candidate and the movement leaving,
3. A different candidate and the movement remaining, and
4. Finally, Pisapia as candidate and the movement leaving.

An overlook of the complete options for the players can be observed in figure 11.

Figure 11. Candidate game Rizzo-PD.



Knowing that the movement would leave in case of a different candidate, the PD had a big incentive to choose Pisapia again. With a simple backwards induction - that is, anticipating the consequences that the own actions will produce in the choices of the other actors- the PD knew that their optimal choice was Pisapia as a candidate, since that implied that the response of Rizzo would be to stay. Unfortunately for both actors, staying together was not anymore possible¹⁵¹ when it was confirmed that Pisapia would not repeat as candidate of the centre-left coalition. Then, the PD's only option was to choose another candidate, and as a result the movement decided to leave the coalition, as they did not consider it anymore as the same political project they previously shared with Pisapia. Meanwhile, the other group of the Movimento Arancione, the one led by Paolo

¹⁵¹ Despite that option would be the outcome where both actors maximize their payoff.

Limonta, decided to wait to know who would be the candidate of the centre-left coalition to make a decision about their role in the coalition.

The various possible outcomes lead to different types of relationships between the two actors. Firstly, as seen in figure 11, the outcome of Pisapia-Remain conducts to a situation of “permeation”. The Movimento Arancione stays and acts as a loyal partner of the PD, who is the one leading the institutional action. The movement was born parallel to Pisapia’s candidacy and that implies that despite having differences it was created an exclusively relationship between the party and the movement. Secondly, either in the outcome that Pisapia repeats as a candidate and the movement leaves, and the outcome that there is another candidate and the movement decides to stay, the type of relationship would be for different reasons “alliance”. The stage of “alliance” means that both actors would still collaborate, but just for specific projects. They felt that they would be each other natural allies, but both would have their own agendas. In the case that the movement decided to stay with a different candidate of Pisapia, the degree of connection could not be the same than with Pisapia, a person that fulfils their ideals. At the same time, if Pisapia would be the candidate of the coalition but the movement would decide to leave, the story and the personal connections between Pisapia and Rizzo would make them allies despite not being in the coalition. Finally, the outcome of Other candidate-Leave conducts to a situation of “independence”. In this case, the most important thing for the social movement is to achieve the implementation of their demands, without taking in consideration a possible electoral cost for the political party.

6.5.2 The case of Paolo Limonta and his followers.

Also in Milan but later in time, another part of the Movimento Arancione had to face the same dilemma that Rizzo and his followers faced before. If Rizzo’s group had to decide whether remaining or leaving the centre-left coalition, depending on the person who would lead the project, this problem was later presented again to the rest the movement’s activists. Therefore, the choice of the person holding the coalition’s candidacy became again a crucial element for the social

movement to decide about the type of relationship they wanted to establish with the other members of the coalition. However, contrary to what Rizzo's group did, this part of the movement waited to make their final decision until knowing who would be the final candidate, and not when Giuliano Pisapia decided to not run again as a mayoral candidate. This group had in Paolo Limonta -a closer friend and collaborator of Pisapia- its more known face, and it included the majority of the activist of the Movimento Arancione.

After the decision of Giuliano Pisapia of no repeating as a candidate became clear, the coalition started the process to choose the mayoral candidate for Milan. The way to find the person for this role was through a process of primaries elections open to all the residents of the city over 16 years. Finally, three candidates with possibilities to be elected¹⁵² run for the nomination: Giuseppe Sala, Francesca Balzani and Pierfrancesco Majorino. The activist of the Movimento Arancione were closely identified with Majorino and Balzani, both members of Pisapia's City Government, and recognized by their leftist positions. At the same time, they were rather sceptical about the suitability of Sala being the candidate of the coalition due to his past as a business manager. Internally, the initial tie between Majorino and Balzani was broken for the support of the incumbent mayor to Francesca Balzani. Thus, following Pisapia's backing to Balzani, the movement accepted her as the natural heir of the centre-left project and also endorsed Balzani in the primaries.

In this context, the first decision corresponded to the centre-left coalition that had to appoint one of the three contenders as candidate. That choice was made through primary elections, over which the party apparatus had not real control, especially because the vote was not restricted to the members of the coalition, but open to all citizens of the city¹⁵³. The interest in using this kind of primaries is based on the assumption that citizens choose their favourite candidate and, consequently, that person will subsequently have more chances to win in the municipal election. Given that the main objective of the coalition leaders is to win

¹⁵² Four candidates were running for the nomination but Antonio Iannetta had not support of any relevant figure, neither more than 1% of the expected votes in the surveys.

¹⁵³ With certain restrictions like the age.


the mayoral election, the coalition will support the elected person as if the leaders of the coalition had appointed him or her. Hence, the organizers of the process -the leaders of the PD- adopted a position of neutrality without favouring any candidate.

Once decided the person who had to be the candidate of the coalition, the Movimento Arancione had to make its decision: choosing between leaving or remaining. A decision that had the potentiality to alter the type of the relationship they had with the PD. The ranking of preferences about the candidates for the movement was: first Balzani, then Majorino and finally Sala. Consequently, if the coalition finally chooses Balzani or Majorino the movement had more interest in remaining than leaving, but with Sala as candidate, that was not so clear. Since Sala was the favourite person to win the primaries, a debate within the movement was generated about which would be the right decision in case Sala would eventually win.

The final nomination of Giuseppe Sala as candidate of the coalition created a problem for the actors. Clearly the coalition, with the PD in front, wanted the movement to stay, however, the activist did not please the choice of Sala and felt more towards leaving. In the internal debate of the movement, there were, from one side, voices which supported the option of remaining within the coalition for loyalty to the project and because they already participated in the primaries endorsing another candidate. Meanwhile, on the other side, there were those claiming that they were unable to recognise Sala as their own candidate and wanted to leave the coalition. Though, in the middle of this debate a third option emerged with the aim of uniting together all positions. This option aspired to accept Sala, but also to reevaluate the terms of the existing agreement between the movement and the party. This new agreement was intended to give, -always being loyal to the coalition- more independence to the movement about some issues. Finally, this option was understood as a fair compromise between the two initial positions and therefore transferred to the party.

Once the move of the social movement was done, party leaders had to decide whether or not to accept the new kind of relationship with the Movimento Arancione. As the main preference for the party was to keep the movement within the political project, they accepted the proposal of the Movimento Arancione despite it meant to have a lover control about some political initiatives in the City Council. The complete sequence of decisions can be observed in the figure 12.

Figure 12. Candidate game Limonta-PD.



What can be observed from the analysis of the situation and the posterior game is that the choice of a specific person had consequences in the relationship between the PD and the Movimento Arancione. Thus in case that the PD chooses Balzani or Majorino the type of relationship would be “permeation”. The movement would continue existing as such but having an exclusive relationship with the party as the movement felt that its goals are reasonably shared and defended by the party. In case of the election of Sala the type of the relationship would be “alliance”. The acceptance by the PD of changing their relationship to give more independence to the movement to disagree would have not been

necessary with other candidates. This new agreement kept the actors as closer allies sharing projects but with the capacity of deciding their own goals.

6.5.3 Podemos and Ada Colau.

Another situation when the figure of the candidate was a crucial element to shape the relationship between a social movement and a political party happened in Barcelona in 2015. The importance of deciding the name of the candidate became visible for the parties when it was necessary to choose who would lead the candidature of Barcelona en Comu (BeC) for the local elections. The social movement PAH was leading the negotiations among the various actors involved in the creation of BeC, and despite the leadership of the project was undisputed, the name of the candidate was still undecided. Ada Colau was, nevertheless, the favourite to become the mayoral candidate. She had at that moment an 80% of popular knowledge among Barcelona citizens, and she was also very recognized for her accomplishments as activist. These numbers were superiors to several of the candidates of other political parties that had already competed before in previous municipal elections. Considering the relevance of the figure of Colau, the intention of Podemos was to link its name with hers in Catalonia. At that time, Podemos was a party with difficulties to achieve the same popular support in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain. Thus, the strategy to grow in Catalonia was to be identified with the media figure of the speaker of the PAH. So, one of the main goals of the political project of BeC for the Spanish leadership of Podemos was to have Colau as candidate of BeC. Hence, Podemos was open to enter in BeC, but just if Colau was the public face of the project. Without Colau as candidate the interest of collaboration with the rest of BeC was much lower.

In terms of the game, the order of preferred outcomes for Podemos were:

1. BeC choses Ada Colau as candidate and Podemos enters BeC, followed by,
2. BeC choses another candidate and Podemos leaves, followed by,
3. BeC choses another candidate and Podemos enters, and finally,
4. BeC choses Colau and Podemos does not enter in BeC.


For BeC the best outcome was the same one that Podemos, that is,

1. BeC choses Ada Colau as candidate and Podemos enters BeC, followed by,
2. BeC choses Colau and Podemos does not enter in BeC, followed by,
3. BeC choses another candidate and Podemos enters,
4. Being the worst outcome the one that BeC choses another candidate and Podemos leaves.

On the one hand, for BeC the best outcome is explained because BeC has both, Colau as candidate that ensures a big knowledge of the project by the citizens, and the votes of Podemos. The second preference it is explained because BeC still has Colau as a candidate with her electoral power. The third preference is based on the fact that even if BeC has not Colau as a candidate, Podemos is at least part of the project. The worst possible outcome is the one when BeC has neither, Colau or Podemos. On the other hand, for Podemos the worst possible outcome is explained because despite being Colau the candidate they are not able to link the brand of the party to her figure. In the case that there is another candidate, Podemos prefers to not staying with the objective of preserving the independence of the brand, than entering and being constrained to share the decisional power without having the figure of Colau as benefit.

Observing the representation of the game in figure 13, it is possible to observe that BeC had to decide in the first place between choosing Colau or another person as the candidate of the project. After this decision of BeC regarding the candidate, Podemos had to chose between entering in the project or not. The payoff in every outcome reveals that if BeC would chose Colau, Podemos would join the project. However, if BeC decided for another candidate Podemos would choose to not enter finally in the project. This situation of the determination of Podemos for Colau as candidate was known for BeC and was also another incentive to choose her. In any case, BeC considered that she was the best candidate and with her they had the higher possible payoffs.

Figure 13. Candidate game BeC-Podemos.



Each outcome has its own consequences for the relationship that is established between the actors. In case of Colau as candidate and Podemos deciding to stay within the project the type of relationship between them would enter in the stage of “alliance”. They would be part of the same project with mutual benefits – the votes of Podemos for BeC and the figure of Colau linked to them for Podemos- and despite keeping their decisions organs independent they would be each other natural allies sharing the same goals. In any outcome of Podemos deciding to leave BeC, the type of relationship between the two actors would be of “competition”. It is important to notice that Podemos is at the end a political party and despite Podemos indented to not use its brand in the local elections, its members were decided to compete under other brands or jointly with other allies, but nevertheless compete. Finally, if BeC choses another candidate and Podemos decides to stay their type of relationship would be “independence”. Both actors have a common ideology, however, the fact of not having the benefits of being associated with the powerful figure that is Ada Colau, makes Podemos helps BeC just while it is in its own benefit. If there were a better way to achieve its goals, Podemos would not doubt in breaking with BeC.

The three cases analysed in this section show the important role of the figure of the candidate in altering the relationship between political parties and social movements. Thanks to the extended-form game it is possible to observe the full relevance of this element. Thus, choosing one specific person or another implies an alteration in the terms of the interaction between the actors. Some candidates will foster a closer collaboration, while others will make the actors to keep a more independent profile. Consequently, remaining all the rest of the elements stable, the alterations in the candidacy imply alterations in the type of relationship.

6.6 The influence on the elaboration of public policies.


One of the main objectives of governing is deciding on the actions of public institutions (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Public policies are one of the most relevant component of these actions. Thus, the influence over the elaboration of public policies is very appreciated among any political actor. Such relevant is the search for the influence over the elaboration of public policies, that there are political actors that can be defined as policy-seekers (Adams & Merrill III, 2009). As an object of desire by the actors, the possibility to decide on policies it is an important element that is also able to shape the relationship between parties and movements. The influence on policies moves the actors to look for partners with who they can achieve that goal. Thereby, if one of the parts is able to introduce its own ideas in form of policies to implement, that part is more open to an agreement with the other parts. On the other hand, if there is no room for introducing their own ideas, hardly the agreement is possible as the that party decreases their feeling of being in their own project. Thus, the option the actors take will vary the type of relationship between them. If any of the actors can influence on policies they will be more likely to look for a closer relationship with the other actors.

When the political parties demand some kind of public collaboration in exchange of some influence on the elaboration of public policies they are doing it from a privileged position for two reasons. The first reason is because there is an asymmetry in the amount of information each actor has. Just for the fact to work

within institutions political parties have a big knowledge on public issues. Political parties can use this privileged position to have an opportunistic behaviour and transform the initial demands of the social movements without suffering the consequences of the pact. The alterations can come from such a different ways as other public administrations to budget constrictions. The second reason is based on the fact that the public support of social movements is given partially blinded. The support is not in exchange of an instant profit, but on the basis on the promise of forthcoming actions. Thus, social movements are investing in future benefits, despite they risk of being ignored by the political party.

The general representation of the situation can be seen in figure 14. There it is possible to see that, normally, the first move corresponds to the candidate -or party-, who is trying to build the possible biggest coalition. The offer of the candidate or party can vary in different forms but is based on future rewards in case of victory. Then, it corresponds to the social movement to decide to support the political party or not. The support of the social movement will not receive an immediate action from the political party, but will be an expected future action with no guaranties. The guaranties can be introduced in case of more than a single collaboration. That is, a repeated game. If the political party knows that the support of the social movement will be necessary again in the future it became important that the party fulfils its promises, otherwise the social movement will hardly accept another agreement. A repeated game reduces the possibility of an opportunistic behaviour from the political party.

Figure 14. Policies game.



The combination of options of the players in this game creates two possible equilibriums: one suboptimal and the other one optimal or Pareto efficiency [see table 22]. The suboptimal equilibrium occurs when both actors decide to not collaborate. That is, when the political party considers that is better to not be linked to the social movement and hence, does not make an offer, and at the same time the social movement prefers also to stay on its own without being linked to the political party and, hence, rejects. Political party chooses to not offer, when it is in its own interest to not collaborate, normally because being associated with the social movement would not improve party's potential electoral benefits or because it could mean being ideology constrained by social movement's demands. Equally, the social movement chooses to reject when it considers that an agreement with that party would be contrary to its interests, as it could block potential agreements with other political parties. Both actors are, thus, interested in pursue their goals independently in this moment of time. This scenario is an equilibrium situation because no actor is interested in changing its choice by itself, because its payoff would decrease. This combination of choices is a stable outcome unless the circumstances change.

Table 22. Normal-form interaction pp-sm.

		Social Movement	
		Accept	Reject
Political Party	Offer	10,10	0,5
	Not offer	5,0	7,7

However although not offer-reject is an equilibrium situation, with the other coordinated choices between the actors, it is possible to improve their payoffs and reach a situation of Pareto efficiency. This optimal equilibrium occurs when the political party is interested in the elaboration of an agreement with the social movement and consequently it makes an offer, while the offer is interesting for the social movement and consequently it accepts the offer. Therefore, when actors decide to collaborate and reach an agreement, it is possible to maximize their payoffs. The possible equilibriums are thus, coordinated choices: both actors deciding to collaborate or both deciding to not collaborate. These two equilibrium situations are useful to explain different kinds of behaviours from the actors in scenarios with more than one potential period of negotiation, for instance two-round elections. While in the first period actors prefer to mark their own profile without being associated to others, in the second period, with different circumstances, it is possible to reach agreements, since actors are more open to collaborate.

The two other possible outcomes, that is, “not offer-accept” and “offer-reject” are not equilibrium situations as any actor can improve its payoff changing its own choice. Offering and accepting describe situations when the social movement do not consider the offer good enough to reach an agreement, meanwhile not offering and accepting describe situations where the political party believes that a collaboration with the movement entails relevant costs.

6.6.1 The attempt to include the PAH in the electoral candidature.

One situation when the influence on the elaboration of public policies has been revealed especially important to define the type of relationship between political parties and social movements, is the events surrounding the interest of Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUiA) to include some members of the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) in the electoral list of the municipal elections in Barcelona in 2011. That year, ICV-EUiA considered about the possibility to include in its electoral list members from outside of the party. This strategy was motivated for the purpose to be seen by the voters as an inclusive party, near to the citizens and not an elitist body. By including some relevant social figures ICV-EUiA wanted to attract more voters and have more relevance on the media. Therefore, they contacted with the PAH to offer their most known member to join ICV-EUiA candidature for the municipal elections: Ada Colau. Colau was the public figure of a social movement known by its fights for citizens' rights, in particular, to avoid home evictions. ICV-EUiA considered, hence, that having her in the candidature would make the party more friendly and appealing to voters.

ICV-EUiA was the first player to move. It had to decide to propose or not to the PAH to join the candidature. Two options, any of them with advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage was that if ICV-EUiA included the PAH in the party's list, that meant counting with the presence of a known figure with associated values of defences of the common citizens that the party wanted to be identified with. The disadvantages were that if Colau was included in the list, it meant having fewer places for the members of the party. Reducing safe seats always creates internal tensions within the parties, a problem that party leaders would have to deal with in case of including members of the PAH. Thus, choosing not to propose to the PAH to join the list with Colau as a representative of the movement, would suppose to avoid internal problems within ICV-EUiA, but at the same time it would also suppose to not be able to use her powerful figure neither the values of the movement for the benefit of the coalition. The approach to address this dilemma was to consider Colau's presence on the roster as a way

to increase the amount of votes and seats, so without a loss of places for party members. Thus, reducing the theoretical internal risks, the best option for ICV-EUiA was to propose Ada Colau to become part of the candidature.


If ICV-EUiA makes the offer to the PAH, the second movement corresponded to the movement. They had to decide if joining or not the ICV-EUiA candidature. One option was to accept the offer of ICV-EUiA and become part of the candidature. This choice implied to jump from the typical activities of the social movements to institutional politics. But the advantage of having voice and vote in the institutions had the disadvantage of not being able to decide the policies to implement and to be subject to the discipline of a municipal group with its rules. These conditions were too harsh for the social movement to accept. Therefore, instead of joining the candidature the movement asked to renegotiate the terms of the agreement making possible for the movement to include the possibility to have more weight in deciding the policies of the candidature.

Thus, ICV-EUiA had to make again a decision. ICV-EUiA had two possible options: accept to renegotiate the offer giving more power to the PAH to decide about policies, or to not renegotiate and discard the pact with the social movement. After evaluating the possible consequences of this choice, ICV-EUiA decided to not accept to renegotiate. Applying backwards induction from the options of the PAH in case of ICV-EUiA decided not to renegotiate, they considered that the best option was to not renegotiate. The leaders of ICV-EUiA knew that after their decision of not renegotiate the agreement the PAH had three possible options as it is possible to see in the figure 15:

- Giving public support to ICV-EUiA in the new coming elections. Despite not being fully identified with the policies of ICV-EUiA, the ideal policies of the PAH were closer to the ones proposed by other political parties. This support would help the PAH to have a type of institutional representation closest to their ideals despite not sharing the entire party's manifesto and that its demands had been rejected.

- Adopting a position of neutrality towards the elections. That is, do not support ICV-EUiA or any other party. This option allowed the social movement to work towards the implementation of specific policies without worrying about the consequences of their demands on the electoral results of any political party.
- Deciding to create their own political project and run for the municipal elections. This option meant to be able to defend their own manifesto but also could mean competing for the same voters.

Figure 15. Policies game PAH-ICV-EUiA.




The reason why ICV-EUiA decided to not renegotiate was because they just considered the neutrality or the public support of the PAH as a realistic outcome. The threat of creating a new electoral adversary was not credible at the eyes of ICV-EUiA. ICV-EUiA did not believe that the PAH could decided to jump in politics by themselves and dispute the votes of ICV-EUiA. But the leaders of ICV-EUiA were wrong in their calculus. They were wrong about the actual value of the payoff of the PAH in each outcome. The PAH considered much more important than ICV-EUiA thought, the capacity to change some policies that they had been fighting for some many years in the streets. That clear case of information asymmetry produced the consideration of not credible threat and the final result

that ICV-EUiA did not want neither the PAH that preferred ICV-EUiA to renegotiate.

ICV-EUiA decided to renegotiate the agreement that they had initially offered to the PAH. As they do not consider that the PAH would run the elections they thought that one was the best option for the party. ICV-EUiA believed that the PAH was not going to support other parties as the PAH preferred them ahead other parties since the policies proposals were the ones closest to the PAH. Hence ICV-EUiA was confident that the PAH would give public support to them, or, in the worst-case scenario, that the PAH would opt for a position of neutrality. This would mean not having to assume any cost for the party. However, despite what ICV-EUiA expected, the final decision of the PAH was to create their own political project and to run for the elections. For the PAH, becoming part of the candidature in the terms of ICV-EUiA, carried the risk of being labelled as a social movement associated with a particular party. This at the eyes of the leaders of the PAH would have complicated the actions of the movement and especially the way some sectors of the population would see those actions. This would imply to loss the connection with part of the citizens, and that was not price the movement was willing to pay, especially without being able to implement the policies that the movement believed were necessary. For the PAH the offer of ICV-EUiA in the terms it was formulated meant to assume the costs without being able to obtain satisfactory benefits. Consequently, once ICV-EUiA decided to not renegotiate, the option with the best payoffs for the PAH was to create a new electoral adversary. If ICV-EUiA had given credibility to “run elections” they would have chosen to renegotiate, as it is possible to see in the figure 16.

Figure 16. Outcomes of the policies game PAH-ICV-EUiA.



The decisions of the actors had consequences in terms of type of relationship as seen in the figure 16. The final choice of the two players configured their relationship in a specific way that would not occurred if the actors would had chosen differently their options. The possibility to have a relevant impact in the elaboration of the political program is an element that produces broad possible solutions. Thus, if the PAH accepted the proposal of ICV-EUiA either in first place or after the renegotiation, the relationship between the actors would be defined as “permeation”. Accepting to be inside the list meant also to accept certain rules, as the exclusivity relationship between the movement and the party, or the internal rules of voting that implies a strong discipline. That strong commitment with a specific political project prevents other possible agreements with other parties creating an exclusive relationship between both actors. If the PAH decided to reject the proposal of ICV-EUiA the movement had three possible options that would conduct to a three different types of relationship between them. Thus, if the PAH opted for adopting a position of neutrality towards the candidature of ICV-EUiA their relationship would enter in a stage of “independence”. Despite being ideologically close, the PAH would show that its priority is the implementation of polices over anything else. For the members of the movement feeling free to criticize what they do not consider suitable polices it is important. If the PAH chose to give public support to the candidature of ICV-

EUiA but without being part of it, their relationship would become an “alliance”. The public commitment towards a political project identifies you with that candidature at the eyes of the citizens reducing the possibility of being a non-partisan movement. On the other hand the PAH doing this, also expects some kind of especial treatment about their policies demands. Finally, if the PAH decides to test their own political project at the polls against ICV-EUiA they are going to be in a stage of “competition”. If the movement considers that their positions are not well represented in the political arena by any existing party and those positions deserve to be an opportunity that someone defends them in the institutions in the same way the movement did it in the streets and media, they will jump into politics. No matter if that means competing with ICV-EUiA, as the PAH feels that their ideas are not well represented by the political party. The PAH negotiated to reach an agreement with ICV-EUiA, however, the party did not accepted the terms and consequently had to face a new adversary in the electoral arena. The decision of the leaders of the PAH allowed them to confront their own ideas and test the citizen support about theses ideas.

6.6.2 The search for the support of Milano in Comune.

The second situation analysed where the element of the capacity to influence public policies has a big impact, occurred in Milan, between the first and the second round of the local elections of 2016. More precisely, it is the core of the negotiations between Giuseppe Sala and Basilio Rizzo and his followers from the original Movimento Arancione¹⁵⁴. After the vote of the first round of the mayoral elections, Basilio Rizzo was unable to pass to the second round as he was not one of the two most voted candidates. However, due to the amount of votes he received and the small gap of votes between Sala and Parisi, he became a relevant figure for the mayoral election. His decision about who would endorse the movement -if anyone- was very expected.


¹⁵⁴ The other part of the members of the movement formed the list Sinistra X Milano linked to Sala.

Looking for his support and knowing that the movement had more ideological similarities in common with the centre-left than with the centre-right, Sala did the first movement. He asked to the leader of Milano in Comune for his support for the second round of the elections. However, at that time, Rizzo and the rest of the movement decided to not endorse him. Rizzo and his people considered that the political program of Sala was too far away from their ideas and consequently they could not endorse him. They considered Sala's positions too similar to the ones of the centre-right. Nevertheless, after some gestures of Sala¹⁵⁵ showing his availability towards the policy demands of the movement, they decided to express publicly their decision to vote for Sala in the second round of the elections.

In figure 17 is possible to observe the sequence of actions in an extensive-form game. In the game it is possible to observe the options Sala and the movement behind Rizzo had in the various moments of the negotiation period. The most relevant points, regarding the preferences of the actors, are on the one hand, that Sala wanted their endorsement even if he had to make some concessions. On the other hand, for the people of Rizzo the worst possible outcome was the victory of Parisi and they were convinced -at some point- to work to avoid that scenario. Thus, after the concessions Sala did, Rizzo had to decide between three possible options: to stay neutral without giving support to any candidate, to give public support to Sala or to give public support to Parisi. The payoff for Sala in case of neutrality of Rizzo and his people is higher than if Sala decided not to ask for the endorsement because just for the fact to show some interest in the leftist voters could attract them to Sala despite Rizzo would not endorse him. For strategic reasons, it is important to know that Sala and the rest of his candidature knew that Rizzo did not want at any cost Parisi's victory, especially once Sala agreed on some public policies. But they also know that the endorsement would be neither easy nor free.

¹⁵⁵ See Chapter Four for more information.


Figure 17. Policies game Sala-Rizzo.



The fact to renegotiate or not is crucial for the final outcome. After Sala's decision, Rizzo and his mates have always the same three options, but the payoff of these options are different if Sala opts for a new offer or not [see figure 18]. The option to endorse Parisi is in any scenario the one that Rizzo wants the least, but the rest of options have different payoff depending of Sala's behaviour. On the one hand, if Sala decides to not renegotiate, for Rizzo the option of neutrality has the higher payoff and it is preferred to the option to endorse Sala. That would imply that any of Rizzo's policies proposals would have been taken in consideration and consequently, that Rizzo and his people would feel that Sala's political project is strange to them and cannot shared. In Milano in Comune eyes, without some leftist policies, Sala's candidature would not be so different from the one of Parisi, and according to their conscience, they could not endorse Sala. On the other hand, if Sala decides to renegotiate, for Rizzo the option of endorse Sala has the higher payoff and it is preferred to the neutrality option. That would be because Sala would assume some of the policies hold by the movement. So, despite not being completely for Sala's candidature they would recognize some of their policies in Sala's candidature, and consequently they would like to see the implementation of those policies. Sala, aware of all of the above, decided to renegotiate and made some gestures of approach towards Milano en Comune

and Rizzo¹⁵⁶ to facilitate them to move from neutrality to public support. The final outcome was, therefore, that Rizzo gave public support to the candidature of Sala.

Figure 18. Outcomes of policies game Sala-Rizzo.



The existence of the second period when to negotiate allowed the actors to reach an agreement and with it, an optimal equilibrium situation. On the one hand, Sala receives the endorsement of Rizzo and his followers, and on the other hand Rizzo obtain the policies he wanted. This agreement would not be possible in the first round of the elections with other circumstances. Thus, While Sala could not offer an agreement to Rizzo due to the risk of losing the centre voters, Rizzo could not join someone who has been so linked so much to the business interest. Consequently, both actors decided to look for their goals separately. However, when the choice is between Sala accepting Rizzo's policies or the candidate of the right Parisi, the new circumstances make possible the coordination between Sala and Rizzo to reach the new equilibrium situation. This is a Pareto efficiency, as both actors reach their maximum possible payoffs.

¹⁵⁶ As seen in Chapter Four.

The consequences for the type of relationship between the two actors depend of the outcome. That decision of both actors to renegotiate and accepted to endorse to Sala, situated their stage of relationship in “independence”. Both were interested in a mutual collaboration in some areas such the implementation of specific policies, but neither of them considered that they owed each other anything. Moreover, if the movement considers that Sala is not doing what is expected to do to achieve the shared goals, it would not hesitate to oppose him or to re-compete against him in the elections. The fact that the movement endorse Sala just after he decided to renegotiate shows that the priorities of the movement are clearly the policies and not whit whom the movement pact. If Sala decided to not ask for the endorsement of Rizzo and his followers the type of relationship between them would be “competition”. They competed in the first round of the elections and nothing would change as the movement still felt Sala’s positions too similar to the ones of Parisi. If Rizzo decided to accept the first proposal of Sala, their type of relationship would be “alliance”. That is because despite, Sala would not offer anything the movement would support him, highlighting that Sala is the natural ally of the movement. Showing that, for the movement the only possible collaboration with institutional politics happens through Sala and the PD, as Parisi and the right is a close door for Rizzo and his followers. Both actors could collaborate with projects but knowing that is difficult for the movement to collaborate with other candidates. In the theoretically possible but unlikely case that Rizzo decided to endorse Parisi, the relationship between the movement and Sala, would be “opposition”. This endorsement would show that the political positions of two actors would be very different.

6.7 Institutional constrictions: the electoral system.

Institutions and the way they are organized are an important factor that determines the way in which it is possible to relate between the actors. The electoral system is one of these institutions and its different configurations produce diverse consequences. Thus, the electoral system is another element that influences the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. The manner in which the different regulation affects the interaction

between political parties and social movements is not unique, since the regulation of the nature of actors that can run in the elections, the quantity of actors allowed to participate, the existence or not of an electoral threshold, the number of rounds of each election, or the types of the elections of the individual positions, either direct or indirect, are examples of how the electoral system can affect it.

Political actors are not acting completely free in their interactions, the institutions in which the actors are immersed have an important impact in their behaviour, as the scholars of the institutionalism argue (March & Olsen, 1989). The electoral system, one of these institutions, is a set of rules designed to produce a specific result such as promoting governance or the correct representation of the different positions of citizens in the City Council. However, despite the original intentions of the legislators at the time of configuring the institutions, those can also produce unintended consequences (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) as it is the case of the impact of the electoral system in the relationship between political parties and social movements. Ultimately, institutions limit the free will to the actors and create a path where to channel their contacts. In the interaction between institutions and actors with rational behaviour, institutions are a crucial factor to shape the strategic context since those limit the possible strategic actions of the actors in their fight for the best possible outcome (Romero, 1999). At the end, actors' actions are not the ideal ones, but those that are feasible within a context. In fact, actors' decisions are "an optimal adaptation to an institutional environment" (Tsebelis, 1991). In other words, actors choose among the best possible options based on the actual circumstances.

6.7.1 The Movimento Arancione's options based on the Italian electoral system.

A good example of how the institutional constraints affect the relationship between political parties and social movements is the one lived in Milan with the Movimento Arancione. The Italian municipal electoral system allows electoral

lists that support the same mayoral candidate jointly with other lists. Thus, this possibility opens various ways for the actors to participate in the local elections. In particular, the Movimento Arancione had three possible ways regarding the relationship with the PD:


- Be part of a joint list integrated by the PD and the Movimento Arancione.
- Create an independent list, but supporting the PD mayoral candidate.
- Create an independent list supporting another mayoral candidate.

On the other hand, another electoral system like those based on the principle that every list present its own mayoral candidate, it would not have the same outcomes for the actors in terms of the types of relationship that can be established between them. Thus, assuming that the actors will participate in the elections, those kind of electoral systems produce just two possible options:

- Being in the same list, or
- Being in another list supporting a different mayoral candidate.

In figure 19 it is possible to observe a representation of the various options in the two types of electoral systems.


Figure 19. Options with different electoral systems for the MA.



The choice of one electoral system or another shapes the interaction between the social movement and the political party, because the existence of a bigger range of outcomes increases also the final number of possible types of relationships.

Thus, if the social movement decides to be part of the same list, the type of relationship between the two actors is going to be “permeation”. In that situation both actors share completely the same procedure despite keeping their decision organs totally independent. However, if the Movimento Arancione decides to build its own list supporting Giuseppe Sala, the type of relationship is going to be more towards “alliance”. In that scenario both actors are interested in sharing particular projects and they know that both are natural allies. Finally, if they decide to have a list supporting another mayoral candidate, their type of relationship would finish in the stage of “competition”. They have to compete for the votes and support of the citizens despite that before could be allies. Therefore, the Italian electoral system allows three variants in the relationship between social movements and political parties. Observing figure 20 it is possible to see that the final outcome depends on the value of A,B and C that represents the preferences of the player in the electoral systems like the Italian. If the value of A is higher than B and C, the movement will be part of the same list of the party. If the value of B is higher than A and C, the movement will have its own list but linked with the same candidate of the party. Finally, if the value of C is higher than A and B, the movement will have its own list supporting another mayoral candidate –a one just exclusively of the movement or shared with other parties-.

Figure 20. Consequences of different types of electoral system for the MA.



In electoral systems like those based on the principle that every list present its own mayoral candidate, just two types of relationship can be observed, “permeation” in the case both actors share the same list, and “competition” in the case the actors are part of different lists. In the first case both actors act under the same internal rules sharing the benefits and the consequences of the defeats. While in the second case they are simple electoral adversaries. Observing the figure 20 it is possible to see that the final outcome depends on the value of D, and E that represents the preferences of the player in the option of electoral systems with no linked lists. If the value of D is higher than the value of E, the movement will be part of the same list. However, if the value of E is higher than the value of D, the movement will have another list.

6.7.2 The election of the mayor and the PSC.


The electoral system played also an important role shaping relationships between political parties and social movements in another situation of the observed cases. This situation is the one involving the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) with Barcelona en Comú (BeC) at the moment of electing the mayor. In Spain the mayor is not elected at the same moment of the councillors, but later in time. The citizens elect their representatives in the City Council, and then, the City Council appoints the mayor. Thus, the Spanish electoral municipal system organizes the election of the mayor in an indirect way, since are not the citizens who directly elect the mayor, but the councillors. That makes the municipal elections in a two-round election *de facto*¹⁵⁷. One round dedicated to choose the councillors and another round dedicated to choose the mayor. In the first round the citizens are the ones with the right to vote, and in the second one the only people with voting rights are the councillors. The existence of this sort of two-rounds election increases the opportunity windows to reach agreements with various political actors. Furthermore, the fact that one of those rounds is restricted to few actors alters the context limiting the electoral pressure. Thus, a collaboration that would be impossible in the first round is not anymore in the second round when the parts are not competing for the support of the voters.

¹⁵⁷ For more information see Chapter Five.

Based on the survey and the usual number of parties in the City Council, the leaders of BeC were aware that they would need at some point the support of other political actors to obtain the mayoral position. However, they also knew that asking for such support before the elections, at a time when all actors are competing for citizens' support, was not realistic. In the elections time -the "first round"- every actor is looking for its own benefit, that is, working to receive the maximum possible amount of votes. Once the voting is completed and the numbers are clear, it is possible to know the bargaining power of each actor in the second stage. It is at the moment of choosing the mayor when it is possible to reach agreements based on the number of seats in the City Council, the ideology and governability (Colomé, Gabriel; personal interview; 18th of May 2017). It is for that reason why BeC searched the support of others political groups after the elections, not before. In fact, they were particularly interested in the support of the PSC.


In case that the PSC would accepted a collaboration pact with BeC in the "first round", the Spanish electoral system just allows for them to join together in the same electoral list. That option was not even conceived for a party that had been ruling Barcelona for 32 years. Especially because at the moment of possible pacts, the PSC still believed to be the alternative to the incumbent mayor. So, another possible moment for collaboration is after the election of the councillors when the mayor has to be chosen. In that moment, the PSC had no fear to receive any electoral punishment from the voters and it could facilitate the election of Ada Colau as mayor. The PSC preferred Colau to her adversary with more possibilities, Xavier Trias. Consequently, at the moment of the mayoral election the councillors of the PSC voted for her. In the figure 21 it is possible to observe the options of BeC and the ones of PSC. BeC had the option to make to the PSC an offer in the "first round" or in the "second round". In every case, the PSC had the option to accept it or reject it.

Figure 21. Options of PSC and BeC based on the types of electoral systems.



The existence of this sort of two rounds has consequences for the type of relationship between political parties and social movements [see figure 22]. Thus, if the PSC accepts the offer before the election of the City Council members, that is, in the “first round”, the relationship between them and BeC would be “permeation” as the only way to join forces is doing it through a single electoral list and they would be under the same internal rules. If the PSC does not accept the offer, they would be in a stage of “competition” where both actors would have to confront their political positions to the decision of the voters. However, as there is also the possibility of a new offer due to the existence of the indirect election of the mayor, if the PSC accepts the offer, they would be in a stage of “independence”. Both actors would be interested in specific agreements but would be still electoral adversaries. The final outcome was precisely that last one, when the PSC gave its support to Ada Colau, but just that, as no further agreements were accorded. The situation was the best outcome for both actors. The PSC, would not accepted an agreement in the “first round”, and knowing that, the BeC just offered in the “second round”.

Figure 22. Consequences for the PSC and BeC based on the types of electoral systems.



The previous game is just possible with the institutional constrictions of an electoral system as the Spanish one, where the mayoral election is undirected and in a second moment. With a real one-round election the electoral system would not create a second opportunity window for pacts between the actors. In this case, the game is reduced to just the top part, eliminating the second negotiation period. This difference between electoral systems affects the type of relationship between political parties and social movements as it eliminates the possibility of a stage of “independence” when the sort of second round disappears. Thus, the electoral system is again an element able to modify the type of relationship between parties and movements.

6.8 The existence of trust among the actors.

The existence of confidence between partners is a crucial element for the development of any relationship. In the case of political parties and social movements the presence or absence of trust can even modify the type of their rapport. Thus, while its existence implies that actors are able to renounce to immediate benefits in exchange of future gains for all the parties and invest in a closer collaboration, its absence means reducing the incentives to pact and to reach closer collaborations. This means that trust can alter the choices of the actors, making possible to accept agreements with other parties, even if it will only be possible to verify the fulfilment of the other party’s duties in the future. This decision of renouncing to present benefits for the expectation of future

benefits is not a secure move for the players since other players could cheat them, however, as it exists trust among them, they still do it.

The amount of trust among the actors is not a stable feature and may vary over time due to the actions of the players (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust can be decline by the breach of agreements between the parties and can also be generated by the will of the actors (Sztompka, 1999). Unlike its removing, trust is not built in a single way, but in several ways. For instance, it can be developed through instruments created especially to assure it, or through the dynamics of the relationship. However, to be able to generate trust between two actors it is important that the situation in which they are in, makes it possible for both players to win at the same time. If they are in a situation of a zero-sum game, that is, a situation when the gain of one actor is the loss of the other actor, they can only be adversaries since any collaboration will imply a worst payoff for one of the actors. Hence, players must be in a situation where they can both improve their situations, otherwise trust can difficultly be created.

The reputation of the parties is an important factor for the outcomes of the games since the strategy of the actors is not just based on the options they have, but also on the knowledge they have about other players. Since it is not possible to be sure about the future behaviour of the counterpart, actors tend to look back to complete the uncertainties they have about how other players will act. The way actors have fulfilled their compromises in the past, creates a reputation about how they are going to act in the future (Kreps, 1990). When an actor has fulfilled his or her commitments, it is generated a status of a trustworthy actor. On the other hand, when it is known that a specific actor tends to deceive other players in their agreements, it hinders the generation of trust between them. The existence of a reputation allows actors that have not collaborate before to know more about what they should expected of the counterpart. Therefore, when the actors have to continue interacting with other players, they are interested in maintaining their reputation as reliable actors and reducing their opportunistic behaviour (Kreps & Wilson, 1982), since for the actors who do not comply,

future pacts will be more complicated to reach, because nobody is interested in agreeing with cheaters.

When it is not possible to know about past decisions of the other players or this information is limited, there are other ways to reduce the aversion of the actors to pact. Thus, the existence of instruments ad hoc to generate confidence between various parts is a common practice in business to reduce the problems related with information difficulties like moral hazard or adverse selection (Wilson, 1980). The codes of ethics are one of those instruments that can be translated from companies into the political arena as Barcelona en Comú did¹⁵⁸. Since it is not possible to be sure about the real intentions of an actor at the moment of reaching agreements since each player is the only one who is totally sure about his or her aims, it becomes necessary some instrument to reduce the moral hazard of the parties. The ethical codes are very useful to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the actors involved, as it creates the feeling of certainty about which behaviour to expect from the rest of actors. Since it is possible to discard certain types of actions by other actors, players handle a narrower range of options to work with. This fact allows the planning of each player's own actions because strategically speaking, these codes provide the way to calculate the "best response to the expected behaviours of the counterparts" (Sacconi, 2000, p17). Thanks to them, the possibility of an opportunistic behaviour is limited, even in unexpected happenings typical of long relationships.

Information asymmetry can also generate adverse selection problems at the time of reaching agreements as George Akerlof proved in his famous article dedicated to the cars market (1970). In situations when information is a resource for optimizing the benefits, the existence a different amount of information between parties can generate reluctance to pact. Thus, the possibility of unfair transactions must be considered at the time to negotiate. Consequently, when one party knows more than the other, the phantom of performing a bad deal appears to the party that know less. If one of the parties considers that is

¹⁵⁸ See Chapter Five and next section (6.8.1).

probable that is going to be cheated, obviously this will generate a lack of trust between the actors. Though, this situation can be mitigated also thanks to the code of ethics that anticipates behaviours in situations when one actor has or will have more information. Lorenzo Sacconi (2000) who dedicated part of his research to the use of this instrument by the firms holds that,

Given the set X of allowable decisions, some of them may turn out to be abusive ex post, without the possibility to provide for them ex ante. Nevertheless, whether abuse were identifiable at least ex post, it could be argued that reputation effects as such are able to discourage abusing because of the threat to the prospective abuser of losing his face forever (i.e. in the following repetitions of the game). P25.

Therefore, the codes of ethics create incentives to comply with the pacts since the risk of not fulfilling them creates a big credibility problem for the cheating player. When the expected behaviour is not produced, the uncooperative actor will be labelled as unreliable. Be defined like this, by other actors will have a big impact on his or her reputation. This mark will difficulty his or her future pacts with the same or other partners, and it will increase the cost of agreeing, since other actors will not be willing to risk unless there is a possible big gain.

In addition to the ad hoc instruments, another way to generate trust among the players is through the repetition of interactions. When there has been already a past collaboration and the parties have fulfilled what was expected of them, there is the conviction that it is rational to expect a similar behaviour in the future (Fudenberg, Kreps, & Maskin, 1990). Repeated interactions between the same actors generate trust, helping at the same time to create a reputation of compliant actors for the players. Additionally, trust is at the same way what impulses new contacts, since the actors feel confident about other actors' decisions. However, if the players know that there is no another game in the future, they do not have incentives to keep fulfilling their promises, since cheating could increase their profits (Kreps, 1990). Thus, trust keeps a relationship going, but the expectation of future interactions it is necessary.

Since we are talking about a succession of interactions, in this case the repeated games rules are applied.

The fulfilment of the reached agreements between the actors is crucial for the existence of trust, especially in long interactions. However, this compliance does not need to be absolute to maintaining two players cooperating, since small acts of discrepancy are presumed. In such a complex relationship, such as that of political parties and social movements, it is unrealistic to expect that these two kinds of actors with such different conception of politics to agree on everything during their period of collaboration. Sometimes, there may be differences in the interpretation of the agreements, or due to their own nature, the partners might act in a way that the other one does not support. An agreement for collaboration that goes beyond a single moment in time will produce unexpected situations. Even if the parts seal their pact through the adoption of an electoral manifesto, this one is going to be incomplete, since it is not possible to foresee all future events. After all, every political and governmental program is an incomplete contract, because the frequent restrictions that will affect the realization of the political actions once in the government, never exactly correspond to those of the planning phase. Consequently, some actions in the future can be implemented with the opposition of one party. This decision could be interpreted as an act of disloyalty. However, maintaining the core of the agreements and with the right amount of communication between them, the parties can accept some level of disagreement without breaking the trust. Certainly, the level of breach cannot be too high to keep the relationship with trust, but it is not necessary to be a complete fulfilment. The reason for accepting this unwanted result is because when there is an assumable level of breach, it pays to be more forgiving, as future gains will already discount small losses. Then, some non-compliance leads to forgiveness, but too much leads to generalized mistrust.

6.8.1 The Code of Ethics of Barcelona en Comú.


The interviews conducted in Barcelona to the members of Barcelona en Comú showed the existence of a concrete aspect that impulse the creation of BeC and deserves to be highlighted: the process of elaboration of the ethical code. All of the interviewed emphasised the importance of the works to create and approve the norms of the elected and appointed members of BeC, to create a collaborative culture between the various actors involved in the creation of BeC. The elaboration of the Code of Ethics was an instrument to start rolling the project and to generate trust between the individuals and the organizations that were involved. The Code of Ethics obligated all the parties to work together for first time to achieve a specific goal. Coming the actors from a very diverse background, those works helped to combine different organizational cultures. The Code of Ethics was, hence, a catalyst for the creation of a common political project. While the common goals were clear and shared by the all the actors involved, there was a lack of trust among the actors and about the way to achieve the objectives. The ethical code reduced that lack of trust and allowed the creation of a common organizational culture. It was established, thanks to the Code of Ethics a way to face the problems and allowed to the parties to observe how the other parties react in front of the circumstances. The existence of that instrument allowed the parties to have more confidence between each other in the future events. The Code of Ethics generated trust in two ways. The first way was the elaboration process that allowed the actors to know each other more and to create a common organizational culture. The second one was that the ethical code allowed knowing in advance the behaviour of all the actors involved in BeC, reducing in that way the fear to possible opportunistic behaviours. Thus, the moments when some of the parts have to renounce to their position regarding an important matter were faced differently thanks to the Code of Ethics. It reduced the risks related of the initial negotiations when the actors when sceptical with the project. Thanks to that common organizational culture structure and the trust created among them with the process of the creation of the Code of Ethics, they were sure that that renounce was for the best of the political project and they would be compensated in the future. Internal

agreements that would be difficult or impossible became possible thanks to the trust in fair conditions or future compensations.

The existence of the Code of Ethics generated a normative pressure among the parties that accepted it. The group pressure established that if a party deviates from the rules the other party would punish it. This increased the internal cohesion of BeC. Thus, thanks to the creation of the ethical code the various parties felt completely supported by the others, and with that confidence they take were able to take braver decisions. Rational calculus always makes actors cautious and slightly suspicious towards others, but thanks to the ethical code those mental reserves were substitute by trust in the other parties. There was no fear that the other parties would use your actions against you or that they would try to cheat you to achieve a better negotiating position. The parties were able to give their maximum for the common project without retaining anything. They were able to do a vacuum jump for BeC, which maximize its potential success chances. Thanks to the full involvement of the parties, the outcome for all of them as a group was optimized.

With the debate regarding the creation of a new political subject, all the parties involved knew that they would have to face a negotiations period when they should lose some points in order to create BeC. However, actors were initially afraid of not being fairly compensated. It is in that moment when the Code of Ethics is configured as an element that fosters the formation of BeC creating a trust environment between the actors as a mechanism to reduce the uncertainty of other actor's actions. Thus, actors had to decide between risking for the creation of BeC and maximize the new subject opportunities or adopting a more conservative position to conserve wider margin of discretion within BeC despite that could mean fewer opportunities for BeC. In the figure 23 it is possible to observe how the situation was for the actors involved in the creation of BeC. Either with the ethical code or without it, the options of the actors are the same, but what changes are the choices of the actors.

Figure 23. Options for the parties with and without the Code of Ethics.




Each actor had to decide in some moment to risk or not knowing that after its choices another actor will have to face the same dilemma but already knowing the choice of the previous actor. Thus the existence of trust between the various actors involved is very relevant. If there is the confidence that the next actor will chose also with loyalty to the project, that is, opting for the common benefit, the first actor is able to sacrifice itself, because it has the conviction that it will not be punished for its choices. The Code of Ethics was the instrument that generated this trust among the members of BeC as it anticipates the behaviour of actors. In the absence of the ethical code, the predisposition to risk by the actors would have been lower as the uncertainty of other actors' behaviour would be higher. All the actors would have shown a more conservative strategic calculus.

The importance of the Code of Ethics for the solution of the game is high. In both cases, that is, with Code of Ethics and without it the final payoffs are the same [see figure 24]. The higher payoffs are received when everyone risk, while the lower for the players when they risk and the following player does not. Moreover, in both situations if a player knows that the other actors choices to not risk, the higher payoff is choosing to not risk too. However, what the presence or absence of the ethical code modifies is the final outcome. As the actors receive their rewards in the future the existence of the ethical code

changes their choices. When it, actors are more willing to risk for a higher payoff, while, without it, actors prefer to not risk and receive a more secure payoff. The preferences of the actors are in first place to risk if the other actor risks too, as the maximum payoffs are received in this situation. However, since the first actor does not have any guarantee that the second actor will risk too, the first actor prefers to not risk. Facing the same dilemma, the second actor also decides the same. Thus, the equilibrium without the ethical code is “not risk”-“not risk”. As it is a repeated situation with different or same actors, each actor is in the position of unknown future and consequently despite what the previous actor did, if there is not certainty about what the next actor will do, each actor will decide not to risk. Nevertheless, this situation changes when the first actor has the certainty that the second actor will also risk. The Code of ethics gives that certainty to the first actor. Consequently, actors are going to risk since they are convinced that the other actors will do the same. Thus, the equilibrium moves to “risk”-“risk” a Pareto efficiency.

Figure 24. Consequences for the parties with and without the Code of Ethics.



This existence of trust had important consequences for the type of relationship between the actors. The Code of Ethics established a level of trust among the parties of BeC allows the relationship among the actors to go towards a more integrated stage that would not have been possible without it. This full commitment of the parties for the political project that is Barcelona en Comú established the type of relationship in “permeation”. Despite keeping the original actors, all of them are fully committed with BeC and act jointly as if they were a single entity. There may be internal debates and disagreements, but if one actor loses in these debates, it would not break BeC nor start retaliating, as it knows that it will be fairly compensated in the future. On the other hand, in the absence of Code of Ethics the type would have been “alliance”. As all of them share the same goals, the actors are interested in the proper functioning of BeC. They want that the BeC is able to win elections and able to implement the common policies. However, as they do not entirely trust each other, the actors prefer to pact any agreement individually.

6.8.2 Past collaboration between the Movimento Arancione and the Partito Democratico.

As seen before, trust is an important element to shape the type of relationship between social movement and political parties, since more present it is, more the various parties are willing to integrate their projects. Thus, meanwhile within BeC trust arrived through the Code of Ethics, trust can also be built -and kept- in other ways. In the case of the relationship between the PD in Milan with the Movimento Arancione, trust was generated thanks to a past of collaboration. The fact of repeating situations with the same actors generates the confidence among them that they are going to behave in a particular way. The confidence it is based on the experience of similar events in the past.

After arriving with Pisapia to institutional politics in 2010, the Movimento Arancione started to collaborate with the PD. At the time of deciding the continuity of the centre-left project for the elections of 2016 the continuity or not of this collaboration showed to be crucial to achieve citizen's support. The


existence, between the movement and the party, of a common past sharing working years, created some tacit agreements. The reason is that after several satisfactory pacts, it was generated the expectation among the actors that the other party would fulfil the agreements. Thus, both, the PD and the Movimento Arancione trust enough the other party to risk in their relationship. The repetition in the compliment of pacts, it is what generates that confidence through time. If every time you agree something with another party the other party acts as you expected, this generates the confidence that in the future pacts will also be respected. That is how the actors felt about their relationship, confident that the agreements would be respected, and consequently both felt able to risk knowing that the other party would also do the same thing. Paolo Limonta one of the leaders of the movement said that they were loyal people, but they were like that because they also knew that the PD was also loyal with the terms once they had an agreement¹⁵⁹. Knowing that, the movement was able to renounce to some proposals knowing that the PD would respect the pact and implement the terms once in the City Government. The Movimento Arancione had no fear backing up the PD or accepting some non-ideal decisions because it existed a trust among the actors. Also from the point of view of the PD it was a secure investment. The PD knew that their initial manifesto was not ideal for the Movimento Arancione, but despite that, once reached an agreement, the PD was confident about the movement's support both in the electoral campaign and in the City Council.

As it is possible to observe in the figure 25, once the actors decided to collaborate, they had to decide between risking or not. Similar to the case of Barcelona, the actors maximize their benefits if both risk, and have their worse payoff in case that they risk en the following actor does not. Consequently, to be able to risk is necessary the conviction that the next actor to choice will do the same, otherwise the actors would chose not to risk as there is no certainty that the actor who moves after will risk too. Thus, the existence of trust is what generates the conviction among the actors that they can risk, because the next actor is going to do the same generating the optimal benefits for both actors. As it

¹⁵⁹ For more information see Chapter Four.


is a repeated game since the collaboration is continuous in time, past decisions of the actors is what generates the expectation about future decisions. Though despite the best individual decision for the second actor would be not risking after the previous actor has risk, the fact the first actor has to play again after the second's actors decision, incentives the second actor to decide to risk to increase the future benefits, confident that the first actor is going to do the same in the following decisions.

Figure 25. Past collaboration game.



Thus, assuming that both actors want to collaborate, the existence of a past working together had consequences for the type of relationship between the actors [see figure 26]. Without trust the type would be “alliance”. They feel that each other are natural allies, but it is necessary to give immediate benefits to each agreement. On the other hand, thanks to the existence of trust, it is possible the existence of “permeation”. All of the actors are fully committed with the project and are able to accept to not have opportunist behaviour. They even do that without demanding for guaranties, based on the knowledge that the other actor will act in the same way.

Figure 26. Consequences for the actors in the past collaboration game.



6.9 The capacity of making public appointments.

The possibility to bargain with managerial positions in the administration is also a relevant element to define the relationship between political parties and social movements. While, as seen before, some actors are interested in the influence on the elaboration of public policies –policy-seeking actors–, others are more interested in political positions –office-seeking actors. The reasons are various and the literature is broad analysing why and how actors search for offices (Müller & Strøm, 1999) (Budge & Laver, 1986). However, what remains beyond doubt is that political parties tend to be very interested in political appointments, since it is part of their nature to hold executive positions to implement their ideas. Therefore, the possibility to offer to parties those positions it is a powerful instrument to start collaborating, and with it, able to alter the type of relationship between the actors.


6.9.1 The inclusion in the Barcelona City Government of the PSC.

Barcelona en Comú was heading a single-party government in 2016. The legal requirements and the amount of work of the members of the government made necessary to increment the number of members of the City Government¹⁶⁰. As the only way to do it is including members of the City Council, an agreement with other political group was necessary. BeC had the capacity to offer some positions to other political actors as the PSC, and with that it was possible to create a kind of relationship that without this capacity would have not been possible. Thus configuring the element of the distribution of offices as a key to delimit the relationship between parties and movements.

As it is possible to see in figure 27, BeC was the first actor to make a move. The movement had the possibility to offer or not to the PSC entering in the City Government. The offer was not ideal for BeC, because that meant to share decisional power and having to reach pacts for their political initiatives, but at the same time BeC needed more members in the City Government to manage satisfactorily all the political areas and they also needed more votes in the City Council to pass their proposals. Thus, in terms of game theory, for BeC to make the offer to the PSC and solve this dilemma, the payoffs the movement would receive in case of acceptance by the PSC have to be higher for BeC, than the payoff that BeC would receive in case of not offering. Figure 27 shows the various options of the players with letters as a representation of the payoffs assuming that A has a value greater than B. In case that BeC finally decided to offer to the PSC to enter in the City Government, posteriorly, the PSC would have to decide between accepting the offer or rejecting it, that is, entering or not in the City Government.

¹⁶⁰ For more information see Chapter Five.

Figure 27. Public appointments game.




The decision of the PSC about entering or not in the City Government was deeply discussed and analysed within the social democratic party, as it was not exempt of disadvantages. Entering in a government with a figure as powerful as Ada Colau as mayor meant that the PSC was not the one leading, moreover, it also meant accepting the role of small actor in the City Government. This choice was a big risk, since it could definitely place them at the eyes of the citizens as a secondary party and no longer as a mayoral alternative. Logically, that was a big step for a party that ruled uninterruptedly Barcelona for 32 years. However, entering in the City Government it also had important advantages. For the PSC being in the government meant being able to shape the future of the city and have more media coverage than they would receive in the opposition. Translated to the game, it means that in terms of preferences if C is higher than D the PSC would accept the offer otherwise it would reject it. The final outcome was that after the offer of BeC the PSC entered into the government as its leaders and members¹⁶¹ considered that there were more pros than cons.

The possibility to make some appointments affected the type of relationship between BeC and the PSC, as it is possible to see in figure 28. On the one hand, if the PSC accepts the offer of some government positions, both actors are going to share the City Government and the decisions. However, despite of the existence

¹⁶¹ Once negotiated the agreement, the decision was voted for the members of the PSC.

of a signed pact they are aware that in some issues they will disagree. Thus, the stage is an “alliance”. It is important to point out that the PSC wants to keep its own political profile and for that reason the party would not accept closer stages as for example “permeation”. That is also why it is so important for the parties the collaboration agreement, to keep a balance between functioning as a single government meanwhile both actors keep their own individuality for the voters. On the other hand, if the PSC does not accept the offer or BeC does not offer to the PSC, the type of relationship would be “independence”. The situation would be the one of two actors with a similar concept of city and similar ideology, being potential allies for policies in the City Council votes, but without concerning about possible electoral consequences for the other actor. Each pact or agreement would have to be negotiate individually and would be to reflect the ideas of both actors to be approved as BeC minority government is not able to pass policies by its own. However, it is likely that the collaboration will transform towards a more adversary positions when the new election call is closer.

Figure 28. Outcomes of the public appointments game.



Therefore, the analysis has highlighted the fact that the possibility to offer political positions to other actors is an element with the capacity to shape the relationship between political parties and social movements. Without this possibility the only possible collaboration between the PSC and BeC would be

the one of sporadic agreements, as the stage of “alliance” just appears when it is possible to offer offices.

6.10 Summary.

This chapter presented the elements extracted from the narrative of the cases of Milan and Barcelona, which could potentially influence the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. Once made some general assumptions, the elements were analysed to know more about their role in the interaction between the actors. The ideology, the figure of the candidate, the capacity of influence in the elaboration of public policies, the electoral system, the capacity of making public appointments, and the existence of trust among the actors, are the elements that in a different way and in a different moments have shown to be able to alter the type of relationship studied in this dissertation.

Conclusions.

In the study of the interaction between political parties and social movements, this dissertation used an approach that, although not frequent in the academia, has proven to be systematic and useful for the purposes of this research. It is thanks to analytic narratives and its combination of tools, that it has been possible to highlight the existence of several elements that have a direct influence over the type of relationship that is established between political parties and social movements. This method allowed not just to recap systematically what happened in real situations, but also to display the potential alternative outcomes of situations in which the actors involved modified their choices. Furthermore, the analysis of those elements provided worthwhile information about their influence on the types of relationship and to better understand why political parties and social movements have certain behaviour towards each other.

The core intention of this work was to reach a better understanding of nowadays politics through a better knowledge of the interaction that involves political parties and social movements. To do that, this research focused on the elements that are capable to produce different configurations of the relationship between those actors. Thus, the investigation started with the aim to answer the question: *How do certain elements affect the type of relationship between political parties and social movements?* Taking an enlarging the classification of types of relationships between political parties and social movements proposed by Michael Hanagan (1998), and through the analysis conducted after the deep study of two cases, it has been possible to prove the existence of a series of elements that play an important role in the delimitation of the type of the relationship between those two actors. Elements such as the ideology of the actors, the figure of the candidate, the capacity of influence in the elaboration of public policies, the electoral system, the capacity of making public appointments, and the existence or not of trust among the actors, have shown to be crucial at the time to end up with one type of relationship or another.

The existence of a compatible ideology between political parties and social movements or not, is an element that despite not shaping the type of the relationship, conditions it. Thus, ideology allows collaboration between the actors in some cases while in others it prevents it. On the one hand, when the actors have contrary ideologies, -leftist and rightist for reasons of simplification- the only possible type of relationship between them is “opposition”. That is, they recognize themselves as adversaries and they will fight for the defeat of each other’s ideals. On the other hand, when the actors have an ideology that is compatible, that means not contrary, a door to collaboration opens. The final type of relationship between the actors will, though, depend of other elements. Hence, ideology shows to be an element that does not determine the way in which the interaction between parties and movements will be, however, is still a crucial element, as without the right configuration no collaboration is possible.

The choice of the person who has to lead a political project can produce hard confrontations within political parties until the point of dividing or destroying them. Its relevance, however, does not end there, as it also influences the external relations of the parties. Thus, the specific person who holds the candidacy of a project is an element capable of producing alterations in the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. The person leading a candidature is a key figure for the political project since he or she holds a position with a great capacity for decision, which will increase if finally elected. Hence the group that is able to appoint the candidate it considers appropriate, ensures that its project will be defended or at least taken into consideration. Therefore, the choice of a particular person can be an incentive for a closer collaboration when he or she is accepted, or for a more distant type of collaboration when the person is not considered valid. If the candidate is considered as not completely aligned with the political ideas of the group, it is possible that discontent produces a reaction that ends in the creation of a new political project, placing the actors in the type of relationship known as “competition”. Instead, if the candidate is seen as the right choice for all parties, this can produce such a big desire of collaboration between the actors that they

may end up being situated in the type of relationship called “permeation”, where actors completely identify with each other. Additionally, as seen in the analysis, the various middle degrees of consensus around the person who holds the position can produce intermediate stages of relationship between the actors, that is, “alliance” and “independence”.

The capacity of deciding which public policies should be implemented is a common object of desire for any political actor, playing a significant role in political agreements. Thus, this influence in the elaboration of policies is revealed, apart from being a bargaining target, as an element able to alter the pacts between actors, and also to influence the type of relationship between them. In particular, for social movements this capacity is highly valued since altering public policies is the natural way to have their demands satisfied. Social movements' requests are based on particular changes about an issue; therefore, public policies are one of the best ways to alter the status quo for them. Being this element so important for social movements, if they can influence policies it is more probable that the movements are interested in a closer relationship with those political parties that can provide them with such impact. Meanwhile, if their policy demands are ignored, they will have much less interest to collaborate. The most common situation in which policies' arrangement between political parties and social movements takes place, is when the party asks for the electoral endorsement of the movement in exchange for approving some of the movement's demands after the elections. Thus, the support of the social movement is not in exchange of an instant profit, but on the basis of the promise of forthcoming actions. With this, social movements are investing in future benefits, despite the risk of being ignored by the political party when it achieves a decisional position. Additionally, social movements have to deal with the fact that due to the very nature of political parties, they have a better knowledge about institutional politics than movements. This privileged position of the parties implies a bigger familiarity with the institutions' insides, such as its limits or its particular terms. These insights can be invoked by political parties to devalue the initial pacts, transforming the terms of the relationship in a more convenient way for party's interests. Consequently, this situation is a perfect

example of opportunistic behaviour by political parties based on a situation of information asymmetry regarding the social movements. To reduce this opportunistic behaviour some mechanisms can be implemented so social movements feel more willing to have a closer collaboration. The extent of influence on policies and the belief of the fulfilment of the agreements will determine the type of relationship that will be established between the actors. As seen in the analytical part, this type can vary from “permeation”, when the actors are integrated in the same project, until “competition”, when the influence on the elaboration of public policies is considered as inadequate by some of the actors.

The specific way in which norms regulate an issue has a big impact on actors’ behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that the analysis performed showed that institutional constraints affect the type of relationship between political parties and social movements. In particular, among all possible institutional limitations, the specific configuration of the electoral system has shown to be an element that can foster the collaboration between actors or obstruct it. Although not envisaged by the legislature at the moment of producing the electoral norms, the particular configuration of them influences the type of relationship existing between political parties and social movements. For instance, in the two cases studied, the analysis revealed that with respect to single-round electoral systems, two-round electoral systems create additional periods of negotiation between actors with diverse characteristics at each stage. Once forces are confronted in the first round, the second round allows new pacts based on the results of the first round. This expands the possible types of relationship between the actors. While in one-round elections, where the types can be “permeation” when the actors form part of the same project or “competition” when they are electoral adversaries, in two-round elections the type of “independence” is also a possibility, as the actors can reach agreements in exchange of endorsements. That way both actors can be mutually benefited, without being part of the same project. However, the number of rounds of the elections is not the only feature of the electoral systems affecting the relationship between political parties and social movements. The specific regulation of the electoral lists has also proven to affect the type of this interaction. For instance,

when it is possible to have more than one list linked to the same mayoral candidate, new dynamics appear among the actors that would not exist under other regulations. When linked lists are an option for the actors, the potential number of types of relationship grows. Since it is possible to have a different kind of commitment with a project beyond being fully in or fully out, the relationships between the actors have more nuances. Thus, thanks to this increase in options, it is possible to observe collaboration that otherwise would not exist. For example, some actors are not willing to assume a complete identification with particular actors as a one-list system would demand, but are open to have a less demanding collaboration if the electoral regulation allows it. Hence, other than in electoral systems with not linked lists where we only find the types “permeation” when the actors join together and “competition” when they do it in other lists, with linked lists it is possible to also include the type “alliance” in the electoral systems.

In this work we have seen the way in which trust acts to shape the relationship between political parties and social movements at the time of reaching agreements in the cities of Milan and Barcelona. Thus, confidence in the counterparts is crucial to reach agreements in situations where one party does not automatically receive the benefits of their interaction, otherwise the collaboration risks to not exist. Moreover, when the mechanisms that assured the fulfilling of the promises are little or inexistent, the presence of trust between the actors became even more necessary since it is the only thing that makes the pacts possible. Without trust in a relation, actors are afraid to do their part while other actors do not do their own. However, when there is trust among actors, they are able to forego immediate benefits since they are convinced that the other party will fulfil its promises at the right time. With trust, parties are not afraid of opportunistic behaviour from other parties and are open to search for a higher common benefit that it is just possible when all parties work together. Therefore, with such an impact on interactions, trust is another element capable of affecting the type of relationship that exists between political parties and social movements. Being a mutable element, in opposition to institutional constraints that tend to be stable through time, trust can be present in a

relationship in various ways. One of the most usual is the knowledge about the other party's previous behaviour. Whether in the same situation or in others, the fulfilling of promises by one actor creates a reputation and an expectation about its future decisions. This kind of repeated game generates the belief that if an actor has fulfilled its promises in the past, it will do it again. Thus, if an actor displays an opportunistic behaviour, this will complicate any future pact, as he will be seen as an unreliable player. This kind of player, does not just make possible future deals with other actors more difficult, additionally he will have to offer much higher benefits and guarantees of compliance for any agreement. However, trust can also be present in other ways. For instance, when a relationship starts from scratch, in which knowledge about the actor's past behaviour is not possible, the result risks not being optimal for the parties, since they do not know if the other party is trustful in their promises and, consequently, they are less willing to risk. Knowing this, some mechanisms to reduce parties' aversion to pact with unknown actors can be implemented. Tools like ethical codes, as seen in the analytical part, can facilitate the rapprochement between the parties. These instruments create a feeling of certainty about which behaviour to expect from the rest of the actors. Consequently, actors are more open to collaborate despite lacking previous information about which type of actor they pact with. Thus, when trust is present in a relationship between political parties and social movements, closer levels of collaboration are possible, affecting the types of relationship than can be observed.

The final element analysed as capable of influencing the type of relationship established between political parties and social movements, is the capacity of making public appointments. Similar to the influence on the elaboration of public policies, public positions are crucial in any political bargain, due to the influence that is linked to them. When there is the possibility to make public appointments the actors are more open to collaborate, as there is a clear benefit in exchange of support. However, meanwhile the analysis has been able to show that the influence on policies is especially appreciated by social movements, occupying public offices is highly valued by political parties. Although no actors relinquish any kind of influence, due to their own nature political parties tend to be more

office-seeking actors than social movements. Consequently, when there is a possibility to distribute positions, actors are more open to establish some kind of collaboration with those actors that can provide these positions. Without the presence of this element, a more limited range of options exists for the type of relationship found between the actors. Thus, while without the possibility to make appointments it is possible to find ad hoc collaborations between the actors, defined as the type “independence”, in scenarios where appointments are possible, a closer collaboration type, such as “alliance”, is possible.

This dissertation is a small and initial attempt to connect two fields, those dedicated to the study of political parties and social movements. These two political players have received a lot of individualized attention from the academia, but the interaction between them has been a secondary issue for the scholars. This work is an attempt to reduce the lack of knowledge about this matter. However, despite the effort dedicated here, there is still a lot more to study about this interaction. For instance, the elements highlighted to be relevant for shaping the type of relationship between the actors are probably not the only elements that play a relevant role. The fact that the studied elements have arisen from two particular cases, suggests that more elements could appear from the study of other cases. Consequently, future research should seek to delimit exhaustively which are the elements that are relevant in the interaction between political parties and social movements. Some elements that deserve to be studied due to their potential to influence the type of relationship established between those actors are: electoral campaigns, the double membership and personal connections of the individuals that belong to the organizations, the possibility of victory in the elections, the assumption that it is not possible to retain the government after the elections, and the expectation of close results. Additionally, it is important to study the interaction under other institutional constrictions apart from the ones studied here. Hence, other features of the electoral systems, such as the existence of a high or low threshold, limitations on the lists (open, closed, blocked, unblocked...), or rules about the kind of actors that can run in the elections, deserve a further enquiry to discover more ways in which the electoral system is able to affect the type of interaction between the

actors of this work. However, all these elements and their impact are not necessarily exclusive for the interaction between political parties and social movements. They also can have a role to play in the relationship between other political actors, especially when there are agreements between them. Deciding who holds the position of the central figure of a project, the existence of information asymmetry between the parties and how to solve it, or bargaining with policies and offices are elements that affect several kinds of negotiations. Exploring further configurations of actors would be an expansion of the method used in this study and this deserves to be taken into consideration.

The analysis in Chapter Six of this dissertation studies the influence of each of the elements on the type of relationship between political parties and social movements individually. A logical step forward in the research would be to analyse the joint influence of these elements. This would allow to measure in each case which element has more weight to define the final type of relationship. However, this task is not easy, since apart from the complexity of measuring the influence of each element, there are elements that act in more than one way. These elements influence the relationship directly but also indirectly, by also affecting other elements that have influence over the relationship. For instance, the electoral system influences the interaction, but at the same time it influences the profile of the candidate, another element with influencing capacity. The fact that some institutional constrictions can affect the existence of trust among the actors involved, can be relevant in this context too.

Once the crucial elements are analysed, the examination of the events through the eyes of path dependency might additionally provide useful information. Path dependency allows contemplating circumstances that affect the type of relationship between political parties and social movements that are hard to include in game theory models. Furthermore, the presence or absence of some elements is not the only relevant factor to consider, but also the sequence when these elements deploy their effectiveness. The exact moment in which each element acts is important since it conditions the following acts of the rest of the elements. This shows that with the same elements there is more than a single

potential equilibrium depending on the sequence of events. Thus, in situations where despite the presence of the same elements, the final outcome is different, path dependency helps to discover the reasons that cause this difference.

This dissertation is a preliminary study on the matter, and the use of quantitative tools to confirm what is suggested here should be considered. The possibility of codifying the conditions under which some strategies happen would allow creating a database of cases in which an interaction between political parties and social movements took place. This would permit to establish hypotheses to verify the various models presented in this work, as well as analysing the way in which the variables interact.

In conclusion, it is necessary to use different approaches and tools to study the interaction between political parties and social movements. We still have to learn much more about this matter, and we need to look for the answers to several questions that are still waiting to be formulated. Analytic narrative is a way of facing the study of this phenomenon from a novel point of view. This methodology furnished us with knowledge that we previously lacked. However, as consequence of this originality, this work is not exempt from failures or from simplifications of certain aspects of reality. Nevertheless, this dissertation provides answers about the importance of certain elements in the relationship between parties and movements, as well as establishing insights into the potential outcomes of interaction when the actors involved change their choices. Finally, this work shows that the type of relationship existing between political parties and social movements is not arbitrary, but is conditioned by a series of elements that shape the relationship to be one type or another.

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Annex I

List of interviewed people in Milan.

- **Ambrosoli, Umberto.** Interviewed the 7-06-2016. Candidate to the Lombardy Regional Government for a coalition of centre-left parties and civic movements in the elections of 2013. Former head of the centre-left coalition in the Parliament of Lombardy. Honorary president of the social movement “Giorgio Ambrosoli”.
- **Bassetti, Piero.** Interviewed the 5-07-2016. First president of Lombardy. Member of the Parliament in the VII and VIII legislatures. President of the Italian Union of Chamber of Commerce. Mayoral candidate in the elections of 1993. Member of the City Council of Milan during the time of Giuliano Pisapia as mayor. Founder of the association Rotary in Milan, former member of National Council for Economics and Labour, president of Assoconsulenza and the Giannino Bassetti Foundation, and impeller of several organizations linked to the social tissue of Milan and Italy.
- **Bussolati, Pietro.** Interviewed the 6-07-2016. Secretary of the Partito Democratico Metropolitano of Milan (head of the party).
- **Comincini, Eugenio.** Interviewed the 28-06-2016. Mayor of the city of Cernusco sul Naviglio (Metropolitan city of Milan). Member of the national board of the PD. Former deputy metropolitan mayor.
- **Dalla Chiesa, Fernando.** Interviewed the 13-06-2016. Full professor of sociology at the University of Milan. Mayoral candidate in Milan in the elections of 1993. Honorary president of the social movement “Libera” which is dedicated to fight against the organized crime. Member of the Parliament in the XI and XIII legislatures and Senator of the Italian Republic in the XV legislature. Undersecretary of State for University and Research 2006-08. Former member of the national board of the PD.
- **Lerner, Gad Eitan.** Interviewed the 9-06-2016. Journalist, writer and television anchorman. Founder of the PD and former member of various

national organs of the PD. Linked to the candidacies of Giuliano Pisapia first and Francesca Balzani later.

- **Limonta, Paolo.** Interviewed the 24-06-2016. Founder and one of the leaders of the Movimento Arancione. Member of the City Council of Milan. Head of the list “Sinistra X Milano” linked to the mayoral candidacy of Giuseppe Sala at the local elections. Founder of the movement for the defence of the quality of the public education. One of the closet aides of Giuliano Pisapia. Head of the Relations Office with the City of Milan under Pisapia. Coordinator of Pispia’s electoral campaign. Member of several leftist social movements.
- **Majorino, Pierfrancesco.** Interviewed the 30-06-2016. Member of the City Government of Milan with Giuliano Pisapia and Giuseppe Sala. Head of the list of PD at the local elections. Candidate on the primary elections to chose the centre-left mayoral candidate. Former leader of the PD group in the City Council.

Annex II

List of interviewed people in Barcelona.

- **Andrés, Carmen.** Interviewed the 17-05-2017. Member of Barcelona's City Government in two terms –one under a PSC mayor and now under the leading of Ada Colau- and Barcelona's City Council for three consecutive terms. Speaker of the PSC group in the Barcelona City Council. Founder of a social movement dedicated to impulse the education in southern countries INTI. Activist of Amnesty International.
- **Bertomeu, Marc.** Interviewed the 14-02-2017. Leader of Podem Barcelona at the time of the talks for the creation of Barcelona en Comú. Member of the negotiations team for the creation of Barcelona en Comú. Former political adviser in the Catalan Parliament for “Catalunya Sí que es Pot” former Catalan brand of BeC.
- **Cid, David.** Interviewed the 2-02-2017. Co-head of ICV. Former co-leader of ICV of Barcelona at the time of the talks for the creation of Barcelona en Comú. Member of the negotiations team for the creation of Barcelona en Comú. Activist of several social movements like “Plataforma Aturem la Guerra” or “Unitat contra el Racisme i el Feixisme”.
- **Colomé, Gabriel.** Interviewed the 18-05-2017. Full professor of political science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He specializes in research on political campaigns and interest of citizens in politics. Former president of the PSC group in the Barcelona City Council. Former speaker of the PSC group in the Barcelona City Council. Former director of the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinio the public Catalan social research institute. Former director of the Rafael Campalans Foundation, think tank linked to the PSC. Founder of the Asociación de Comunicación Política (ACOP), international association dedicated to join together professionals and scholars of the political communication. Campaign manager of the PSC in the national elections of 2016. Invited in the International Visiting

Program by the State Department to follow the USA presidential elections since 1988.

- **Gomà, Ricard.** Interviewed the 9-02-2017. Full professor of political science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He specializes in research on social policies, local governments, citizen participation and social movements. Former leader of ICV list for the local elections. Former head of ICV in Barcelona's City Council. Former member of the City Government of Barcelona for two terms. Former member of the City Council for three terms. Activist of several social movements like the anti-nuclear movement, and anti-war movement. Former president of the Nous Horitzons Foundation, think tank dedicated to research about the leftist ideology. Member of the national board of ICV.
- **Martín, Lucía.** Interviewed the 28-01-2017. Member of the Parliament. Member of the group which founded the PAH. Former activist of the PAH.
- **Sanz, Janet.** Interviewed the 25-01-2017. Fifth deputy mayor of Barcelona. Member of Barcelona's City Government. Member of Barcelona's City Council for two terms. Activist of the youth and feminist movements among others.
- **Segovia, Susanna.** Interviewed the 15-03-2017. Speaker of Barcelona en Comú. Specialist in citizen political participation. Activist of several social movements like the fight for indigenes rights or urban organizations. Member of the national board of BeC.

Annex III

Script interviews Milan.

Area 1: l'esperienza milanese, continuità, discontinuità, evoluzione dalla candidatura di Pisapia a quella di Sala.

1. Un breve ritratto dell'esperienza milanese che ha portato all'elezione di Pisapia: singolarità del movimento arancione. Come inizia? Per che?
2. Che cosa è cambiato dal 2010 al 2016 nel rapporto fra partiti e movimenti civici?
3. Come vede la campagna 2016? Differenze con quella di Pisapia. Più individualizzata sul candidato o più corale?
4. Dove sono gli arancioni adesso?

Area 2: ruolo dei movimenti in politica

1. Che ci siano liste che non fanno parte di un partito, vuole dire che c'è gente interessata in politica ma che non si sente rappresentata per l'offerta dei partiti esistenti. Per che? Per che si creano i movimenti e le liste non partitiste?
2. Pensa che i movimenti sociali abbiano più connessioni con la società civile che i partiti politici? Per che? Come?
3. Sono oggi i movimenti sociali o civili la "voce" del popolo?
4. Allora, per che s'incontrano i movimenti con i candidati? Qual è lo scopo finale di questo?

Area 3: gradi di lealtà/defezione rispetto al percorso delle primarie.

1. Come si è arrivati alle liste presentate alle elezioni comunali, passando per la fase delle primarie per il Sindaco.
2. Quanto pesa/ha pesato il fatto che il proprio candidato abbia perso/vinto le primarie e quindi sia o meno il candidato Sindaco dello schieramento
3. Sono le liste civiche un canale che usano le fazioni dissidenti? È la creazione di un movimento sociale uno di questi canali? Hanno i movimenti dei rapporti più stretti con qualcuna corrente del partito?

4. Pensano i movimenti civici, o sociale l'elezione come un primo passo per creare un partito?

Area 4: la dialettica fra partiti e liste civiche, lo spazio di rappresentanza esclusivo delle liste civiche.

1. Quanti settori/segmenti della società civile milanese si ritrovano compiutamente nelle liste civiche (la civica "arancione" dei sostenitori Balzani e la civica "del Sindaco") ... sono liste che rappresentano universi diversi/complementari ... s'integrano, competono o no sullo stesso segmento di elettorato ecc.
2. Qual è lo spazio che assegna ai partiti e alle liste di origine civica nel costruire il consenso attorno al candidato Sindaco?
3. [Per gli intervistati di espressione "società civile"]: come vedono l'evoluzione del rapporto fra partiti e liste ed esperienze civiche (conflittuale, cooperativo ecc.)
4. [Per gli intervistati di espressione "partitica"]: che ruolo assegnano alle liste ed esperienze civiche nella costruzione di una proposta politica di governo della città

Area 5: strategie di campagna elettorale, agenda setting, grado di influenza sulla campagna di partiti vs liste civiche.

1. Com'è la collaborazione per i temi a trattare in campagna. Come si fa a decidere di cosa parlare, quando e chi deve farlo.
2. Agenda setting della campagna elettorale: come si costruisce, con quale dialettica sullo sfondo... Come si definiscono gli slogan principali?
3. Quale rapporto esiste fra il candidato Sindaco e le liste rappresentative di diversi ambiti della società civile: in che misura la presenza di liste civiche compensa/integra la capacità del candidato Sindaco di raccogliere quel voto più fuori dai recinti di partito? Non può farlo da solo il candidato a Sindaco?
4. Su quali temi, key issues, questioni dell'agenda di governo per la città, messaggi e strategie di campagna elettorale, il contributo delle liste

civiche è più caratterizzante, e quindi non riconducibile all'offerta politica dei partiti dello schieramento.

5. Che cose possono fare in campagna elettorale i movimenti e i partiti no?

Area 6: aspetti organizzativi e logistico-strategici della campagna elettorale.

1. Chi segue per la lista/le liste civiche la campagna elettorale del candidato Sindaco? da quanto "vicino" o "lontano" segue quella campagna? C'è una cabina di regia comune con le liste civiche? C'era all'epoca della candidatura di Pisapia?
2. Quanto concorrono le liste civiche alla definizione dell'agenda degli appuntamenti di campagna elettorale del candidato Sindaco?
3. Satisfazione con la relazione (1-10).
4. Chi ha iniziato i contatti?
5. Ce stato un dibattito interno en relazione con gli incontro o la collaborazione fra candidatura/partito e movimenti? De che tipo? Positivo, Negativo, Neutro...

Annex IV

Script interviews Barcelona.

Área 1: la experiencia de Barcelona.

- El nacimiento del proyecto.
- Las partes implicadas.
- El contacto con las partes ¿cómo comienza? ¿Quién lleva la iniciativa? ¿Quién lleva el impulso del proyecto? ¿Cómo se negocian los candidatos?
- ¿Cómo se acuerdan los roles de las diferentes partes? ¿Por qué Ada Colau?
- El por qué del proyecto. Retrato de la experiencia del proyecto.

Área 2: el papel de los movimientos sociales en política.

- ¿Que exista un proyecto como el de Barcelona con gente del mundo social significa que la gente no se siente representada por los partidos?
- ¿Tienen los movimientos sociales más conexión con la sociedad civil?
- Entonces ¿por qué encontrarse movimientos y partidos para el proyecto?

Área 3: ¿Qué posibles salidas había en las negociaciones? ¿Cómo se aseguraba que todo el mundo cumpliera lo acordado?

- El proceso de primarias.
- Lealtad a un candidato externo.
- ¿Cómo ha sido el grado de compromiso de los miembros entre si y con el proyecto?
- Un nuevo partido como proyecto impulsado por movimientos sociales.

Área 4: distribución de roles. ¿Qué ha aportado cada parte al proyecto?

Estructura de la campaña.

Área 5: temas de agenda setting.

- ¿Cómo se decidían los temas de campaña? ¿quién debía decir qué, cuando y como?

- ¿Cómo era la relación entre la candidata y los grupos que formaban la coalición?

Área 6: estructura de la campaña electoral.

- Órganos de coordinamiento.
- Debate interno sobre la conveniencia del proyecto.

Questions just for the members of PSC:

- ¿Cómo se vio desde el PSC el proceso de creación de BeC? ¿Qué suponía para el sistema de los partidos de la ciudad? ¿Cómo estaba el PSC en ese momento? ¿Cuál era el proceso o la situación que vivía? ¿Era BeC una amenaza? ¿Qué suponía la inclusión de ICV? Y ¿el hecho de PAH y Ada?
- ¿Cuáles fueron las razones de la pérdida de apoyos del PSC? De ser claro dominador a 5 partido.
- ¿Cómo fue el proceso de voto para la alcaldía?
- El pacto de gobierno con BeC. ¿Por qué pactar con ellos? ¿Qué se buscaba? ¿Qué obtenían las partes?
- ¿Cuáles fueron los elementos que aseguraron el pacto? ¿Qué instrumentos se produjeron para asegurarse que el pacto se mantuviera por las partes?
- ¿Cuál es el rol de los movimientos sociales en política? ¿Y el de los partidos políticos?